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"The history of any institution is really the history 
of its people. The advances in aeronautics and 
space technology at Dryden were literally bought 
with blood, sweat and tears." 
e e e e e ~ e ~ e ~ e e e e ~ e ~ e e e o e e e e e e e e ~ e e ~ e e o e e o e ~ e e e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a * ~ e e ~ ~ ~ ~  
fluid dynamics-often developed elsewhere- thereof, the solving of practical problems. 
are absolutely critical ingredients in the process It's clear that Dryden owes its heritage 
of aeronautical discovery. In this book, Lane to Walt, who died peacefully at his home in 
Wallace has captured very effectively many of Tarzana, California, on 7 October 1995. To 
the ways in which Dryden has cooperated with him, for example, we owe our emphasis on 
its partners over the past half-century to ad- research instrumentation, on getting the data we 
vance the process of aeronautical discovery that need; on safety and quality assurance; on 
has so often begun with Dryden's partners. careful flight planning by a small, integrated, 
An important part of the Dryden spirit and highly competent team. We also got from 
was bequeathed by its first Director, Walter C. him our willingness to tackle the most difficult 
Williams. He joined the National Advisory and seemingly impossible tasks. The project 
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) in August structure we use today was really invented in 
of 1940. During World War 11, he was a project these early years. 
engineer in the evaluation of several fighter History records all of the technical 
aircraft-the P-47, P-5 1, and F6F-looking at accomplishments in terms of Mach number, 
handling qualities, low- and high-speed flight altitude, maneuverability, orbits, and the like. 
characteristics. As a member of Hartley A. For these alone, Walt will be remembered and 
SoulC's stability and control branch at Langley honored. But historians will never capture in 
Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory, he was one words the zeal and zest that Walt put into his 
of the NACA's foremost research airplane life and work. This same spirit lives on today at 
advocates. He led the first NACA team at NASA Dryden. The history of any institution is 
Muroc and became the first Director of what really the history of its people. The advances in 
was to become DFRC aeronautics and space technology at Dryden 
He had tremendous experience in the were literally bought with blood, sweat and 
flight testing of high-performance aircraft. As tears. I therefore dedicate this book to the 
Dick Hallion noted in On the Frontier, Walt Dryden Team that has given so much to accom- 
"was an inquisitive, take-charge sort of engi- plish the flight research mission for 50 years, 
neer, a man who believed that useful research 
had to confront actual problems and not be 17 April 1996 Kenneth J. Szalai 
limited to studying theoretical aspects of aero- Director 
nautical science." This outlook continues to be Dryden Flight Research Center 
the basis of our work here at Dryden-the study 
of aeronautical phenomena and the applications 
-- --- - - -  

Joshua trees in desert at 
sunrise 
ess than 100 miles north of the bustling international city of Los 
Angeles lies a barren, windswept landscape known as the Mojave Desert. It is an 
unfriendly environment known for blazing summer temperatures and bone-chilling 
winter winds, a place once described by then-Colonel Henry H. "Hap" Arnold as 
"not good for anything but rattlesnakes and homed toads."' 
Yet for all of its desolation, the desert also contains unique gifts. It offers 
unending days of piercing blue skies; dawns and sunsets that dust its rocky mountain 
sides with breathtaking hues of color. And while its arid landscape and dry lakebeds 
support little vegetation, for the past half century they have provided an ideal envi- 
ronment for pilots, researchers and engineers to test and explore new concepts in 
flight. 
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It was above this stark expanse of land 
that the notorious "sound barrier" was finally 
broken; that innumerable speed and altitude 
records were set and quickly surpassed; that the 
first Space Shuttle proved it could land safely 
without power. It was here that the X-15 taught 
researchers valuable lessons about hypersonics 
and space; that the first fully digital fly-by-wire 
aircraft was flown; and that a pilot successfully 
landed a transport aircraft using only t h s t  for 
engine control. 
Over half a century, this desolate loca- 
tion has allowed innumerable technologies to be 
explored, improved upon, and given enough 
credibility for industry to accept and apply 
them. And what began as a small, temporary 
detachment to support a single research project 
has evolved into a substantial National Aero- X-1 with crew: left to right, 
nautics and Space Administration (NASA) Eddie Edwards; Bud Rogers, 
Dick Payne, crew chiefi 
facility known today as the Hugh L. Dryden Henry Gaskins 
Flight Research Center. (NASA photo 
E-49-00039) 
There are three things that made the 
Mojave Desert so well suited for flight research. 
The first was the area's flying conditions, which 
included clear skies and 50 or 100 miles of 
visibility almost every day of the year. The 
second was Rogers Dry Lake-a 44-square- 
mile natural landing site that General Albert 
Boyd referred to as "God's gift to the Air 
Force."2 The third factor was that the lakebed 
was surrounded by miles and miles of virtually 
uninhabited desert, providing a buffer zone 
where rocket and jet aircraft could be operated 
safely and with far fewer restrictions than a 
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more populated area would require. research efforts the NACA had undertaken to 
The Army's initial interest in the area expand the country's knowledge and under- 
around Rogers Dry Lake was as a bombing and standing of aeronautics. Established in 191 5, 
gunnery range in the years preceding World the NACA's mission was to "supervise and 
War 11, and a formal army air base was estab- direct the scientific study of the problems of 
lished near the town of Muroc in July 1942.3 flight, with a view to their practical solestion."5 
But it was the The committee 
Although the NACA and the advent of jet 
Air Force would continue 
until June of 1948 "neither engines and higher 
[to] confirm nor deny " speed aircraft that 
the story of Capt. Charles 
"chuckM Yeager's breaking highlighted the real 
the sound barrier on 14 strengths of the 
October 1947, the Los 
Anpeles Times was one of a desert location. The 
number of publications that new experimental 
reported the story in late 
December. Apart from the jet aircraft, starting 
facts that Yeager had with the Bell XP- 
exceeded the speed of sound 
in the XS-I, the reporting 59A, required 
was rife with so-called longer runways 
'jcacts" that were nothing 
more than sheer speculation. than most air bases 
Nearly two Years would had, and the classi- 
elapse, for example, before 
the XS-1 came close to the fied nature of the 
70,000feet the research required a 
reported as already reached. 
The Times also reported that remote site for 
NACA research pilots flight testing. ~h~ 
Howard Lilly and Herbert 
Hoover had already "dupli- Muroc Army 
cated Yeager's feat. " In Airfield, officials fact, Hoover became the 
NACA 'sfirst supersonic realized, was the 
pilot nearly three months perfect choice for 
afler the article appeared, in 
earlv March 1948. followed this kind of work. 
by Lilly about three weeks 
later. 
(Air Force Photo) 
These same reasons led the Army Air 
Forces, Bell Aircraft, and the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) to choose 
Muroc as the test site when they undertook the 
challenge of designing and building a research 
aircraft to break the notorious "sound barrier." 
In the fall of 1946, the first NACA contingent 
of 13 engineers, instrument technicians, and 
support staff arrived at the Muroc Army Air- 
was to help the 
fledgling aero- 
nautics industry 
by conducting 
research that 
manufacturers 
could not, either 
because the work 
was too expen- 
sive, long-range, 
or required 
facilities industry 
lacked. 
By 1946, 
the NACA had 
already made 
numerous contri- 
butions to aero- 
nautics. But the 
coming of the 
high-speed jet 
age at the close 
of World W x  II 
brought new 
challenges. Ground facilities did not exist that 
could adequately simulate the dynamics of the 
transonic environment, which included speeds 
above Mach 0.85 but below Mach 1.2. The first 
slotted-throat transonic wind tunnel, which 
provided much better data at speeds approach- 
ing and surpassing the speed of sound, was not 
developed until 1950.6 A large part of the 
rationale for building the X-1 was because at 
field to support the X-1 effort.4 that time there was no other way to gather 
The X-1 project was just one of many reliable information about transonic flight. 
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The Role of Flight Research 
It was not only the lack of ground 
facilities that provided the justification for 
exploring ideas in flight, however. The impor- 
tance of trying out new concepts and designs in 
flyable aircraft was understood even by Wilbur 
Wright, who in 1901 argued that "if you are 
looking for perfect safety you will do well to sit 
on a fence and watch the birds, but if you really 
wish to learn you must mount a machine and 
become acquainted with its tricks by actual 
tria1.997 
The NACA shared Wright's belief, and 
flight research has always played a critical role 
in the work of both the NACA and its successor 
agency, NASA. By the rnid-1960s, ground 
facilities were much more capable than they had 
been in the days of Wilbur Wright or the X-1, 
but NASA administrator James E. Webb still 
considered flight research a critical activity. In 
1967 he testified before Congress that 
Flight testing of new 
concepts, designs, and systems is 
fundamental to aeronautics. 
Laboratory data alone, and 
theories based on these data, 
cannot give all the important 
answers. . . . Each time a new 
aircraft flies, a "moment of 
truth"' arrives for the designer as 
he discovers whether a group of 
individually satisfactory ele- 
ments add together to make a 
satisfactory whole or whether 
their unexpected interactions 
result in a major deficiency. 
Flight research plays the essen- 
tial role in assuring 
that all the elements of 
an aircraft can be 
integrated into a 
satisfactory system.8 
That argument still 
holds true today. No matter 
how sophisticated laboratory 
technology becomes, comput- 
ers can only simulate what is 
known. The unknown is 
always, in a sense, unpredict- 
able. A computer can extrapo- 
late what should happen as a 
logical extension of what has 
happened up to that point, but 
the outcome cannot be as- 
sured until it is tested in 
realistic conditions. Flight 
research is where that testing 
occurs. It is that unique point 
where the rubber meets the 
road, where the aircraft, 
human, and real-life flight 
conditions come together for 
the first time. And because 
flight research explores that 
ragged edge between the 
known and the unknown, it is 
a place where discovery 
happens. 
"'I &<- 
Aerial of NASA facility and 
desert beyond as of 1992 Discovery is that moment of divergence (NASA Photo EC92 10204) 
where something other than what was expected 
occurs. Indeed, researchers say a discovery is 
marked less often by a shout of "Eureka!" than 
by a perplexed murmur of "That's odd. . . ." 
And for all the improvements in ground and 
laboratory facilities, there has yet to be a flight 
research project conducted at Dryden that did 
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not have at least one such moment.9 Some- 
times, the discovery shows only that the compu- 
tational codes used to predict the performance 
of the aircraft need to be adjusted. Other times 
it turns the research in an entirely different 
direction, opening up a whole new set of ques- 
tions from those envisioned at the start of the 
project. 
In either case, it is these discoveries that 
slowly expand our understanding of the world 
of aeronautics. And it is the pursuit of these 
discoveries that differentiates flight research 
from the closely related discipline of flight test. 
The Air Force Flight Test Center 
(AFFTC) is situated just a short hike down the 
flightline from the Dryden Flight Research 
Center at what is now Edwards Air Force Base. 
The flightlines of both centers display an 
impressive array of high performance aircraft 
and, to a casual observer, there might seem little 
difference in the work the two facilities do. 
Both centers employ highly skilled pilots who 
fly new and experimental aircraft configurations 
to precise test points. In both cases, data from 
those maneuvers is collected by various types of 
instrumentation and recorded or sent back to the 
ground, where it is processed by engineers, 
technicians and analysts. 
The difference between flight test and 
flight research lies not in the mechanics of each 
operation, but in the questions that drive the 
work and how unexpected discoveries are 
viewed. In flight test, the objective is to com- 
pare the airplane's performance against set 
specifications it is supposed to meet. The idea is 
not to explore new realms of aeronautical 
knowledge, but simply to make sure that a new 
aircraft design or configuration performs in an 
acceptable manner. Unless the anomaly is 
better-than-predicted performance, unexpected 
results in a flight test program indicate prob- 
lems that need to be fixed. The information 
gained through flight test is also directed toward 
a specific customer with regard to a specific 
product. 
Flight research, on the other hand, 
gathers information that can be used by a much 
wider audience for a wide variety of applica- 
tions. In addition, flight research involves 
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NB-52A (tail number 003) 
making a pass over one of 
the X-15s following a 
lakebed landing. One of 
only three B-52As produced, 
003 was one of a pair of 
highly modified 
Stratofortresses-the other 
being NB-52B number 008- 
that were used to launch X- 
15s at speeds of 600 miles 
per hour and at altitudes of 
up to 45,000 feet. Scenes 
such as this typically took 
place 20 minutes or more 
afer the X-15 had touched 
down, because the NB-52 
returnedfiom a launch point 
200 to 300 miles northeast of 
Edwards. (NASA Photo 
EC610034) 
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Group airplane photo, 
X-24B, F-15 Remotely 
Piloted Vehicle, F-I 11 
Transonic Aircraft 
Technology, F-8 Digital 
Fly-By- Wire, F-104s, 
T-38, PA-30, Jetstar, 
Aerocommander, R-4D 
(Gooney Bird), F-I I I 
Integrated Propulsion 
Control System, and the 
small remotely-piloted 
research vehicles 
in the foreground 
(6 May 1974). 
(NASA Photo ECN 4029) 
regions."lO 
The problems have also become more 
complex. In 1946, researchers were simply 
trying to see if it was possible for an aircraft to 
surpass the speed of sound. Today, the goals are 
broader. We want not just supersonic aircraft, 
but efficient, environment-sensitive supersonic 
aircraft, or highly maneuverable supersonic 
aircraft. So despite all the advances in aeronau- 
tics, flight research is still operating at the 
cutting edge of knowledge. 
Even elements that are understood 
individually may interact in an unexpected 
manner when they are brought together in a 
realistic flight environment. This is especially 
true for any aircraft that requires a human pilot. 
Time after time, for example, computerized 
flight control systems for aircraft have been 
tested successfully in simulators, only to exhibit 
different tendencies in actual flight. One reason 
for this is that simulators rely on predicted data 
to model a new aircraft or system's perfor- 
mance. But another cause is the simple fact that 
pilots react differently in simulators, where 
even the worst mistake will cause them only 
embarrassment, than in an aircraft where the 
stakes are very real and very high. Yet if the 
end goal of aeronautical research is to improve 
A Place fir Discovery Page 7 
1 products. A Furthermore, 
the design of practical, flyable aircraft, it is 
essential to explore those reactions and discover 
potential problems with configurations or 
technology. 
Indeed, another important function of 
flight research is that it forces researchers to 
focus on those particular problems that are truly 
critical to developing usable technology. Many 
interesting questions can arise in the course of 
laboratory and ground research. But putting a 
piece of technology on a flyable aircraft quickly 
differentiates those questions that are low- 
priority curiosities from those that suggest 
critical issues to address. Furthermore, a prob- 
lem identified as critical cannot simply be put 
aside to be studied later. It has to be solved. 
In part because so many operational 
problems have to be addressed and solved 
before a concept can be tried on an aircraft, 
flight research can also play an important role 
in winning industry's acceptance for new 
technology. Technology that has been explored 
in flight is generally more mature than concepts 
investigated only in laboratory or simulator 
settings, leaving a smaller gap for industry to 
bridge in order to incorporate it into commercial 
Page 8 
there is a measure of 
credibility that can be 
achieved, almost 
instantaneously, from 
a successful demon- 
stration of a technol- 
ogy on an actual 
aircraft in realistic 
7 flight conditions. As 
a former vice presi- 
dent of engineering at 
the Boeing Commer- 
cial Airplane Company argued, "laboratory 
development has great appeal and usually gets 
substantial government support. However. . . 
the attainment of credibility is [also] an impor- 
tant national issue. It is dwing this second phase 
that a technical concept achieves a state of 
readiness, validation and credibility such that 
private industry and financing can assume the 
attendant risks."ll 
In some cases, laboratory research is 
sufficient for industry to see the benefits of a 
concept and invest in it. But especially as 
technology becomes more complex and expen- 
sive, making a commitment to a new technol- 
ogy is an increasingly difficult and risky gamble 
for industry to make. An idea that has been 
proven successful in realistic flight conditions is 
much more convincing, because while it might 
still be uneconomical or impractical, industry 
decision-makers at least know it can work. 
Giving aerospace manufacturers the 
confidence to invest in new technology can, in 
turn, increase their global competitiveness. This 
has important implications, because aerospace 
is one of the few remaining fields in which the 
United States still has a trade surplus. If the 
Flights of Discovery 
Above left: SR-71 
crew members with aircraf. 
(NASA Photo 
EC91056.Fr 16) 
SR-71B Mach 3 trainer country is to improve its balance of trade and 
at sunset. overall economy, the aerospace industry must 
(NASA Photo remain competitive. EC95 43351 -1) 
Supporting National 
Priorities 
research conducted at Dryden12 over the past 
half century has played an important role in 
furthering the country's priorities, whatever 
they were. 
In the post-World War I1 era and the 
Cold War of the 1950s, the drive was to de- 
velop aircraft that could go higher and faster, 
Of course, global competitiveness has exploiting speed and power to maintain superi- 
not always been the driving national concern ority over Soviet aircraft and defense systems. 
that it has become in recent years. But the flight Dryden's work reflected this theme with its X- 
A Place far Discovery Page 9 
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planes and its efforts to improve a variety of systems of aircraft. Dryden's focus shifted with Robert McCall's famous 
military jet aircraft designs. After the launch of the nation's, leading to projects such as the mural entitled The S~irit of Flight 
Sputnik in 1957, the space race also became a Supercritical Wing and winglets, which made Research depicts the 
aircra>flown during high national priority, culminating in the Apollo aircraft more aerodynamically efficient, and to Dryden Flight Research 
effort throughout the 1960s. At Dryden, those the world's first purely digital fly-by-wire Center'sfirst 30 years. 
priorities were paralleled by its X-15 and McCall completed the airplane, which opened a whole new realm of painting the the 
lifting bodies research, as well as efforts such as efficient and capable aircraft design. renaming of the Center in 
the Paresev and the Lunar Landing Research The country's need for higher perfor- honor of Hugh Latimer Dryden. 
Vehicles. mance aircraft continued into the 1980s, leading (NASA Photo EC96 
Another national priority in the 1960s to research at Dryden that focused on under- 4341 6-3) 
was the development of a civil Supersonic standing the dynamics associated with more 
Transport (SST). This goal spawned a number maneuverable and capable configurations. The 
of high-speed research projects at Dryden, X-29, the HiMAT, the FIA-18 High Alpha 
including work with the Mach 3 XB-70 and Research Vehicle (HARV) and the X-3 1 re- 
YF-12 aircraft. But environmental concerns, an search planes all reflected this priority in one 
economic recession and a burgeoning fuel crisis way or another. 
in the 1970s shifted the country's priorities to Interestingly enough, the 1990s have 
improving the fuel efficiency and internal brought a renewed national interest in higher 
-- - 
- a 
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Key to Aircraft 
A. YF-12: Predecessor to the SR-71, on a modified F-8 from 1971 -73. 
flew at Dryden in a high speed Concept now used on many transport 
research program from 1969-79. and fighter aircraft. 
0. XF-92: First delta-wing aircraft 
flew at Dryden from 1951 -1 953. 
P. D-558-1: D-588-1 Skystreak was 
flown from 1947-53 in a program to 
investigate safety of flight at transonic 
speeds. 
B. 74710rbiter Enterprise: 
747 shuttle carrier aircraft carried 
Enterprise, prototype orbiter, aloft 
during 1977 approach and landing 
tests at Dryden. 
I. X-1: The X-1 became the first 
aircraft to fly faster than sound on 
October 14, 1947. Pilot was then- 
Captain Charles E. Yeager, one of 
the several project pilots assigned to 
the joint NACNArmy Air Corps 
project. History of Dryden dates to 
1946 and the X-1 project. 
Q. M2-F2: First heavyweight lifting 
body was the M2-F2, flown from 
1966-67. Damaged in a landing 
accident and rebuilt as M2-F3 with a 
third vertical tail and flown from 1970- 
72. Now displayed at the 
Smithsonian National Air and Space 
Museum. 
C. XB-70: flown from 1967-69 in a 
high speed research program. 
D. X-15: Rocket-powered research 
aircraft flew 199 missions from 1959 
to 1968. The X-15 still holds the 
world's absolute speed (4520 mph) 
and altitude (345,200 ft) records for 
winged aircraft. 
J. HL-10: Fastest and highest flying 
of the five lifting body designs flown 
at Dryden form 1966-75. Research 
aided space shuttle program. HL-10 
now displayed at Dryden entrance. R. X-3: Dubbed the Flying Stiletto, 
X-3 flew from 1952-55 to gather data 
on supersonic flight and use of 
titanium and stainless steel in aircraft 
construction. 
K. X-4: Semi-tailless vehicle flown 
from 1948-54 in studies of stability 
and control at transonic speeds. 
E. B-52: Pictured carrying the X-15, 
NASA's B-52 air launch aircraft, 
NASA 008 has been used since the 
late 1950s to air launch a variety of 
piloted and unpiloted vehicles. 
L. X-5: First aircraft capable of 
sweeping wings in flight, flew from 
1950-54. 
S. PARESEV: Between 1962-64 the 
PARESEV 1 A vehicle (paraglider 
research vehicle) studied wing 
configurations as possible methods of 
returning vehicles through the 
atmosphere from space. 
F. 8-50: A modified B-50, and an 
earlier B-29, were used to air drop 
research and experimental aircraft in 
the 1940s and 1950s. 
M. HH-53: HH-53 aerial recovery 
helicopter carries NASA's 
F-15 318 scale remotely-piloted 
research vehicle used in stall-spin 
research program. 
T. X-24B: Last of the lifting bodies, 
the X-24B flew from 1973-75 in a 
program aiding in development of the 
space shuttle. It was developed from 
the X-24A airframe. 
G. D-558-2: The D-588-2 Skyrocket, 
dropped from the B-50 launch 
aircraft, flew from 1948-56 to investi- 
gate the swept-wing configuration at 
supersonic speeds. First aircraft to 
fly twice the speed of sound. 
N. LLRV: Lunar Landing Research 
Vehicle, flown in mid -1 960s, devel- 
oped control system used on the 
Apollo lunar module to land astro- 
nauts on the moon's surface and on 
the Apollo astronauts' training 
vehicle. 
H. F-8SCW: Supercritical wing 
research was carried out at Dryden 
A Place for Discovery Page 1 I 
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Shuttle mate/demate facility 
with Space Shuttle 
Endeavour in it. Endeavour 
had just completed itsJirst 
flight (STS-49) from 7 May 
1992 to I6 May 1992, when 
this photo was taken. 
(NASA Photo 
EC92 05169-1) 
and/or faster aircraft-but with a twist. The 
impetus for high flying aircraft is fueled largely 
by the need to gather information on the Earth's 
atmosphere, and that avenue of research is 
focusing primarily on small, remotely piloted 
vehicles. NASA's initiative for a High Speed 
Civil Transport (HSCT) differs significantly 
from the 1960s goal of a Supersonic Transport 
in that it now must be economical and environ- 
mentally sensitive as well as fast. Not surpris- 
ingly, therefore, the work Dryden is conducting 
to support NASA's High Speed Research 
program is loolung not just at speed, but at 
technologies such as achieving supersonic 
laminar flow and mapping the parameters of 
sonic booms. A national concern with making 
access to space more economical is also driving 
Dryden's current research into reusable launch 
vehicles such as the X-33. 
Not all of the research conducted at 
Dryden fits neatly into these chronological 
national themes. Efficiency, for example, is an 
important issue in any aircraft design and has 
always been a concern for aerodynamicists 
working on furthering the basic research and 
technology knowledge base. Layered on top of 
those basic research efforts, however, are more 
focused research programs such as the X- 15, 
the Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACEE) pro- 
gram, or the Space Shuttle, which are more 
closely tied to shifts in national concerns. And 
on this level, there have always been inescap- 
able parallels between the focus of Dryden's 
research and the nation's technological and 
economic priorities. This is hardly surprising, of 
course, given that NACAINASA has always 
been funded by the national government. 
Congress is unlikely to approve funding for 
research that is totally irrelevant to national 
concerns. Yet it is not just funding that drives 
the type of research Dryden performs. 
The managers and researchers at the 
Dryden Flight Research Center understand that 
their mission is not only to advance their own 
ideas but also to provide support to other NASA 
centers, government agencies, the military, 
industry and, in the end, the American public. 
Consequently, only perhaps 50 percent of the 
work the Center does is "exploratory" research 
stemming from long-term objectives developed 
with its various research partners. The other 
half of its work comes from requests by other 
centers, government agencies, the military, or 
industry for help on other programs or efforts. 
Programs on stall-spin characteristics of small 
airplanes, tests of an experimental anti-misting 
fuel, and research on shuttle thermal tiles and 
tires are just a few of the many such projects 
Dryden has undertaken over the years. 
Dryden Contributions 
Yet whether the research was initiated 
by Dryden, industry, or by another center or 
agency, the work conducted by the Center and 
its research partners over the past 50 years has 
made some very important contributions to the 
aerospace efforts of both government and 
industry. In some cases, the impact of the 
research has been clear and direct. The flight 
experience with the X-15 and the lifting bodies, 
for example, provided the space program with 
critical information about the use of reaction 
controls and gave the designers of the Space 
Shuttle the confidence to have it land without 
power. Research with the X-3 led to the identi- 
fication of both the cause and a cure for a lethal 
inertial roll coupling problem that had plagued 
the F-100 jet fighter and other aircraft of the 
1950s. The Supercritical Wing has been applied 
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to numerous aircraft, including all new large 
commercial transports and the AV-8B Harrier, 
and winglets tested at Dryden have been used 
on many corporate jets as well as on the Boeing 
747-400 and McDonnell Douglas MD-11 
airliners. 
After a potentially dangerous pilot- 
induced oscillation (PIO) was discovered in the 
final pre-launch landing test of the first Space 
Shuttle, Dryden engineers were able to design a 
suppression filter that fixed the problem without 
forcing a redesign of the Shuttle's entire flight 
control system. Research into a Digital Elec- 
tronic Engine Control (DEEC) system with a 
Pratt & Whitney FlOO turbofan engine resulted 
in a DEEC system being incorporated into the 
company's production model engines. A prob- 
lem with compressor stalls in an upper comer of 
the FlOO's operating envelope was also suc- 
cessfully analyzed and solved as a result of the 
research. 
In other cases, the Center's research has 
advanced technology or understanding in areas 
that have yet to be applied. The X-29, for 
example, demonstrated the feasibility of a 
composite, forward-swept-wing design. There 
is currently no production aircraft that incorpo- 
rates this particular technology, but that does 
not mean that there won't be one some time in 
the future. The variable-camber, supercritical, 
variable-sweep wing Dryden investigated on an 
F- 11 1 proved the validity of the technology, 
although it has yet to be used. Dryden research- 
ers, in partnership with industry, also developed 
an integrated, computerized flight and engine 
control system that allowed a NASA pilot to 
successfully land both an F- 15 fighter jet and an 
MD-11 transport airliner using only throttle 
controls. This technology is too recent a devel- 
opment to have spurred any commercial appli- 
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cations yet, but several tragic airline accidents 
have been caused by partial or complete loss of 
hydraulic power that rendered the flight con- 
trols useless. Since a propulsion control system 
could help prevent this kind of accident, it 
might be incorporated into airliners before too 
long. l3 
Harder to trace, but no less important, 
are the less direct contributions made by re- 
search conducted at Dryden. There are many 
instances where, although the technology was 
not applied directly, the Center's research 
expanded the knowledge base of aeronautical 
engineers or changed people's thinking on what 
was possible. In addition to the direct technol- 
ogy that was developed and transferred to 
industry through the Digital Fly-By-Wire 
program, for example, the research created an 
important element of confidence in the basic 
concept. The fact that Dryden research pilots 
had flown the fly-by-wire research aircraft 
without any mechanical back-up controls was a 
factor in determining how decision-makers' 
viewed the technology's reliability. That, in 
turn, led to the design of pure digital fly-by- 
wire systems for the F- 16 C/D and the FIA- 18 
Hornet fighters, and eventually the Boeing 777 
airliner. 14 
By the same token, Dryden's structural 
flutter research with a Remotely Piloted Vehicle 
(RPV) led to improved real-time flutter analysis 
algorithms for designers to use. The FIA- 18 
HARV is exploring actual airflow dynamics at 
extremely high angles of attack in order to 
make the formulas used to predict this flow 
more accurate. This information, in tum, can 
allow engineers to design aircraft that will 
perform better in that flight regime. And a 
series of mathematical procedures developed by 
Dryden researchers to extract previously unob- 
Flights of Discovery 
Joshbin free with cow and 
unidenrqied person 
(NASA Photo 
B96 43403-5) 
tainable aerodynamic values from actual aircraft 
responses in flight, a process known as pararn- 
eter identification, has become an international 
standard. This definitive contribution allowed 
flight researchers for the first time to compare 
certain flight results with predictions. 
In short, the contributions Dryden has 
made over its 50-year history have been as 
varied as the aircraft its pilots have flown. 
Sometimes the 
versus reach."l5 To take too small a step is to 
discover nothing new. To take one too large is 
to invite catastrophe. And the burden of con- 
stantly walking the thin line between those two 
extremes is one that every researcher at Dryden 
carries. 
Walt Williams, head of the small NACA 
contingent that arrived at Muroc to support the 
X-l program, recalled that the engineers "devel- 
oped a very lonely 
For no matter how well engineers and 
The road to discovery is not an easy one. analysts try to anticipate every possible problem 
In order to make contributions to technology or and reaction, physical exploration of the un- 
to our understanding of aeronautics and aero- known is never without risk. There is always a 
space, research has to be working on the cutting moment when someone has to make the deci- 
edge of knowledge. There is a constant tension sion that "enough has been done and it is time 
in flight research that is characterized as "risk to go fly, knowing that if a mistake has been 
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made, someone can die. Yet it is the willingness 
of people to step into that lonely abyss of the 
unknown-whether it was Lewis and Clark 
exploring the western wilderness, Wilbur and 
Orville Wright launching the first powered 
aircraft, Charles Lindbergh setting off across 
the Atlantic, or Captain Charles "Chuck" 
Yeager pushing the X-1 through the speed of 
sound-that has allowed progress to occur. 
"We do these things," President John F. 
Kennedy said in his famous 1961 space chal- 
lenge, "not because they are easy, but because 
they are hard."l7 For 50 years, the Dryden 
Flight Research Center has been a place where 
"hard problems have been welcomed. It is a 
place where people are encouraged to question 
and look for the unexpected, where it is under- 
stood that the answers exist and the challenge is 
to find them. 
Hugh L. Dryden, the former NACA 
director of research for whom the NASA flight 
research center is named, once said that flight 
research separates "the real from the imag- 
ined."'* His statement is true in more ways than 
one. In many cases, flight is that critical ele- 
ment in the interdependent disciplines of labo- 
ratory, wind tunnel and simulator research that 
finally turns an idea into hard, tangible reality. 
In every case, however, it forces researchers to 
go beyond imagined difficulties and grapple 
with those very real, critical problems that will 
make or break a technology or design.19 
It is an effort not without risks or cost. 
Out of the original "X-series" and Douglas D- 
558 research airplanes, for example, four 
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exploded while still attached to the launch 
aircraft, one crashed in a stall-spin accident, one 
came apart in rnid-air, and one crashed after a 
catastrophic engine failure on take-off. Over the 
years, no fewer than nine aircraft have been lost 
and a number of pilots and crew members have 
given up their lives in the course of flight 
research projects associated with Dryden.20 But 
the research conducted at the Center has also 
resulted in innumerable advances that have 
saved lives, led to the design of better and more 
capable aircraft, and expanded our understand- 
ing of the world and the atmosphere that sur- 
rounds it. 
The Mojave Desert may be windy and 
desolate but, in retrospect, it is far from barren. 
For 50 years, its open spaces have contributed 
and been witness to the birth of discoveries that 
have repeatedly revolutionized the art and 
science of aeronautical design. 
Cradled in the midst of that desert 
world, the Dryden Flight Research Center has 
grown from a small, temporary detachment to 
the premier flight research center in the country. 
And while Dryden has undergone a number of 
changes over the past half century, one thing 
has never varied. No matter what its size or 
research focus, the Center has always been a 
unique place where people work at the cutting 
edge of knowledge, where theoretical principle 
and real life come together, where discovery 
happens and where the imagined becomes real. 
Flights of Discovery 
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Aerial view of Muroc Army 
Airjield, 10 October 1946, 
just ten days after Walt 
Williams and his small team 
had arrived and one day 
before the XS-I (later 
redesignated the X-1) test 
program got underway with 
Bell test pilot Chalmers 
"Slick" Goodlin's first glide 
flight in the experimental 
rocket plane. The village of 
Muroc appears near the top- 
left corner of this photo with 
the tracks of the Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad 
extending eastward across 
Rogers Dry Lake. (They 
would continue to bisect the 
lakebed until they were 
removed in late 1953.) The 
XS-I fueling area and 
loading pit were located at 
the corner of the far west 
(left) end of the 
flightline, and a giant 
Northrop XB-35 Flying Wing 
prototype bomber may be 
seen taxiing across from the 
West Main Hangar. 
Williams' NACA team shared 
space, next door, in the East 
Main Hangar. Two smaller 
hangars are visible in a 
recessed area to the right of 
the main hangars. The one 
on the far right would be 
transferred to Williams' 
Muroc Flight Test Unit in 
April of 1948 and it would 
serve as "home" for NACA 
flight research operations for 
the next six years. 
(Air Force Photo) 
little more than a tent encampment. Barracks, a 
control tower, a concrete runway and a sewage 
system had been added in 1943, but the condi- 
tions were still appallingly rough. 
For work space, the NACA personnel 
were given part of one of two main hangars at 
South Base, and two small rooms for offices. 
The hangars were unheated and the desert sand 
and dirt blew through them constantly, creating 
an ongoing problem for technicians working 
with delicate instrumentation. Engineers would 
frequently have to sweep a layer of dirt off their 
desks in the morning before starting work. 
Flight test equipment was also rudimentary, 
especially by today's standards. The "control 
room" tor the X-1 flights, for example, con- 
sisted of a small, mobile van with a radar 
antenna on top of it and a radio in the office of 
the Chief of Operations.4 
Living quarters for the NACA employ- 
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oblematic. Initially, th 
ineers lived in a small, 
ases. The cluster of firetrap 
alled visitor from t 
is impracticable be- 
miles away from the Muroc Army Airfield. As 
a result, Walt Williams, the head of the NACA 
contingent, was able to obtain permission for 
the married NACA personnel to move into the 
former base housing there. The single NACA 
Page 22 Flights of Discoveyl 
on a complete series of X-planes fro 
There were not many women who came to the X-5, all of which would be flo 
out to work at Muroc, but those who did ful- Muroc. Consequently, the NACA conti 
filled an important role in the research program. was made a permanent facility, still un 
A couple of them served as secretarylclerks, but Langley management, known as the N 
in those pre-automation days, someone with a Muroc Flight Test Unit. 
strong mathematics background had to take the In 1949, Muroc was renamed E 
raw data from flight instrumentation and con- Air Force Base, in memory of Captai 
vert it into a format the engineers could process. Edwards, an Air Force test pilot who 
The women who did that were known, even killed in the crash of a YB-49 Flying Wi 
then, as "computers," and they were a respected That same year, the name of the NACA facility 
and essential part of the research team. was changed to the NACA High Speed Flight 
Interestingly enough, both the women Research Station (HSFRS), underscoring the 
and men who worked at the Muroc station emphasis of the work the group was conduct- 
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ing. Yet it remained a division of Langley until 
1954, when it was redesignated the NACA 
High Speed Flight Station (HSFS) and made an 
autonomous facility reporting directly to NACA 
headquarters. That same year, the Station's 
employees, who now numbered 250, moved 
into new facilities halfway between the South 
and North Bases. Those facilities have been 
expanded since that time, but they are still in 
use today.6 
To many people who worked at the 
HSFS, the 1950s were their golden years. Jet 
noise, rocket sounds, and sonic booms shattered 
the desert air throughout the day, and NACA's 
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"stable" was filled with exotic X-planes and Left. NACA Mur.oc unit sia8 
barbecue, 1949 
new configuration fighters. Speed and altitude (NASA P I ~ O ~ O  ~ 4 9  00236) 
records were being set on a regular basis, and 
there was a tremendous public fascination with 
the activities at Edwards that grew as the X- 
planes reached higher and higher altitudes and 
speeds. The Station's fame, prestige and prior- 
ity status at the NACA probably reached its 
peak with the X-15 program, which made its 
first flight in 1959, just after the NACA became 
the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis- 
tration (NASA) and the space race began. That 
same year, NASA renamed the Edwards station 
once again, redesignating it as the NASA Flight 
Flights of Discovey 
Research Center (FRC). Kennedy. 
ofi ts  tow azrcraft, a 
Stearwlarz biplane, on 
lakehed: Milt TIzoinpson 
ated in Paresev and, to his 
right, a motorcycle with 
driver who served ns the 
chase observer &iring l@ 
ufcmd low-level$ights, 
(IVASA Photo E 5713) 
to keep the concept of a 
e alive, FRC engineers 
h of lifting body shapes and 
later contributed valuable 
pace Shuttle program, but 
iversally recognized at the 
X-15 program wound down 
e House Committee on 
autics recommended the 
t Research Center, as "no 
nd the X- 15 would require 
tion was proven wrong, but 
FRC Director Paul Bikle the 
fly back from space had been put on the back danger of having the Center dependent on a 
burner in favor of a simpler ballistic capsule single research project. In 1963, Bikle's staff 
design and, with the Mercury missions, more of compiled a 5-year plan for the Center that 
NASA's resources and the nation's focus turned outlined a number of projects the Center could 
toward the space centers of Johnson and pursue that would support both the space 
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program and the development of a Supersonic wing and winglet research, wingtip vortex 
Transport (SST). Fortunately, both of those analysis and a number of other research pro- 
programs were high national priorities in the grams. It was during this time that the Center 
late 1960s, and congressional funding for the was renamed once again, in honor of Hugh L. 
Center was kept intact.8 
The late 1960s and 
1970s, then, saw the 
Center diversifying into 
several different research 
areas-not only because 
Bikle wanted to develop a 
broader base of research, 
but also because the 
Center was receiving a 
growing number of exter- 
nal requests for joint 
research efforts. In addi- 
tion to lifting body and 
Lunar Module research to support the space Dryden, the internationally renowned aerody- 
program, the FRC conducted high-speed re- namicist who had been the NACA's Director in 
search with the XB-70A and the YF-12 super- the FRC's early days. On March 26, 1976, the 
sonic aircraft. At the same time, the Center Center became the Hugh L. Dryden Flight 
delved into digital fly-by-wire, supercritical Research Center. 
SR-71 being worked on at 
night on ramp. The aircraft 
was one of three SR-71s 
loaned to NASA by the Air 
Force for use as high-speed, 
high-altitude testbeds for 
research in such areas as 
aerodynamics, propulsion, 
structures, thermal 
protection materials, and 
instrumentation. Data from 
the SR-71 research program 
could aid designers of 
future supersonic/ 
hypersonic aircraft and 
propulsion systems. 
(NASA Photo EC92 3103-8) 
This painting by Stan Stokes 
of the X-15 rocket aircraft is 
part of the NASA Art 
Program. First flown in 
1959from the NASA High 
Speed Flight Station 
(renamed the NASA Flight 
Research Center that year 
and the Dryden Flight 
Research Center in 1976), 
the rocket-powered X-15 
was developed to provide 
data on aerodynamics, 
structures, reentry 
characteristics, heating, 
reaction and other flight 
controls, instrumentation, 
and the physiological 
aspects of high speed, high 
altitude flight. Three were 
built by North American 
Aviation for NASA, the Navy 
and the Air Force. They 
made a total of 199flights 
during a highly successful 
research program lasting 
almost ten years. Their 
speed and altitude records 
for winged aircraft 
remained unbroken until the 
Space Shuttle first returned 
from Earth orbit in 1981. 
(NASA Photo 
EC94 42909-1) 
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Despite its efforts to diversify, Dryden Arnes was actually one of several consolidation 
once again faced a challenge when the YF-12 moves NASA made in 1981 in an effort to 
program ended in 1979. The number of employ- conserve money and resources. Combining 
ees was scaled back, and the Center was forced Dryden and Ames, it was reasoned, would 
eliminate duplication of 
many administrative 
functions. Yet regardless 
of the reason, going from 
an autonomous facility to 
one that required Ames' 
approval for its activities 
was a difficult change for 
the independently-minded 
Dryden employees to 
accept. Part of the problem 
was that having to obtain 
approval from managers 
to reevaluate its future direcuon. Then, while it over 300 mres away, who often went months 
These wingless, lifhng-body 
aircraft sitting on Rogers 
Dry Lakebed are, from left 
to right, the X-24A, M2-F3, 
and HL-10. The lz@ng-body 
aircraft studied the 
feasibility of maneuvering 
and landing an aerodynamic 
craft designed for reentry 
from space. Launched by a 
B-52 mothership, the liftzng 
bodies flew, powered by 
their own rocket engines, 
before making an unpowered 
approach and landing. They 
helped validate the concept 
that a Space Shuttle could 
make safe, accurate, 
landings without power. 
(NASA Photo ECN 2359) 
was still in the process of redefining itself for without ever seeing the people they were 
the needs of the 1980s and beyond, the Center supervising, slowed down the speed with which 
was hit with another rough adjustment. Its projects could proceed. The Ames directors did 
attempt to maintain the 
i flexible and exploratory communication style that managers and employees at Dryden had developed over the years, and they The No. 2 X-29 technolo) demonstrator aircraft, flown by NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center in a joint NASA-Air Force program to investigate the unique design's high angle-of- attack characteristics and its 
military utility. Angle of 
attack is the angle of an 
aircraft's body and wings 
relative to its actual flight 
path. This aircraft was 
flown at Dryden from May 
1989 until August 1992. 
[@ASA Photo EC90 0039-4) 
I remained strong supporters 
I of the flight research Dryden was conducting. I But it was sometimes I difficult for off-site man- agers to understand the 
need or importance of 
some of Dryden's activi- 
status as an independent NASA center was ties or requests, and both communication and 
taken away, and it was redesignated as a Flight management relations were hampered by the 
Research Facility under the administration of 300 mile distance between the two facilities. 
the Ames Research Center near San Francisco. Nevertheless, the merger was the way of 
Putting Dryden under the auspices of the world, at least for the time being, and the 
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work at Dryden continued. In fact, the 1980s toward independent operation, and in March 
saw the development of the first significant X- 1994, Dryden was officially redesignated as an 
plane since the X- 15. In 1984, the radical autonomous NASA Center.10 
forward-swept wing X-29 made its first flight. The move in part reflected NASA's 
And if speed was perhaps less of a driver than it recognition of the continuing importance of 
had been, especially in military aircraft design, flight research and the invaluable resources that 
there was a great deal still to be learned about Dryden's clear skies and open-desert surround- 
improving systems and making aircraft more ings provided. In fact, soon after Dryden was 
maneuverable and efficient. redesignated as a center, senior staff at NASA 
Dryden's work in the 1980s included the began investigating the idea of moving all of 
beginning of the High Alpha (Angle of Attack) the agency's aircraft and flight research activi- 
Research Vehicle (HARV) FIA-18 program, the ties to Dryden. 
Highly Integrated Digital Electronic Control But more than anything else, Dryden's 
(HIDEC) F-15 program, the Advanced Fighter shift back to the status of an autonomous center 
Technology Integration (AFTI) F-16 project, reflected NASA's recognition of the fact that 
and the AFTI F-111Nission Adaptive Wing bigger was not always better. Left on its own, 
(MAW) effort, as well as the Highly Maneuver- the small, sometimes irreverent center in the 
able Aircraft Technology (HiMAT) remotely desert could operate much like the innovative 
piloted vehicle research. The facility also broke and effective "Skunk Works" that Kelly 
ground in 1987 for a new $16.1 million Inte- Johnson had created for the Lockheed Corpora- 
grated Test Facility (ITF).g The new building tion in 1943. Dryden's particular mission, 
would include not only office 
space designed for working 
puterized aircraft; simulator 
even be connected to the act 
pits; and facilities for rapid ai 
check-out and troubleshootin 
Dryden would be better prep 
puter-driven information age, 
and on the ground. 
By 1990, NASA hea 
to the conclusion that Dryde 
Ames for all its decision-m 
more difficulties than it was 
number of administrative func 
egated back to Dryden. The head position of the tasks at hand, so employees got used to 
Dryden was upgraded from a "site manager" to being flexible and performing whatever job had 
a "director" level, reflecting the increase in to be done. The fact that it was small and not 
control over the facility's activities. Over the easily accessible also meant that it had to 
next four years, Dryden moved slowly back contend with less bureaucracy and politics than 
Page 28 Flights of Discoveiy 
of a mere two pages of policies. The rest of its 
five volumes are simply procedures that offer 
guidelines based on what has worked with 
previous Center projects. 
The structure of Dryden's operating 
manual reflects not only a reliance on a human 
corporate memory, but also a belief on the part 
of Center management in empowering its 
employees to simply "get the job done." If a 
problem arises at 8:00 at night and the airplane 
is scheduled to fly at 8:00 in the morning, the 
most important goal is to find a solution that 
works. In the minds of Dryden's managers, a 
thousand procedures cannot cover the myriad of 
contingencies encountered in flight research as 
well as the resourcefulness of employees chal- 
lenged and empowered to find creative solu- 
tions. 
This attitude also creates an environ- 
ment where innovation and experimentation are 
more likely to occur. The lifting body research, 
for example, started as a "backyard" project by 
several researchers who believed a craft could 
be flown back from space. Knowing it would be 
difficult to get approval for a formal program 
through accepted channels, they went about 
proving the concept themselves first, with a 
small amount of FRC money, a steel-tube-and- 
plywood wingless aircraft, and a souped up 
Pontiac tow vehicle. The success of their design 
led to a formal research program which, in turn, 
significantly influenced the design of the Space 
Shuttle. But without feeling that they had the 
freedom to innovate; to venture ever so slightly 
beyond the lines imposed by formal procedures 
and programs, the researchers who instigated 
the lifting body effort would never even have 
attempted the project. 
This kind of support for individual 
innovation at Dryden has endured over the 
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years. And NASA supports this kind of grass 
roots effort by including a small "director's 
discretionary fund" in centers' budgets to allow 
researchers to explore concepts that might be 
outside the scope of existing formal research 
programs, but which still might generate impor- 
tant results.12 
All of these elements-this individual 
empowerment, a freedom to innovate, a staff 
accustomed to being flexible and working on 
several projects at once, a long corporate 
memory, the informal management style al- 
lowed by the center's small size, and an ever- 
present focus on practical solutions-have 
created a unique atmosphere at Dryden that is 
particularly well suited for flight research. 
These same elements have also given the center 
a capability described as "technical agility," or 
the ability to adapt and adjust resources to meet 
constantly changing needs. It is this quality that 
has allowed Dryden to accommodate not only 
changing national research goals, but also the 
estimated 50 percent of its research projects 
that are requests for help from other sources.13 
The People 
Without question, the facilities them- 
selves and the Center's unique environment 
have played a big role in the contributions 
Dryden has made over the years. But another of 
the Center's most valuable resources has always 
been its people. 
From its very earliest days, it took a 
special kind of individual to work at the desert 
station. Even today, with all the growth that has 
come to the Palmdale and Lancaster communi- 
ties south of Edwards Air Force Base, a pro- 
spective employee is unlikely to choose Dryden 
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because of its location. For the past 50 years, 
I most of those who have come to work at the 
Center have done so for one reason: they love 
airplanes, and they want to do flight research 
badly enough that they are willing to live in the 
Mojave desert in order to do it. The advantage 
of this fact, of course, is that Dryden's employ- 
ees have always tended to be very dedicated to 
their work. 
The most visible of those employees 
- - 
have always been the pilots. They are the ones 
whose pictures appear next to the airplanes, the 
"Iron Men" of the rocket era who became 
heroes to millions of American children. One 
I reason pilots have always had such a high profile is simply that they perform the most visible piece of the many elements involved in any research project. For all the sketches, calculations, wiring, and measurements that are completed ahead of each flight, the pilots are the ones who actually climb into the hardware and take it up in the air. But by the same token, the flight crews are also the only members of the research team who actually risk their lives to gain new knowledge or understanding. Some features of NACA/NASA pilots 
have changed over the years. In the early days, 
I although Dryden research pilots had Bachelor 
of Science degrees, they were more likely to be 
"stick and ruddery7 men who knew more about 
flying than they did about systems and who 
taught themselves the observation and reporting 
skills necessary for flight test or flight research. 
Today, NASA research pilots typically possess 
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not only Bachelor of Science degrees, but also of the price sometimes exacted for progress in 
quite possibly Masters degrees, and have formal knowledge or aircraft designs. Pilots rarely talk 
test pilot school training or some equivalent 
experience. The few pilots hired in recent 
of danger or fear, but they do acknowledge risk. 
"Tf we're doing something new, then by its very 
historv at Drvden 
who had not already 
completed test pilot 
training were sent 
through the Air 
Force school at 
Edwards Air Force 
Base. As a result, 
current NASA pilots I 
tend to be more 
knowledgeable 
about systems and 
systems safety than C 
their predecessors I 
were. 
Yet many 
aspects of the 
research pilot's job 
have not changed. 
The job has always 
required excellent, 
almost faultless, 
I 
nature, we are stepping into arenas where we 
use all of these capabilities, all of these tools, to 
minimize the risks and maximize the chance of 
success, but there are still elements there that 
are unknown," says NASA research pilot 
Rogers Smith.14 
Thirty or forty years ago, the risks were 
higher because computer ground test and 
simulation technology was not nearly as ad- 
vanced. The X-15 pilots, for example, were 
exploring altitudes and speeds far beyond 
anything that was known. No amount of wind 
tunnel model testing could really predict what 
an actual aircraft would do at Mach 6 or 50 
flying skills. For researchers to get the data they 
needed, the pilots need to be extremely precise 
F-18 sittwluto~ wih4 Mafiha 
Evans, simulation group 
leader, at the controls 
in all of their maneuvers, because at the edges 
of an aircraft's performance envelope or at 
speeds of Mach 3 or Mach 6, there is little 
margin for error. In addition, no matter how 
they got their training, the pilots have to be able 
to observe and report the nuances and peculiari- 
ties of an aircraft's performance in clear, spe- 
cific terms. 
Being a research pilot also has always 
entailed a certain degree of risk. Street names at 
Edwards Air Force Base that memorialize pilots 
who didn't come back are a constant reminder 
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miles above the Earth's surface. Not surpris- uncurl his toes. Some of the maneuvers required 
ingly, the accident and pilot loss rate was also for test purposes would be more uncomfortable 
much higher thirty years ago than it is today. than most people could stand. A textbook 
Yet the risk is always there. Despite all the definition of an F-18 spin, for example, might 
advances in technology and simulation, an X-3 1 describe it as having "a medium yaw rate mode, 
oscilliatory in all three axes," with a note that "a 
post-stall gyration may occur." What this means 
for the research pilot, however, is that he will be 
thrown about as if he were inside a washing 
7 machine, and after he stops the spin, the aircraft 
is likely to snap upside down suddenly and 
hang motionless in the air.16 
I It takes a special kind of person to be both able and eager to take on these kinds of 
challenges. Certainly, many different types of 
pilots have climbed into Dryden's cockpits over 
the years, but they seem to share several impor- 
Close -LL~  of researchers in research plane was still lost in January 1995. 
control rooin for rlze F-15 
HIDEC.fliglzt researclz; John The pilot managed to eject safely, but he only 
Orme, (on right) and Gerard had approximately two 
- - 
Scl~kolnik (center) 
(NASA Plzoto seconds to identify that a 
EC93 42219-5) problem existed, gauge its 
severity, make a decision 
Electronics techiziciai~ Bill and punch out of the 
Clark rizakirzg a cannon plug 
aA Jirn Lewis looks on aircraft. 15 
(NASA Plzoto EC91 134-29) Even normal 
operating circumstances 
in research flying can be 
extremely challenging, 
both physically and men- 
tally. One of NASA's SR- 
7 1 pilots reported that he 
could tell how proficient 
he was in the Mach 3 
airplane by how long into 
the flight it took him to 
tant traits. Beyond simply being highly capable, 
confident, and observant, good research pilots 
possess a driving curiosity for new challenges 
and knowledge that could be described as 
"technical passion." They want to learn what is 
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beyond the limits of our current knowledge- 
badly enough that they are willing to take the 
calculated risks and discomfort the journey may 
entail. And while they all have undoubtedly had 
moments of anxiety or high tension, they focus 
on preparing well for each new challenge and 
handling any contingencies in a professional 
manner. As veteran research pilot William H. 
Dana said, "I've been scared a few times flying 
research missions, but my real fear was screw- 
ing up."17 
This fear of not measuring up reflects a 
pride in their profession that NASA's research 
pilots all seem to share. "The flying we do is a 
craft," explains pilot Ed Schneider. "Your 
hands, your brain, and your artistic talent 
literally are combined together . . . and, like the 
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guilds in the middle ages, we pass that knowl- 
edge down to new pilots."l* 
Yet despite the visibility of their posi- 
tion, the research pilots are very aware that they 
constitute only one element of the project team. 
A typical project will include research engi- 
neers, operations engineers, and a project 
manager, in addition to data systems engineers, 
technical and support staff. Research engineers 
work on designing the experiments and analyz- 
ing the results, while operations engineers make 
sure the modifications will not compromise the 
integrity or safety of the aircraft. The project 
manager is responsible for keeping the project 
on schedule and budget and coordinates the 
various efforts and work tasks. These three 
forces clearly have slightly different agendas, 
Flights of Discove~ 
F-104 nose instrumentation 
and technicians Keith Wright 
(holding flashlight) and 
Gaston Moore 
(NASA Photo EC91134-4) 1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Gold control room during 
F-1 Sflight. 
(NASA Photo 
I EC93 42219-Fr.2) 
I 
but they are designed to 
balance each other to keep 
research efforts both on track 
and safe. Indeed, staff mem- 
bers are so acutely aware of 
the red-life consequences of 
any mistakes that they tend to 
be very outspoken about their 
views. AS Dryden employees 
say, "there are no secrets in 
flight research," There cannot 
afford to be. And any project 
team member, from research 
engineer to the pilot himself, 
has the power to stop a fight if 
he or she feels them is a 
safety-of-fl;lg;ht issue left 
unresolved. 19 
In addition, Dryden is such a small 
facility that most employees can see, wifhin one 
or two steps, the direct impact of their efforts on 
a flyable &craft. This helps maintain t h ~  high 
morale and enthusiasm that, in turn? make the 
Center" "technical agility9' possible. Delaying 
an ongoing project to incorporate a new re- 
search effort can be htrating; yet it is the 
ability to reassign personnel according to need 
that allow Dryden to conduct such a wide 
range of research with its relatively small M. 
Seeing the tangible results of their efforts helps 
staff members cope with these kinds of b t s t a -  
tions. It also makes employees more aware of 
the fact that the efforts of many other people 
may hinge on successful completion of their 
particular task. Consequently, when a problm 
@curs that could stop a scheduled flight the 
next day, it is not unheard .of for researchers and 
technicians to work through the night to find a 
solution.2" 
The Partnerships 
Dryden" own employees are not the 
only people whose dedication has been essential 
to &e Center's contributions, however. Since 
the first group of engineers came to M m c  with 
Walt Williams to support the Armyme11 Air- 
craft/NACA X-1 effort, Dryden's research has 
been characterized by partnerships. Some were 
f&ly simple pairings, involving only Dryden 
and a single contractor, or Dryden and another 
NASA center, Others-such as the X- 1, X- 15 
and X-29 projects-have invdved one or more 
contractors, several NACALNASA centers, and 
one or more branches of the military. And the 
X-3 1 program involved not only U.S. contrac- 
tors, the W.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, the 
~dvanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) 
and NASA, but the German Air Force and a 
German contractor as well. 
In a sense, the type of work Dryde~ does 
requires partnerships. In many cases, Dryden 
has been the last stop on an idea's journey from 
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m. That idea project. On the X-1, for example, the Arrny Air 
ad different objectives. 
ed to proceed methodically 
h data as possible, while the 
forge ahead and conquer the 
s soon as possible.21 With the X- 
nd, the two organizations had 
oals, which helped the 
ership work more smoothly. In general, 
tnerships have seemed to work best when 
mmon objectives. If mem- 
at the program was moving 
r area of interest or expertise, 
ere more likely to occur. 
when there are common 
are still challenges to be 
rship to be successful. 
int efforts are not always 
anizations' procedures 
building. As a result, Dryden has always had and requirements do not always mesh. Success- 
ongoing partnerships and relationships with the ful partnerships, therefore, require skillful 
aircraft manufacturing industry. Furthermore, negotiation, cooperation, and team-building 
the fact that Dryden is located on Edwards Air efforts. Individual relationships are critical, and 
Force Base and uses Air Force facilities on a many partnerships evolve from a rocky begin- 
regular basis has required an ongoing partner- ning to a point where the members have devel- 
ship between the Center and the Air Force. oped enough of a rapport and trust among 
Although all of these relationships have themselves to develop procedures and ap- 
had their advantages and have allowed Dryden proaches that are agreeable to everyone. Team 
to accomplish the work it has over the past half cooperation is so important that, as one Dryden 
century, maintaining partnerships can be a manager said, "You draw up an organizational 
challenging task. NASA and the Air Force, for chart, but if you ever have to pull it out of the 
example, have not only different agendas and drawer and actually look at it, you're in 
missions but different operating cultures as trouble." With a partnership as complex as the 
well. Over the years, both the Air Force Flight X-3 1, some of the potential turf issues were 
Test Center and Dryden have learned a lot diffused by consciously downplaying all indi- 
about working together, but creating and main- vidual identities in favor of an "X-3 1 team" 
taining a smooth working relationship still identity. The partnership was also aided by the 
requires effort. fact that the new Integrated Test Facility (ITF) 
In some ways, the success of a partner- at Dryden could house all the different team 
ship depends on the dynamics of the particular members in the same place. That close proxim- 
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ity encouraged both individual interaction and and concerns of those who will actually apply 
informal problem solving, which helped the new technology. In addition, joint efforts help 
team overcome its significant organizational transfer new technology by strengthening 
challenges. 22 individual relationships between NASA and 
Clearly, successful partnerships require industry or military personnel and creating 
a lot of work. But they also offer benefits that champions for new concepts within organiza- 
Walter C. Williams Research 
Aircraft Integration Facility 
(formerly, Iiztegmted Test 
Facility) soon after the 
dedication of the facility to 
the fit-st director of what 
became the Dryderz Flight 
Research Center 
(NASA Photo 
EC96 43393-1) 
make the effort worthwhile. One obvious 
benefit is that partnerships can support projects 
that are beyond the capabilities of any one 
organization. But there are other advantages as 
well. Through some of its industry partnerships, 
for example, Dryden has found itself simulta- 
neously in the position of both teacher and 
student, learning about the practical applica- 
tions of technology as it shares its expertise in 
developing and testing new concepts. Partner- 
ships also give Dryden's researchers a real- 
world anchor and a "customer" orientation, 
helping them understand the needs, pressures, 
tions or companies. 
Furthermore, if budgets continue to 
decrease and pressures to "downsize" increase, 
partnerships will undoubtedly become even 
more common. In 1995, for example, the 
Dryden Flight Research Center and the Air 
Force Flight Test Center signed an Alliance 
agreement seeking to develop any and every 
opportunity to cooperate and share resources, 
from aircraft flight time and laboratory space to 
on-site child-care facilities.23 
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Conclusion 
The contributions the Dryden Flight 
Research Center has made to aeronautics and 
aerospace technology over the past half century 
have been the result of many people's efforts 
and many factors that have helped make those 
efforts possible. Since its origins as a small 
desert outpost of the Langley Laboratory, 
Dryden has been a unique place. Certainly its 
physical environment is unlike that at any other 
NASA center. But its desert location and 
single-minded mission have also attracted a 
certain type of person and encouraged the 
development of a particular management style 
well-suited to flight research. 
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Without question, the physical surround- 
ings at Dryden are very important for its flight 
research activities. But the most valuable assets 
at Dryden are not its open skies or even its 
aircraft, but its people. Without all the indi- 
vidual research team members, the pilots, and a 
set of pragmatically minded managers, and 
without the ideas and efforts of its many part- 
ners, no flight research would have occurred. It 
was the unique combination of these factors- 
the Center, its people, its particular manage- 
ment style, and its partnerships-that gave 
Dryden "the right stuff' to make its many 
contributions possible. 
Reprinting of an 1 
article from the 1 
Dryden newspaper, 
the X-Press, 1 
summarizing the 
lge of Hugh L. 1 
Dryden on the 
occasion of the 
renuming of the NASA 1 
Flight Research I 
Center in his honor 
on 26 March 1976. 
Flights of Discovwy 
Painting of Hugh L. Dryden, 
for whom the Dryden Flight 
Research Center was named, 
by Albert Murray 
of New York. 
(NASA Photo 
EC94 42724-1) 
I i.. , ,-.- , , I ,  
50 Years of Flight Research 
Dryden Flight Research Center ~ e d i c z o n  Ceremonies, March 26,1976 
This year we celebrate Dtyden's anniversary yca~: In Scientific Advisory Groq headed by Dr. Theodore von 
ncognition of rhis event, the X-Press will reurint historical Karman. 
amcies, f&res andphotos of evenrs in rhcpasr 50 years. 
Thefollowing is o nprinr of an anicle fmm the Mach Medal of Fmdom 
26. 1976 edi~wn of the X-Pms. commemoratin~ the occasion 
of the dedication & m i n *  of rhe NASA ~lz;hr ~esearch V0n Karman's group produced a scries of reports, titled 
.. 
Center in honor ofHugh 
Dryden, with slight 
comctions for accuracy. 
Hugh Latimer Dryden 
knew Orville Wright and he 
knew John Glenn. 
Dr. Dryden was born in 
Po~moke  City. Maryland. 
on July 2.1898. He was 
five years old when the 
Wrights titst flew off the 
dunes at Kill Devil Hill. 
Nonh Carolina. in 1903. 
Yean later be was fond of 
remarking, "the airplane and 
I grew up together." 
In 1907 the Dryden 
family moved to Baltimore 
when young Dryden saw 
his first airplane. He was 
fascinated by the birdlike 
silhouette of the craft, but he 
was not much impressed by 
its performance. 
In 1913, at the ageof 14, 
he graduated from Baltimore 
City College. which in that 
dav was a hieh school He 
collectively ~ h ; r e  We Stand, 
and Toward New Horizons. 
For his ccmibutions to these 
reports and by the direction 
of General Henry H. "Hap" 
Amold, C b f  of the U.S. 
Army AirForces, Dryden 
was awarded the Medal of 
Freedom. Years later, after 
many other awards had been 
received. Dryden remarked 
that he prized this award 
above all others. 
In 1946 Dryden 
became Assistant Director of 
the Bureau of Standards, and 
six months later he became 
the Bureau's Associate 
Director. Then in 1947 a 
new horizon of his own 
suddenly appeared. Dr. 
George W. Lewis. Director 
of Aeronautical Research of 
the NACA, was in failing 
health. and Dryden was 
asked to succeed him. In 
1949 he was named to the 
newly created post of 
DkckOr of the NACA 
wint to  oh& Hopkins HUGH L. DRYDEN -NASA Flight Reswch Centerphoto At the NACA 
University to receive his a9389 Dryden worked with others 
bachelor's degree in tbrtt to find a solution to what 
sears. which he took with honors in 1916. He went on to might be called "The Great National Wind Problem." 
realms of physics and mathematics his faith experienced no 
erosion; indeed it broadened and deepened over the years. 
He becam a licensed local preacher of the Methodist 
Church. 
While many snentists and philosophers have whined and 
cried about "conttadictiou" betwan science and religion. 
Dryden found no difficulty in achieving a durable synthesis 
of the two. And when he spoke on the subject his auditors 
wen inclined to agree with him. He realized that we live in 
an imperfect world populated by imperf@ct men; and 
although it might be impossible to achieve perfection in this 
world, it was incumbent upon everyone to strive for the best 
The honors, offices and a+ bestowed upon Dryden 
were great in their significance and in number. A sampling 
might include the Resident's Award for Distinguished 
Civilian Service, the Lanalev Gold Medal of the Smithsonian 
Instirution. the Daniel ~ui&nheim Medal, the Wright 
Brothers Memorial Trophy, the Elliot Cresson Medal of the 
Franklin Institute. the Rockefeller Public Service Award. the 
John Fritz Medal, and the Robert A. Goddard Memorial 
Trophy. He was honod  by election to honored foreign 
member status in the National Academics of France and 
Germany, and to the aeronautical sociuics of Great Britain 
and Canada His hcnorary degrees. awarded in the United 
States and ovenms. numbend 16. 
Layman of the Year 
In 1962 tbe Methodist Union named Dryden the 
Methodist Layman of the Year. It was a distinction that he 
cherished every bit as much as the many scientific pr im and 
awards and all of the honorary degnes that were bestowed 
upon him in his lifetime. 
Dryden was hospitalized in Octoberof 1961 for some 
weeks and exploratory surgery determined that he had an 
incurable malignancy. 
Before he entend the hospital for the M time, he kept 
busy with conferences, meetings, and leotures. Dryden 
conceded nothing to his illness. He packed each day with 
graduate school to receive his mastds degree in 1918. The %result was the Unitary Wind Tunnel P h  which saved more commiunents and accelmted his schedule. 
titL of his mastds thesis was Airplanes: An lnmducfion ro millions of dollars and millions of man-hours of duplicating At 7:46 p.m. of Thursday. Dec. 2. 1965 High L. Dryden 
the Pkysicnl Principles Embodied in Their Use. effoort was no longer of this world 
In June of 1918. Dryden joined the staff of the National Ill these same years he played a key role in guiding palicy Dryden's career was devoted to solving problems of 
Bureau of Standards as an inspector of gauges. W i t h e  and development of a g m t  series of high speed reswmh iurbulence - in the realm of aeronautics and in the affairs of 
encouragement of Dr. Joseph S. Ames. who at that time was airpla~es whicb culminated in the X-15, an aircraft that mea As far as many one man's influence can be feIL he was 
hcad of b e  Department of   by sics at Johns Hopkins, and a 
member of the newly created National Advisory Committee 
for Aeronautics (NACA), Dryden obtained a transfer to the 
Bureau's mmtly mated wind tunnel section. At the same 
time Dr. Ames manged to give advanced courses for a 
number of Hopldns graduate6. This allowed Dryden to 
complete bis doctoral rquhments while being employed 
full time. 
Youngest m. 
Dryden received his Ph.D. in physics and mathematics in 
the sprineof 1919. He wasonly 2Q~camoldandhemnains 
the &n&t student ever to have keived a%D. from 
Johns Hopkins. The title of his thesis was AirForces on 
Circular Cylinders; in it he described experiments on the 
drag and distribution of air flowing around cylinders 
perpendicular to the wind. 
It was also in Baltimore that Dyden m a  Mary Libbie 
Travus. On Jan. 29,192Q they were married 
In the same year Dryden became the head of the Bureau's 
Amdynamics section, and continued his researches on 
turbulence. 
In 1924, collaborating with Lyman J. Briggs, his mentor 
and Friend and later dinnor of the Bureau, he m a d m e  of 
the earliest scientific investigations of airfoil characteristics 
at flows up to the speed of sound - and even slightly beyond 
In a day when the fastest racing planes did well to fly at 280 
mph hydm was already probing the transonic range of 
suprsonic flight. 
Since 193 1 Dryden had been a member of the N A W s  
Commiuet on Aerodynamics. and in 1934 he became Chief 
of the Bureau of Standardsb Division of Mechanics and 
Sound. 
When the National Defense Research Committee and 
almost became a spacecraft by 
reaching the very limits of the 
Earth's atmosphere. As missiles 
pierced the atmosphere to hurtle 
out into space, Dryden pushed for 
solutions to the ctiticd mentry 
problem. 
On Oct 4,1957 the Soviet 
Union launched into orbit the 
world's first attitlcial Earth satellite, 
Sputnik I. 
Congress and the White House 
immediatels made plans of their 
own to compete wiib the Russians. 
These olans included the cleation of 
a civilian agency to conduct the 
exploration of space. The NACA 
was to be the nucleus of this new 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). 
NASA fonned 
T. Keith Glennan, president of 
the Case Institute of Technology 
was selected to be the new agency's 
Administrator. Glennan insisted 
that Dryden be NASA's Demtv 
~dm&trator. ~ogether they - 
worked through the new agency's 
most difficult years. 
Dryden brougbt with him to 
NASA not only tbc loyalty of the 
NACA employees, but also the high 
regard in which he was held through( 
inmdibly successful 
on both accounts. 
The legacy of 
Dryden is described 
here in one of his 
sumons: "None of 
us knows what the 
finaldestiny of many 
may be, or if then is 
any a d  to his 
capacity for gmwtb 
and adaptation. 
Wherever this vennue 
l&us.Iam 
convinced that the 
power to h v e  the 
earth - to travel whuc 
we wil l inspaced 
toretunlatwill- 
marks the opening of 
a brilliant new stage 
in man's evolution." 
Todsy's Events 
269 1976) 
Formal activities 
today will begin with 
a ceremony in the 
UNVEILING TBE BUST - During P Center dedication &'bration hangar. 
ceremony on Mnrdr 26,1976, Mrs. Hugh L. Drgden 
~ v f i c  win be 
unveils the bust of her bnsband wbieh is now in the Iobby pmvided by the 
oI Bl& 48W. NASA photo ECN 5137. Antelope Valley High 
School Symphonic 
,ut the aeronautical Band. under the direction of Mr. Joseph Acciani. 
I w r  the Omceof Seientitic Research and Development world. Among those addnssing the gathuing will be Cmtm 
(OSRD) wuc created in 194Q. Dryden took b e  of one of When the White House finally chose James E. Webb to Director Dr. David Scott. NASA Adminisuator Dr. James C. 
the O S W s  guided missile sections. He was spekfidy 
charged with the development d a  radar guided W i e  of 
aerodynamic characteristics, or a glide bomb. For his work 
on the B W  (glide bomb) he received the Presidential 
Ce~Mkpe of Mui t  
%den's work with OSRD marks his first experience in 
maoagmg a lagensearch and development project tium 
concept tohardware; and it marks the be-g of the end of 
his original, mativc scientific camrand the start of his 
adminismive camr. Concumntly with his work for the 
Burrau of Standards. OSRD and NACA, he was also the 
Deputy Dinctor, Scientific, of the U.S. Am~y Air Form 
become NASA's second Administrator, Webb replied that he 
would accwt the wsition onlv on the mudition that Drvden 
main as his depity. And sobryden remained until bis 
death in 1965. 
Methodist Minister 
A powerful factor in Dryden's life was his devotion to the 
Methodist Church. He originally wanted to become a 
minister, but when he graduated from high school at the age 
of 14 he was ngarded as too young for acceptance in any 
divinity school. Although he found a second calling in the 
Fletcher, Senator Frank Moss, and T. Keith Glcnaan, first 
Administrator of NASA. Mrs. Hugh L Dryda, guest of 
honor, will unveil a bust of h a  husband, whicb will evarm- 
ally be placed in the C e d s  lobby. 
After the ceremony, visitors w i i  be invited to view a 
static display of aircraft in the main hangar. As of press date. 
aircraft scheduled to be on display included thew-12,YC- 
IS. P16  andF-17, X-24B and HL-10 lifting body. F-111 
TACT and IPCS aim& Firebee and F-I5 Ranotely Woted 
R-h Vehicles, the two F-8 Digital Ply-By-Wue and 
Supemitical Wing aircraR the full-size F-15, the Mini- 
continued on pafe 5 

'exploratory" research conducted at the Dryden Flight 
past half century, a good portion was devoted to exploring 
at could not be tested safely at other NACA 
t of aircraft design from the late 1940s 
easingly faster and higher-flying airplanes. 
nology and advances to help make these goals pos- 
, is the renewed emphasis on high and fast flight in 
significantly different from the initial work. 
gh Speed Civil Transport (HSCT) must meet 
ironmental impact as well as speed and per- 
formance. In the early days, the goals were less complex, and the focus was on 
paving the way to supersonic flight and space. 
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Breaking 
the Sound Barrier 
The most famous of all the research 
projects conducted at Dryden and its predeces- 
sor NACAINASA facilities in the Mojave 
Desert is probably the X-1-the rocket plane 
that first broke the infamous "sound barrier" in 
October 1947. 
The X-1 , a joint effort of the Army Air 
Forces, NACA, and the Bell Aircraft Corpora- 
tion, was built to get answers about flight in the 
transonic region (approaching and immediately 
surpassing the speed of sound) that researchers 
were unable to get through conventional ground 
and wind tunnel tests. Aircraft design had 
progressed rapidly during World War 11, but as 
high-performance fighters such as the Lockheed 
P-38 Lightning developed the capability of dive 
speeds approaching Mach 1, they began to 
encounter difficulties. Shock-wave, or "com- 
pressibility," effects could cause severe stability 
and control problems and had led to the in- 
flight break-up of numerous aircraft. Many 
people began to believe that supersonic flight 
was an impossibility. 
Clearly, more information about flight 
dynamics at these higher speeds was needed, 
but that information was proving difficult to 
obtain. In the 1940s, no effective transonic wind 
tunnels existed. The NACA Langley Laboratory 
X-1 being loaded under mothership, B-50 Supe$ortress. 
The aircraft had originally been lowered into a loading 
pit and the launch aircraft towed over the pit, where the 
rocket plane was hoisted into the bomb bay. By the early 
1950s, a hydraulic lift had been installed on the ramp to 
elevate the launch aircraft and then lower it over the 
rocket plane for mating. On 9 November 1951, however, 
after a so-called "captive"JZight in which this particular 
X-1 (tail number 6-064) remained attached to the launch 
airplane, both aircraft were destroyed by a postjlight 
explosion and fire that also injured Bell test pilot Joseph 
Cannon. (NASA Photo E51593) 
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region and determine if, in fact, supersonic 
flight was possible. 
Although numerous researchers across 
the country agreed on the need for such an 
aircraft, they did not all agree on its design. 
Stack and other NACA engineers, along with 
the U.S. Navy, favored a jet-powered plane, 
while the Army Air Forces (AAF) wanted to 
pursue a rocket-powered design. As a compro- 
mise, the researchers decided on a two-pronged 
approach to their research plane. The AAF and 
NACA teamed up with Bell Aircraft to build 
three models of the X-1 rocket aircraft, while 
the Navy and NACA worked with the Douglas 
Aircraft Company to create the D-558-1 jet- 
powered Skystreak. The Skystreak's perfor- 
mance would not be as great as the X-1 design, 
but a rocket-powered aircraft was seen as a 
much riskier proposition. The dual approach, 
therefore, was thought to provide a greater 
assurance of success in a transonic research 
program. 
The X-1 was modeled after the shape of 
a bullet, which was the only shape that had been 
proven capable of stable transonic or supersonic 
flight. Its four-chamber, 6,000-pound thrust 
rocket engine would give it a mere 150 seconds 
of powered flight, which led to the decision to 
air-launch the aircraft from a specially modified 
Boeing B-29 Superfortress. In December 1945, 
only nine months after Bell Aircraft received an 
Army contract to build the plane, the first X-1 
rolled out of the factory.2 A test group, includ- 
ing a NACA contingent led by Walt Williams, 
took the airplane a month later for its initial 
glide tests to Pinecastle Field near Orlando, 
Florida. Pinecastle had one of the country's 
very few 10,000-foot-long runways, but the 
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X-IE being loaded under area proved less than ideal for the X-1 flights. 
mnilzership, wlth n techni- 
cian servicing tlze Among other things, scattered cloud decks and 
rocket plaize the landscape surrounding Pinecastle could 
jmsA Photo 2509' make it difficult for a pilot to keep the airport in 
sight. On the X- 1's very first flight, in fact, 
Bell's test pilot Jack Woolams did not quite 
make the runway, touching down on the hard 
grass beside it. Woolams and the test team 
recommended that the powered flight tests be 
conducted at Muroc, where they would have the 
advantage of clear skies, open landscape and 
dry lake landing sites.3 
The NACA team, still headed by Will- 
iams, arrived at Muroc on 30 September 1946, 
and the second X- 1 aircraft arrived a week later. 
This second X- 1, which had a thicker wing than 
the first model, had been designated for the 
more thorough transonic research NACA 
wished to conduct. The first X-1 was to be used 
as quickly as possible, while the NACA wanted 
to make sure it got all possible data from every 
flight. The two goals were often in direct 
conflict, as instrumentation issues often slowed 
the pace of the research flights. 
This problem was intensified by the fact 
that although NACA's instrumentation was 
state-of-the-art for its time, it was still fairly 
rudimentary and temperamental. Aside from the 
fact it weighed 500 pounds, the equipment was 
susceptible to frequent failures, and some 
flights failed to return much data.4 
Yet despite the conflicts created by the 
different approaches and agendas of the two 
organizations, nobody on the team lost sight of 
the common goal. Almost 50 years later, with 
supersonic flight a standard capability of most 
military and even some transport aircraft, it is 
difficult to fully appreciate the enormity of the 
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personic flight was possible, critical component for transonic and supersonic 
flight, in fact, that virtually every transonic1 
supersonic aircraft since then has had 0ne.5 
Geoffrey DeHavilland had been killed in a On another flight just four days before 
British D.H. 108 Swallow while attempting to the sound barrier was broken, the X-1's canopy 
break the sound barrier. frosted over during Yeager's descent and chase 
Even without catastrophic failures, the pilots had to talk him down to a blind landing. 
road to that October flight was not an easy one. To prevent a recurrence of the problem on 
On a flight in early October 1947, for example, future flights, crew members coated the X-1's 
the Air Force's primary X- 1 pilot, Captain windscreen with Drene shampoo-illustrating 
Charles "Chuck" Yeager, achieved an indicated the desert team's ability to find creative and 
airspeed of Mach 0.94 but found that when he effective solutions to unexpected problems. 
pulled back on the control stick, nothing hap- Finally, however, success was theirs. On 14 
pened. The speed had created a shock wave on October 1947, flying with two broken ribs, 
the surface of the elevator, rendering it useless Captain Yeager took the X-1 to a speed of 
and leaving him with no pitch control. Yeager Mach 1.06 at 43,000 feet, proving for the first 
recovered by shutting down the engines and time that a piloted aircraft could successfully 
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Znec/znrciuns servicing X- I surpass the speed of sound and making the vember 1947. 
attached fo B-29 nzollzership 
(NASA Photo E 595) sound "barrier" a myth of the past.6 
The X-Planes 
While the breaking of the sound barrier 
is the landmark the world remembers, it was 
actually just one research mark of many for the 
NACA unit at Muroc. NACA began flight 
research with the second X-1 just one week 
after Yeager's Mach 1 flight, and NACA pilot 
Herbert H. Hoover became the second man to 
fly supersonically on 10 March 1948. The 
NACA also received the first of its two jet- 
powered Douglas D-558-1 Skystreaks in No- 
The lower-performance D-558- 1 took 
backseat to the X-1 aircraft, but it did achieve 
some useful research on flight in the transonic 
region approaching Mach 1. The Skystreak 
showed that adding vortex generators, or small 
vertical tabs, to the wing of an aircraft could 
reduce buffeting and wing-dropping tendencies.7 
John Stack of the Langley Laboratory came up 
with the idea and, in a typical example of the 
Muroc unit's independent, nonbureaucratic 
management style, Walt Williams simply 
instructed his technicians to try it out. The small 
tabs they glued on the Skystreak's wing allowed 
its speed in level flight to increase by .05 
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Mach-and proved effective enough that vortex 
generators were subsequently incorporated into 
Boeing's B-47 bomber design. Since then, 
vortex generators have been used to improve 
the performance of air flow over the external 
surfaces and even through the engine inlets of a 
great many production aircraft.8 
Unfortunately, one of the Skystreaks 
also claimed the life of NACA research pilot 
Howard "Tick" Lilly in May 1948, when its jet 
engine compressor suffered a catastrophic 
failure on take-off. Lilly, who had been the 
third person to fly an aircraft past the speed of 
entered the line-up of 
research aircraft in 1948. To increase the D- 
558-2's performance further, Douglas removed 
the jet engine from one of the three Skyrockets, 
using the extra space and weight for extra 
rocket fuel, and configured the airplane for air- 
launch instead of ground take-off.10 The Army 
Air Forces and NACA also signed an agreement 
in February 1947 detailing a joint effort for 
additional research aircraft, designated the X-2, 
the X-3, the X-4 and the X-5. And while the 
first X-1 s were still conducting flight research, 
an order was put in for three updated versions 
called the X-lA, the X-lB, and the X-ID. An 
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Turbojet-powered 22-558-1 
taking offrorn lalcebed 
(NASA Photo E49-226) 
The X-4, for example, was a semi- 
tailless design similar to the D.H. 108 Swallow 
that had broken apart while trying to reach 
supersonic flight in 1946. The X-4 was a twin 
jet, swept wing aircraft built by Northrop, 
which had also designed a "flying wing" 
bomber prototype for the Air Force. Not sur- 
prisingly, the X-4, which had a vertical but no 
horizontal stabilizer, used the flying wing's 
concept of a combination elevatorlaileron called 
an "elevon" to control its pitch and roll. 
The X-4 was something of a mainte- 
nance nightmare, but it did accomplish some 
somewhat, but the problem could not be com- 
pletely alleviated.12 Nevertheless, the X-4 
supported General Jimmy Doolittle's assertion 
that "in the business of learning how to fly 
faster, higher, and farther, it is sometimes very 
important to learn what won't work." l3 
The X-5, which was a variable-sweep 
wing design built by Bell, arrived at Edwards in 
1952. It had vicious stalllspin characteristics 
that caused NACA pilot Joe Walker to lose 
18,000 feet recovering from a stall during one 
flight and eventually killed Air Force test pilot 
Ray Popson. But its problems were determined 
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to be design flaws of the X-5, not the concept of 
variable sweep. In fact, the aircraft proved the 
feasibility of the concept and allowed research- 
ers to learn a lot about the dynamics involved 
with that configuration throughout the transonic 
range. 
Likewise, the Convair XF-92A proved 
the suitability of the delta-wing design for 
transonic flight. Yet it, too, had some unpleas- 
ant flight characteristics, the most problematic 
of which was a tendency to pitch up violently 
during maneuvering, resulting in positive forces 
as high as 8 Gs and, even more alarmingly, 
negative forces as high as -4.5 during recov- 
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ery.l4 "Pitch up" was, in fact, a problem inher- Two B-29s, one with X - I E  
ent in any swept-wing design at transonic attaclzed. 711e silhouertes or? 
t11.e side of fhe r?zotlzenizi~? 
speeds, but research with the X-planes gave indicate it had cor?zpietc?d 31 
engineers an opportunity to examine it in lau1zclzes. (NASA Photo E-2082) 
various configurations. One of the major re- 
search contributions of the D-558-2 Skyrocket, 
in fact, was its investigation into the dynamics 
and possible solutions to the pitch-up problem. 
Over a 27-month flight program with the 
Skyrocket, NACA researchers examined the use 
of wing fences (vertical strips running from the 
leading edge to the trailing edge of the wing), a 
sawtooth-shaped leading edge, and retractable 
leading edge slats to control pitch-up. 
Flights of Discovey 
fastest it ever went was Mach 1.2 in a powered 
ese aircraft, the NACA researchers deter- dive. Yet it was still susceptible to inertial 
ined that the best solution to the pitch-up coupling because, like the supersonic "Century 
lem actually was to place the aircraft's tail Series" fighters, it had a thin, short wing and 
sign like the XF-92A, of course, able to give engineers their first detailed data 
another solution because it and analysis of the dynamics, and therefore the 
therefore tried a series of wing fences on the result, NACA advised North American Avia- 
ir was in the process of building. The modifications turned the F-100A into a highly 
as subsequently changed quite significantly to gained through the X-3 flights and the F-100 
loped by a Langley Laboratory research another to virtually every supersonic fighter 
neer named Richard Whitcomb. built since then.17 
The configuration research conducted 
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of the aircraft program but of numerous pilots 
as well. 
This is not to say that Dryden had 
neglected work in the high-speed arena while it 
explored various transonic configurations. 
Indeed, it was the high-altitude and high-speed 
achievements at Edwards Air Force Base that 
garnered the biggest headlines during the early 
1950s. 
The X- 1 A, X- lB, and X- 1D derivatives 
of the X-1 design were designed to have greatly 
expanded capabilities. They had larger tanks for 
rocket propellant and were designed to use a 
turbine-driven pump instead of the X- 1's more 
cumbersome nitrogen pressure-feed system. 
They also had, for the first time, an ejection seat 
for the pilot. Unfortunately, the follow-on X- 1 s 
were plagued with accidents and problems. 
The X-1D was the first new-generation 
X-1 to arrive at Edwards, delivered by Bell in 
mid- 195 1. On its very first powered flight 
attempt, however, the aircraft exploded while 
still attached to the B-50 mother ship. The Air 
Force pilot, Major Frank K. Everest, managed 
to get back into the B-50 safely, but the stricken 
X- 1D had to be jettisoned. Thus the X- ID 
program ended before it began, and the accident 
set the X- 1A and X- 1B programs back almost 
two years. 
The X-1A joined the Air ForceINACA 
research fleet in 1953. It was designed for 
speeds in excess of Mach 2, but it encountered 
serious stability problems as it approached its 
design speed. On one flight at the end of 1953, 
Chuck Yeager set a new speed record of Mach 
2.44, or approximately 1,650 miles per hour, 
only to lose control of the airplane immediately 
thereafter. The X-1A gyrated wildly for 70 
Early NACA aircraft in front 
ofthe South Base hangar 
wed by the NACA unit from 
the late 1940s to 1954. . 
From viewer's left: D-558- 
2, Do-558-1, X-5, X-1, XF-92, 
X-4 
(NASA Photo EC 145) 
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The X-1A had given researchers an already in the planning stages, and researchers 
unpleasant taste of some of the surprises that needed information on the flight environment 
still awaited them as they reached for higher and forces with which those craft would have to 
speeds. In fact, although both the X-1B and the contend. 
X-1E that followed were designed for faster The X-2 was, in a sense, a third genera- 
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tion research aircraft, designed to go further in Force flight before turning the plane over to 
investigating problems of aerodynamic heating NACA for its more thorough research program, 
as well as stability and control by operating at tragedy struck. Captain Milburn G. Apt, flying 
speeds of Mach 3 and at altitudes between his very first rocket flight, took the X-2 to a 
100,000 and 130,000 feet. To make the plane record speed of Mach 3.2, or 2,094 miles per 
Research aircraft Jiaonz 
viewer's I@ to right: 
X-IE, D-558-2, X-IB on 
lakebed (1955) 
(NASA Photo E 19 14) 
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0-558-2 dro13piizg at Iaztnch result, the X-15 was equipped with a gyro- 1952, when several prominent researchers 
from B-29 mothcrslzip (Navy 
designaliotz: P2B) stabilized inertial navigation system (INS) and began lobbying for a research vehicle that could 
{NASA Phom E 2478) flight instrumentation that would give the pilot begin investigating some of the basic problems 
much more precise and accurate flight infonna- that human space flight would entail. At that 
tion. time, however, NACA had its hands full with 
The second and third generation rocket the problems of Mach 2 flight, so it was 1954 
planes had produced some valuable information before serious studies began on an aircraft 
about flight at high speeds and altitudes. But it design for the ambitious goal of flight at speeds 
had come at a cost. So it was against a mixed from Mach 4 to Mach 10 and altitudes 12-50 
background of triumphant records and tragic miles above the Earth. In December 1954, 
failures that the NACA flight research team at NACA, the Air Force and the Navy signed an 
Dryden began working on the X-15-a program agreement for the research plane that gave the 
that aimed to achieve not only what the early Air Force responsibility for administering its 
rocket planes had left undone but also goals two design and construction and NACA responsibil- 
or three times as high. Is ity for technical supervision. The Air Force and 
the Navy would share responsibility for the 
The X-15 program's cost. This partnership proved 
smoother in many ways than the X- 1 project, 
The X-15 program actually started in due in large part to the fact that although it was 
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obtain the unknown values 
of the parameters that 
define aircraft behavior. 
Calledparameter ident(fi"- 
cation, this technique 
allowed researchers to 
detennine precisely the 
diferences between values 
predicted from wind tunnel 
data and those actually 
encountered in flight. 
Such precision is essential 
for understanding and 
fimng undesirable or 
dangerous flight charac- 
teristics. This significant 
flight test andflight 
research technique has 
been used on over 50 other 
aircrafl at Dryden, 
including all of the lifn'ng 
bodies, the XB-70, the SR- 
71, the Space Shuttles, and 
the X-29. This technique 
has spread to virtually all 
flight test organizations 
, throughout the world and 
has been used to enhance 
B the safety, flight proce- 
; dures, and control system 
designs of most current 
supersonic aircraft as well 
as to improve flight 
simulators, submarines, 
economic models, and 
even biomedical models. 
(Air Force Photo) 
a joint military1NACA program, the goals of the 
participants were similar. The X- 15 was far 
enough beyond any operational aircraft the 
military had that it was seen as a pure research 
aircraft by all three participants. In November 
'~955, North American Aviation was awarded a 
contract for three X-15 aircraft, which were to 
be capable of going 6,600 feet-per-second and 
reaching an altitude of 250,000 feet. 
Despite the huge leap in performance 
that those figures represented, scientists and 
engineers knew the foundations upon which the 
X-15 was based were sound. By the same 
token, however, they knew that they couldn't 
wait to have all questions answered before 
going ahead with the program. When the con- 
tract for the X-15's airframe was awarded, for 
example, the technology for its 57,000-pound- 
thrust rocket engine (representing 608,000 
horsepower at 4,000 miles per hour) did not yet 
exist. A contract for the powerplant went to 
Reaction Motors in September 1956, but the 
engine was still not built when the first X-15 
was delivered in 1958. In fact, the first XLR-99 
motor was not installed in an X- 15 until 1960. 
In the interim, the X- 15s were equipped with 
two XLR- 1 1 engines from the X- 1 program. l9 
North American was also forging new 
ground with the X-15 airframe. The structure of 
the X-15 had to withstand forces up to 7 Gs, 
and the friction generated by its high speed was 
expected to create temperatures on the airframe 
as high as 1,200 degrees Fahrenheit. That was 
beyond the tolerance of any aircraft material 
used up until that time, including stainless steel. 
So North American built the X-15 out of a new, 
heat-resistant nickel alloy called Inconel X. The 
X- 15 also incorporated rocket engine-powered 
reaction controls and was outfitted with 1,300 
pounds of instrumentation, including no fewer 
than 1,100 sen~ors.~O 
The main research goals of the X- 15 
were to investigate aerodynamic forces, heating, 
stability and control (including reaction con- 
trols), reentry characteristics, and human physi- 
ology at extremely high speeds and altitudes. 
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Accomplishing this research was particularly hand side stick was used for high-G maneuver- 
difficult, not only because it required flying far ing when it was critical not to over-control the 
beyond any condition or speed anyone had plane. A left-hand side stick operated the 
attempted before, but also because it required reaction controls when the aircraft was outside 
operating an aircraft throughout an incredibly the Earth's denser atmosphere.21 
wide envelope. The X-15 was air-launched at The complexity of the X-15 program 
approximately 45,000 feet, would accelerate to also required special ground and air support. 
anywhere between Mach 2 and Mach 6 while The B-29 and B-50 launch planes were replaced 
climbing as high as 350,000 feet, execute a by a B-52 with a special pylon for the X-15 
successful hypersonic reentry through Earth's mounted under one wing. A formal control 
atmosphere and then glide back to a 200-miles- room replaced the portable van and radio used 
per-hour, unpowered landing on a dry lakebed. to control previous test programs, in order to 
This created a real challenge for the X-15's better monitor and respond to the many pieces 
designers. Just as an example, the broad speed of information the X-15 would be transmitting 
range of the X-15 led them to put three control to engineers during each flight. The control 
sticks in the cockpit. A conventional center room later made famous at the Johnson Space 
stick was used at slower speeds, and a right- Center was based on the Dryden facility. 
Flights of Discovery 
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We'd get hit with totally unknown things fortunate. On a 1967 flight that reached Mach 
because we were operating in an area we didn't 5.2 and an altitude of 266,000 feet, Adams was 
understand. Fortunately, the airplane was distracted by a malfunctioning experiment and 
overbuilt in all areas that allowed us to learn apparently misread a cockpit instrument, caus- 
from our mistakes. We could heat cables and ing him to slip the X-15 sideways as it was 
landing gear and crack windows . . . the X-15 approaching reentry to Earth's atmosphere. At 
could deviate from its optimum (flight) profile, that speed and altitude there is little margin for 
and it would still come home." 24 error, and the X- 15 went out of control and 
Or at least it almost always came home. broke apart. The death of Adams was a tremen- 
terms of safety, especially 
considering the difficulty of 
what the X-15 team was 
trying to achieve. Yet the 
program did suffer four 
accidents. Two of them 
involved emergency land- 
ings on alternate lakebed 
sites when engine problems 
The nearly ten-year, 199- 
? ,  - , . , ...; , - 
' I  ' - .  
. . . I ' -  , , ,n : ' -  . . I ! . - .  - ., ' I .  . " 
.. . - . 
flight program was a tre- 
mendously successful one in 
occurred after launch. North 
American test pilot Scott 
Crossfield escaped without 
injury when his fuel-heavy 
X-15 broke in two on touch- 
,,, , ,- I..I - , ,. , *,, . ( + 
. '  
' 
- 7 
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down, but NASA pilot Jack 
McKay crushed four verte- 
brae when his X-15 rolled 
Right. X - I 5  being secured by over on landing at Mud 
ground crew afer  landing 
(Air Force Photo) Lake, Nevada.25 Less than a 
year after his first mishap, 7. - - 7 
. - 
*i Crossfield was in the cockpit 
when the X- 15's new XLR- 
99 engine exploded during a ground test. The dous blow to the X-15 project team, and some 
15-foot aircraft cockpit section that was left people who worked on the program attribute the 
intact shot across the ramp and was engulfed in end of the program a year later in part to that 
flames, but Crossfield waited out the fire and tragic accident. 26 
emerged unharmed. Nevertheless, even the X- 15's accident 
Air Force pilot Mike Adams was not so rate proved that a pilot was an important ele- 
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ment of a high-performance near-space craft. 
Post-flight data revealed that without pilot 
intervention and system redundancy, the X- 15 
would have crashed on 13 of its first 44 flights, 
and that the success rate of its first 81 missions, 
based on whether or not the research objectives 
for the flight were achieved, would have 
dropped from 56 to 32 percent. 27 
Actually, the X-15 proved a whole lot 
more than that. In fact, it has been described as 
one of the most successful flight research 
programs ever conducted. In almost ten years 
and 199 flights, it produced no fewer than 750 
research papers and reports on a broad range of 
aeronautics and aerospace topics and made 
more than two dozen significant contributions 
to future flight both within and outside the 
Earth's atmosphere.28 The research that pro- 
duced these monumental results fell into three 
major categories: exploring the upper bound- 
aries of flight speeds and altitudes, filling in the 
area within those boundaries with additional 
information, and doing "piggyback" experi- 
ments that used the X-15's speed and altitude 
capabilities to conduct research unrelated to the 
X-15 itself. 
In terms of exploring boundaries, the X- 
15 reached a maximum speed of Mach 6.7 and 
a maximum altitude of 354,200 feet, or 70 miles 
above the Earth.29 The maximum-speed flight 
was achieved with the repaired and modified X- 
15 that McKay had crash-landed on Mud Lake. 
When it was rebuilt, the fuselage was length- 
ened and additional fuel drop tanks were incor- 
porated to give it enough endurance to reach 
Mach 8. It was then redesignated the X-15A-2. 
Because the heating experienced above Mach 6 
was expected to be too great for the X-15's 
initial design structure, researchers planned to 
apply a spray-on, heat-resistant ablative coating 
Page 62 
on the aircraft before each flight. The Mach 6.7 
record flight used the ablative coating, but the 
non-reusable spray-on material proved too 
difficult to work with and maintain for it to be a 
good operational therrnal-protection system for 
an X-15 type of vehicle. 
The X- 15 program also produced a 
tremendous amount of information about 
hypersonic and exoatmospheric flight. Perhaps 
most importantly, it demonstrated that a high- 
performance reusable vehicle could be success- 
fully flown by a pilot outside Earth's atmo- 
sphere, brought through reentry, and returned to 
an unpowered landing. In the process, the X-15 
gave researchers a much clearer picture of the 
combined stress of aerodynamic loads and 
heating in a hypersonic, high-dynamic-pressure 
environment. 
In addition, the X-15 led to the develop- 
ment of numerous technologies that would 
benefit future programs. The X-15's engine, for 
example, was the first large, restartable, 
throttle-controllable rocket engine. The 
aircraft's blunt-ended, wedge-shaped tail was 
found to solve directional stability problems at 
hypersonic speeds. The X-15 also led to the 
development of the first practical full-pressure 
suit for protecting a pilot in space and to a high- 
speed ejection seat. It successfully tested a "Q- 
ball" nose-cone air-data sensor, an inertial flight 
data system capable of functioning in a highly 
dynamic pressure environment, and the first 
application of energy management techniques. 
The X-15 pilots also successfully demonstrated 
the use of reaction controls outside the Earth's 
atmosphere. Reaction controls were small 
rocket-powered jets placed strategically in the 
aircraft's wingtips and nose that could be fired 
to control the plane even when thin air rendered 
its aerodynamic flight controls useless. The idea 
Flights of Discovery 
NASA Hangar 4802 in 1966 
with lifing bodies (HL-10, 
M2-F2, M2-Fl), F-4, F-5D, 
F-104, C-47 (one row), and 
X-15s (second row), from 
viewer's left 
(NASA Photo EC66 1461) 
grew out of the stability problems experienced 
with the X-1A at high altitude and were initially 
researched using one of Dryden's F-104s, but 
reaction controls were a critical technology for 
not only the X-15, but also the Mercury cap- 
sule, the Apollo Lunar Landing Module, and 
every piloted craft to ever fly in space. The 
Mercury capsule also used a variation of the X- 
15's controls, including the side-stick control- 
ler, on its orbital missions. 30 
The X-15 flights also revealed an 
interesting physiological phenomenon that 
indicated just how difficult the pilots' job was 
and provided a baseline for monitoring the 
health of future astronauts. The heart rate of the 
X- 15 pilots (and, in fact, the astronauts that 
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followed) during their missions ranged between Mercury and Gemini Programs. And NACA 
145 and 180 beats a minute instead of a more research pilot Neil Armstrong, who had evalu- 
typical 70-80. Aeromedical researchers found ated the use of reaction controls with both the 
that the high pulse rates were not due to the F- 104 and the X- 15, went on to apply his 
physical stress of the pilots' environment, but to knowledge to the Apollo program, hand-flying 
the psychological keyed-up, highly-focused the Lunar Landing Module to the first landing 
state the missions required of them. on the moon in July 1969. 33 
The third phase of the X- 15 program After 199 flights and over 18 hours of 
yielded many other valuable contributions, supersonic and hypersonic research, the X-15 
including measurements of the sky brightness program came to an end in December 1968. 
and atmospheric density, data from micromete- Adams' accident the previous year may have 
orites collected in special wing-tip pods, and an had some impact on the final decision, but the 
opportunity to explore Earth-resources photog- biggest factor was simply that the focus of 
raphy. The X-15 also tested a number of proto- NASA and the nation had shifted to space 
type systems that were subsequently used in the flight. By 1965,80% of NASA's budget was 
Apollo program. For example, the aircraft earmarked for space-related research.34 Much 
tested the insulation later used on the Apollo more research information might have been 
program's Saturn booster rockets, and the X-15 gained by continuing the X-15 program or 
pilots tested horizon-measuring instrumentation developing a follow-on effort, especially in 
that aided development of navigation equipment terms of preparing for the Space Shuttle, the X- 
for the Apollo capsule. 32 30 National Aerospace Plane, or the High 
Some of the biggest benefits reaped by Speed Civil Transport projects that followed. 
the space program from the X- 15 and other But at the time the X-15 program was seen as 
rocket aircraft efforts, however, did not come having decreasing value, because NASA's 
from tangible pieces of hardware or technology space program, at least in the 1960s, was 
but from the intangible assets of people and centered around a ballistic capsule rather than a 
experience. Since the Mercury spacecraft was lifting reentry vehicle. 
being developed during the early stages of the 
X- 15 research program, the aircraft had a The Lifting Bodies 
somewhat limited impact on the design of the 
Mercury capsule. But the success of the X-15 Understandably, a number of people at 
flights provided the Mercury program managers Dryden were not happy about NASA's choice 
with a level of confidence that was tremen- of a capsule over a lifting reentry space vehicle, 
dously valuable. Furthermore, a number of the and a few of them were not content to close the 
people at Dryden who had been involved with book on the subject. The result was the lifting- 
the rocket-powered X-planes and the X-15 went body research program-an effort that exempli- 
on to assume key leadership positions in the fied more than any other the independent, 
space program. Walt Williams, for example, innovative, pragmatic and pioneer mind-set of 
became the operations director of the Project the people who chose to work at Dryden. 
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I M2-Fl over base on tow line A lifting body is a vehicle that generates divert funds to study, construct, or flight-test a fNAsA Photo ECN4081 enough lift from its fuselage shape to permit it lifting-body aircraft. But in the minds of engi- 
to fly without wings. Alfred Eggers and others neers like R. Dale Reed and pilots like Milt 
at the NASA Ames Laboratory conducted early Thompson, that was not an insurmountable 
wind-tunnel experiments on the concept, dis- obstacle. 
covering that half of a rounded nose-cone 
shape, flat on top and rounded on the bottom, 
could generate a lift-to-drag ratio of perhaps 1.5 
to 1. Eggers even sketched out a preliminary 
design of what would later become the M2 
lifting body design. Several other researchers at 
the NASA Langley Research Center were 
toying with their own lifting-body shapes. 
The aircraft-oriented researchers at 
Dryden liked the lifting-body concept because 
in their view, it offered a pilotlastronaut the 
more dignified option of flying his spacecraft 
back to an Earth landing instead of being 
ignominiously dumped into the ocean in an 
unflyable capsule. With the decision for the 
Mercury capsule already made, NASA head- 
quarters would have been very unlikely to 
Reed, a model aircraft builder and 
private pilot in his spare time, was intrigued 
with the lifting body idea. Using Eggers' 
concept, he built a lightweight, free-flying 
lifting body model that he launched repeatedly 
into the tall grass near his house, modifying its 
control and balance characteristics as he pro- 
gressed. He then attached it to a larger free- 
flying tow aircraft to allow it to glide from a 
slightly higher altitude. Pleased with the result, 
he had his wife film some of its flights with 
their 8-rnm home camera to help him present 
the lifting body concept to others at the Flight 
Research Center. 
Reed recruited fellow engineer Dick 
Eldredge and research pilot Thompson to help 
him prepare a plan to test a lifting body vehicle. 
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Above: M2-F3 launch 
.from B-52 
(NASA Photo ECN 2774) 
Lef: M2-FI and modified 
Pontiac tow vehicle 
in hangar 
(NASA Photo 
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Dryden7s staff was always characterized by a fins to give it directional stability and control. 
passion for airplanes, and Reed hoped to take Constructing a lightweight fuselage shell was 
advantage of that fact. Throughout the Flight more of a problem, but Bikle, who was a world- 
Research Center staff there were numerous record-holding sailplane pilot, knew a sailplane 
talented machinists, welders, and sheet-metal builder on nearby Lake El Mirage that he 
workers who were involved in building thought could make one out of plywood. He 
homebuilt aircraft in their spare time. Reed and allocated $10,000 from his discretionary fund 
Eldredge's plan was to utilize this on-site talent for a fuselage shell contract, and contributed the 
and enthusiasm to build a low-cost test lifting- services of Ernie Lowder, a NASA craftsman 
body vehicle. Reed, Eldredge and Thompson who had worked on the building of Howard 
prepared a proposal and convinced Eggers to Hughes7 mammoth "Spruce Goose" wooden 
come down from flying boat. 
M.2-FI lightweight lijting 
body behintl a C-47 Ames to hear them While the aircraft 
(NASA Photo 10962) present it to Center was being constructed, 
Director Paul Bikle. the team began scout- 
Eggers enthusiasti- ing for a tow vehicle 
cally offered wind- that could allow them 
tunnel support for the to try some taxi tests 
project, and Bikle with the M2-Fl before 
gave the trio the go- taking it to Ames for 
ahead to build a full- wind-tunnel testing. 
scale wind tunnel Fortunately, one of the 
model of the M2 project's volunteers, a 
design. Although the man named Walter 
official permission "Whitey" Whiteside, 
was for wind tunnel was active in the hot- 
testing only, Bikle rod racing circuits. He 
noted that if the supervised the pur- 
aircraft happened to be chase of a Pontiac 
built so that it was Bonneville convertible 
capable of actual flight, well, that would be and sent the car to Mickey Thompson's re- 
something beyond management's control. The nowned hot-rod shop in Los Angeles for modi- 
message was clearly received, and the M2-Fl fication. The car arrived back at Edwards 
lifting-body team went to work. capable of pulling the 1,000 pound M2-F1 at 
A small hand-picked cadre of engineers speeds over 100 miles per hour-which was, 
and fabricators set up shop in a corner of a just coincidentally, fast enough to get the 
hangar at Dryden and began designing a steel aircraft airborne. The slightly irreverent but 
tubular frame and control system for the air- enthusiastic group also arranged for the car to 
craft. They designed the aircraft with a flat top be painted with racing stripes and a NASA logo 
and rounded nose and belly, with two vertical on the side. 
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Research pilot Bill Dana 
with HL-10 to his left and B- 
52fZying overhead. Bending 
over the cockpit is John 
Reeves. 
(NASA Photo ECN 2203) 
The plan was only to conduct ground 
tests of the vehicle, but sitting in the fully 
operational cockpit, Milt Thompson remarked 
that "maybe it really wouldn't be flying if we 
just lifted it off the lakebed a couple of inches." 
BMe's response to the group was, "Go for it, 
I but be careful." Aftafter some changes to the control syskm, the plywood M2-F1, now dubbed the 'flying bathtub"because of its bulbous ~hape, was successfully towed by the Pontiac to an altitude of 20 feet, where Thomp- son released the tow line and glided back to touchdown. After a successf\rl series of wind-tunnel 
tests on the vehicle at Ames, the group came 
back to Bikle for permission to actually fly the 
aircraft. Headquaters had not sanctioned the 
project, and Dryden's director of research 
engineering at the time went on record opposing 
any flight testing other than towing a few inches 
off the ground because he felt the information 
they stood to gain was not worth the risk to 
Thompson. But Bikle believed in the project. 
Fully aware that he was putting his NASA 
career on the line, BWe authorized the flights 
anyway. It was a display of courage equal to 
that shown by any of the reearch pilots, and it 
was a reminder of an important fact. Bravery 
comes in many forms, and managers with the 
courage and faith to back their people and 
projects were just as important to Dryden's 
success as the pilots who flew the 
actual aircraft. , 
On 16 August 1963, the M2-F1 team 
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towed the aircraft to 12,000 feet behind the 
Center's DC-3 aircraft and Thompson success- 
fully glided back to a lakebed landing, inaugu- 
rating Dryden's lifting body flight research 
program. Some people at NASA headquarters 
were aware of the project, but the Administrator 
was unaware that it had flown until, while 
testifying before a congressional committee, he 
was asked about it by a congressman who had 
read about the M2-Fl's flight in the newspaper. 
Some feathers were ruffled, but Bikle's defense 
was aided by the fact that the flight had been 
successful and the whole project had cost only 
$30,000. 
The M2-F1 went on to conduct approxi- 
mately 100 research flights. Ten different 
NASA and Air Force pilots flew it successfully, 
although they did find that it had a nasty ten- 
dency to develop a pilot-induced roll oscilla- 
tion. On pilot Jerry Gentry's first air tow flight 
with the vehicle, the rolling motion increased so 
severely that he ended up inverted behind the 
DC-3, still attached to the tow line. As the 
ground crew watched in horror and the ground 
controller called for Gentry to eject, Gentry 
released the tow line and managed to turn the 
maneuver into a full barrel roll, touching down Group shot ofremotely 
on the lakebed at the bottom of the roll. When piloted vehicles on lakebed, 
with "mother" ship in the M2-Fl did the same thing a year later, Bikle 
ordered it grounded. 35 (NASA Photo ECN 1880) 
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By then, however, the success of the 
M2-F1 program had proven the concept suffi- 
ciently to win broader support within the 
agency. In 1964, NASA authorized the building 
of two "heavyweight" lifting-body aircraft for 
further research. One was a metal version of the 
M2-F1, designated the M2-F2, and the other 
was a design known as the HL-10 that was 
developed at the Langley Research Center. Both 
aircraft were to be built by the Northrop Corpo- 
ration and would be equipped with an XLR-11 
rocket engine to allow pilots to explore the 
crafts' characteristics at higher speeds, includ- 
ing transonic and supersonic flight. The design 
also called for small hydrogen-peroxide rockets 
for the pilot to use if some additional flare time 
was needed at touchdown. The flight research 
program itself was to be another joint effort 
between Dryden and the Air Force Flight Test 
Center at Edwards. 36 
The heavyweight lifting-body flights 
began in July 1966, with the vehicles launched 
from the same B-52 aircraft that was being used 
to drop the X-15s. In their first configurations, 
the lifting bodies were not the best handling of 
aircraft. The first flight of the HL-10 was so 
marginal that NASA instantly grounded the 
vehicle and sent it back to Northrop for modifi- 
cations. The M2-F2, on the other hand, had the 
same poor lateral-directional stability as its 
lightweight predecessor, which eventually led 
to the program's only serious accident. 
On 10 May 1967, NASA pilot Bruce 
Peterson was bringing the M2-F2 down to a 
lakebed landing when a wind gust started a 
rolling oscillation. The rolling turned Peterson 
off his original heading, which increased his 
problems because without the tar markings of 
the runway on the lakebed, it was difficult for 
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pilots to tell exactly how far off the ground they 
were. As he was trying to dampen out the 
rolling motion, a rescue helicopter appeared in 
front of him, adding another distraction at a 
critical time. Realizing he was very low, 
Peterson fired the M2-F2's hydrogen peroxide 
rockets to reduce his angle of descent and 
extended the landing gear, but it was too late. 
Before the gear could lock, he hit the lakebed. 
The gear sheared off and the M2-F2 
cartwheeled over and over across the hard 
lakebed surface at more than 250 miles per 
hour. The film footage of the accident was so 
spectacularly horrifying that it became the 
opening sequence of the televisioii series The 
Six Million Dollar Man. Fortunately, Peterson 
was protected by the M2-F2's rollover struc- 
ture, so while he lost an eye he managed to 
survive the accident. 
Peterson's accident was actually the 
fourth time the M2-F2 had demonstrated a 
severe rolling oscillation, and the modified WL- 
10 looked like it was going to have much better 
flying characteristics. So there was not a lot of 
support among NASA's managers for rebuild- 
ing the M2-F2 aircraft. But once again, there 
was a small group of believers who refused to 
say die. Researchers at Ames conducted wind 
tunnel tests to determine what modifications 
might alleviate the M2's instability and deter- 
mined that adding a third fin in between the two 
existing tail fins would correct the problem. A 
couple of champions for the program eked 
successive small amounts of money out of 
headquarters to pennit the modification and 
rebuilding of the aircraft. Northrop did the 
major work and delivered a "kit" for the rede- 
signed M2-F3 back to Dryden for final assem- 
bly. Three years after Peterson's accident, the 
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M2-F3 made its first flight.37 
The lifting-body flight research program 
eventually added two other Air Force-sponsored 
configurations: the Martin-Marietta built X-24A 
and its derivative, the X-24B. The X-24B, 
which was literally built around the existing 
fuselage of the X-24A, was by far the sleekest 
looking and highest performing of the lifting 
body designs. It had a higher lift-to-drag ratio 
than the rounder models, which allowed it to 
glide for a much longer distance. The Air 
Force's interest in the X-24B design was moti- 
vated partly by a desire for a near-space capable 
reconnaissance craft that could take pictures 
over the Soviet Union and then still have 
enough gliding power to make it back to the 
United States for landing. Although an opera- 
tional vehicle never materialized, the X-24B 
proved a successful lifting body design with 
very pleasant handling characteristics.38 
The lifting-body flights contributed a lot of 
useful research information about that kind of 
aircraft configuration. Advocates of the pro- 
gram, in fact, had hoped that the research 
results would lead NASA to select a lifting- 
body shape for the planned Space Shuttle. That 
did not happen, but the program made a signifi- 
cant contribution to the Shuttle design by 
demonstrating that a horizontal landing space- 
craft configuration with a very low lift-to-drag 
ratio could be landed successfully and accu- 
rately without propulsion. The initial Rockwell 
design for the Shuttle called for air-breathing jet 
engines to power it to landing in addition to the 
rocket engines it needed for launch. The Dryden 
experience with the lifting bodies, however, 
convinced the Shuttle managers that the craft 
could be landed safely as a glider, saving 
weight and increasing the Shuttle's payload. 
Five years later, mission planners were still 
debating whether the Shuttle could be landed 
within the confines of a runway. To demon- 
strate that it could be done, NASA pilot John 
Manke and Air Force pilot Mike Love per- 
formed spot landings on Edwards' concrete 
runway with the X-24B, touching down pre- 
cisely where they were supposed to. The debate 
came to an end. 
The lifting-body flights also contributed 
to the Shuttle program by demonstrating not 
only the fact that unpowered landings could be 
done, but also how they could be done. The 
lifting-body pilots' approaches to landing, 
which used steep descents to maintain high 
speed that could then be transferred into excess 
energy for a flare and gentle touchdown, is the 
same technique used by the Shuttle pilots 
today.39 
The lifting-body program came to an 
official end in 1975. Yet like a Phoenix rising 
from the ashes, the concept has appeared sev- 
eral times since then in proposed NASA space- 
craft. When the Langley Research Center 
revealed its HL-20 design for an emergency 
crew return vehicle or small mini-Shuttle in 
1990, the shape was remarkably similar to the 
HL- 10 and X-24A designs. Lockheed's pro- 
posal for an unpiloted X-33 single-stage-to- 
orbit cargo vehicle is also a lifting-body con- 
figuration. And even one proposed crew return 
vehicle, designed to carry sick or wounded 
astronauts back from a space station, is a lifting 
body design that would be programmed to fly 
back into the atmosphere and descend only the 
last few thousand feet by a steerable 
parachute.40 
The lifting-body design has not yet 
made it into an operational spacecraft, but it has 
survived as a design concept longer than the 
ballistic capsule that dominated NASA's focus 
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ing over 500,000 pounds and capable of Mach 
3+ speeds. It had an advanced design that 
incorporated two vertical fins, a forward hori- 
zontal control surface called a canard, and a 
highly swept delta wing with droop tips.. Before 
the bomber went into production, however, the 
program was canceled. Nevertheless, the Air 
Force continued to fund the two XB -74) proto- 
types to be used as research aircraft. 
The Langley Research Center was 
already involved in SST research, and the XB- 
70A Valkyrie was appealing to researchers 
because its configuration closely matched many 
elements they expected a supersonic transport 
would include. The XB-70 was to be allother 
joint effort between Dryden and the Air Force 
Flight Test Center, and research instrunlentation 
was incorporated into the aircraft from the start. 
The plan called for the Air Force to manage the 
initial test, evaluation, and early research Rights 
with the airplane, with NASA eventually taking 
over management of one of the two aircraft. 
wingtip. Suddenly, Walker's F- 104 collided 
with the XB-70's wingtip, flipped over and 
crashed into the top of the bomber, taking off 
both the Valkyrie's vertical stabilizers. The XB- 
70A went out of control and crashed. Of the 
three pilots involved, Walker in the F- 104N and 
North American test pilot A1 White and Air 
Force Major Carl Cross in the XB-70A, only 
White survived, and he was seriously injured. In 
less than two minutes, the Air Force and NASA 
lost two aircraft and two talented test pilots. 
The accident severely set back plans for 
the joint research program. The remaining XB- 
70A aircraft was not as capable or as well 
instrumented, but it became the primary re- 
search aircraft. The Air Force and NASA flew it 
for several months in late 1966 and early 1967 
to test the ground impact of its sonic boom at 
different altitudes and speeds-research that 
helped determine that the American public 
would not tolerate overland supersonic flight. 
NASA began research with the airplane 
in April 1967, using it to correlate NASA wind 
tunnel and simulator predictions at Ames and 
Langley, as well as those of Dryden's General 
Purpose Airborne Simulator (GPAS), which 
was a variable stability Lockheed Jetstar air- 
craft. In the most comprehensive drag correla- 
tion effort ever attempted for a supersonic 
cruise configuration, researchers found that 
Above: XB-70 taking ofl 
(NASA Photo E 16695) 
Right: XB-70 inflight over 
mountains 
(NASA Photo EC68 2131) 
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SR-71B take-offfrom 
Edwards with "shock 
diamonds" in the exhami 
(NASA Photo 
EC92 1284-01) 
reasonably close but that there was an astound- 
ing 27 percent discrepancy at the transonic drag 
peak, with the predicted value being too low. 
This sobering result will require much attention 
to transonic drag by future promoters and 
designers of supersonic cruise airplanes. 
The NASA flights also looked at the 
structural dynamics of the aircraft at high 
speeds, investigating methods future supersonic 
aircraft manufacturers might be able to use to 
reduce vibrations in the aircraft's structure. By 
the end of 1968, however, the research results 
could no longer support the program's cost, and 
Dryden was already getting involved in the YF- 
12, which could yield much of the same high- 
speed data. So the XB-70A was retired. 42 
The Lockheed YF- 12A was the proto- 
type of a fighterlinterceptor version of the SR- 
71 "Blackbird" spy plane that, even today, 
remains the world's fastest jet-powered air- 
craft.43 Because its routine operations at alti- 
tudes above 80,000 feet and at speeds of Mach 
3 subjected it to extremely high temperatures, 
painted a characteristic flat black color. In the 
mid-1960s, and indeed for many years, the YF- 
12 and SR-71 programs were highly classified. 
Fortunately for NASA, the YF- 12lSR-7 1 
program personnel decided they could also use 
some help from NASA on a flight test program 
they were conducting at Edwards. While work- 
ing with the Air Force team getting the SR-71 
ready for Strategic Air Command use, NASA 
asked if it might get access to an SR-71 for 
some of its own research. The Air Force said no 
on the SR-7 1, but offered NASA two YF- 12s 
that it had in storage at Edwards. 
So just two days before Neil Armstrong 
walked on the Moon, Dryden found itself with 
two Blackbirds and yet another joint research 
effort with the Air Force. In addition, the 
partnership included several other NASA 
centers that were interested in what flights with 
the YF-12 might yield. Langley wanted infor- 
mation on aerodynamics and structures, Lewis 
wanted data on propulsion, and Ames was 
looking for information on the aircraft's com- 
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SR-71B over plex engine inlet aerodynamics and data to 
snow-capped mountains 
(NASA Photo correlate its high-speed wind-tunnel predictions. 
EC94 42883-4) The YF- 12 flights provided information 
about numerous areas, including aerodynamic 
loads and structural effects of sustained Mach 3 
flight, thermal loads, the dynamics of the engine 
inlet system, and stability and control issues 
with the aircraft. The YF-12 had a very narrow 
flight envelope at high speeds, and if the stabil- 
ity augmentation system failed, for example, the 
aircraft could become extremely difficult to fly. 
The Blackbird also had sensitive and complex 
engine inlets, which varied their position based 
on the aircraft's speed, altitude, attitude, and 
other factors. They also were susceptible to an 
unpleasant occurrence known as an "inlet 
unstart," which occurred when the shock wave 
formed by the aircraft's high speed flight 
jumped from its normal position just inside the 
inlet to outside the inlet opening. The effect on 
the aircraft was described by one pilot as "kind 
of like a train wreck," because it jolted the 
aircraft so badly." 
As with the X-15, some of the research 
conducted with the YF-12s was unrelated to the 
aircraft itself. One project, for example, was a 
"cold wall" experiment that involved super- 
cooling an insulated test fixture on the aircraft 
Page 77 
before take-off, and then explosively removing 
the coating once the aircraft reached Mach 3. 
This test, which achieved laboratory standards 
at 14 miles above the Earth's surface, became a 
benchmark heat transfer and fluid dynamics 
experiment. 
The YF-12 flight research program was 
much more trouble-free and successful than the 
XB-70A, completing almost 300 flights and 450 
flight hours in nine years. Both aircraft, how- 
ever, gave NASA researchers an opportunity to 
study an area even the X-15 could not cover: 
sustained flight at speeds of Mach 3. By the 
late 1970s, however, the SST project was long 
dead and fuel efficiency had become a much 
greater national concern than extremely high- 
speed flight. So at the end of 1978, the YF-12 
program was canceled. The staff at Dryden was 
disappointed, of course. The rocket aircraft 
were already gone, and the Blackbirds repre- 
sented a kind of wonderful, sleek mystery and 
excitement that systems research at transonic 
speeds just couldn't match. But the program 
had served its purpose, and no research project 
lasts forever.45 
If Dryden's researchers could have 
looked 12 years into the future, however, they 
might have felt better. In 1990, the Air Force 
made the shocking announcement that it was 
retiring the SR-71s. Spy satellites, it was an- 
nounced, could adequately perform the 
Blackbird's role. 
Scientists at NASA had shown renewed 
interest in the SR-71s for a couple of years prior 
to the Air Force's announcement. Some atmo- 
spheric researchers wanted a platform that 
could perform research at higher altitudes than 
the U-2 aircraft the Center was then using. In 
1987-88 Ames had inquired about getting an 
SR-71 for its use, but the Air Force at that time 
had limited airframes at its disposal. That 
changed with the retirement announcement. 
Suddenly, the Air Force offered NASA not one 
but three Blackbirds on long-term loan. Re- 
searchers at Ames and Dryden weren't immedi- 
ately sure what they would do with three air- 
craft, but they snapped them up. 
The official agreement was for two SR- 
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YF-12A showing the 
hollow cylinderflown 
beneath the aircraft to 
obtain flight data about 
heat transfer and skin 
friction for correlations 
with theoretical findings 
and data from wind 
tunnels. During one 
flight, researchers 
insulated the cylinder 
from the effects of 
aerodynamic heating 
while cooling it with 
liquid nitrogen. As the 
aircraft accelerated to 
nearly Mach 3, a primer 
cord blew off the insula- 
tion, and instruments 
measured temperatures, 
pressures, and friction. 
The same cylinder and 
sensors were also 
exposed to Mach 3 
conditions in the Langley 
Research Center's 
Unitary Plan Wind 
Tunnel. The correlations 
offlight data with both 
theory and wind-tunnel 
data were excellent, 
making this "Cold- Wall 
Experiment," as it was 
called, a significant 
achievement in the field 
offluid mechanics. 
(NASA Photo ECN 4777) 
71As and one SR-71B training aircraft, along 
with appropriate spare parts. But Dryden, which 
was given the aircraft to manage and fly, found 
itself overwhelmed by the generosity of the Air 
Force line personnel who were responsible for 
dispensing those parts. The Dryden managers 
discovered that there was an intensely loyal 
group of SR-71 supporters within the Air Force 
who were concerned that the SR-7 1 s might be 
wanted again someday. Consequently, they 
wanted to make sure that Dryden had not only 
what it needed for its own research but also 
sufficient quantities of critical parts and materi- 
als so that if somebody ever wanted to reacti- 
vate the SR-7ls, the necessary support equip- 
ment and materials would still exist. 
The foresight of these people was 
rewarded just four years later, when Congress 
authorized the reactivation of three SR-71 
aircraft for Air Force reconnaissance use. 
NASA's spare parts and current, trained person- 
nel suddenly became a key component to 
allowing that reactivation to happen. Dryden 
returned one of its three SR-7 1 s, supplied 
necessary spare parts and equipment, and then 
took on the job of retraining Air Force person- 
nel and pilots and conducting functional test 
flights for the Air Force. 
In the meantime, Dryden' s SR-7 1 s have 
performed a variety of research programs. Some 
have been follow-on research to the XB-70N 
YF-12 work in the 1960s and 1970s, sparked by 
NASA's new High Speed Research program 
begun in 1990. One flight program, for ex- 
ample, used the SR-71 to map not just the 
ground impact but also the actual shape, size 
and characteristics of sonic booms from behind 
and below the aircraft all the way to the ground. 
This information may lead to supersonic aircraft 
that produce sonic-boom levels acceptable to 
communities underneath their flight path. 
Another set of flights has explored the radiation 
effects on the crew (and future passengers) for 
sustained flight above 60,000 feet, which is 
another consideration for a High Speed Civil 
Transport. 
The Blackbirds have also been used as 
platforms for more unusual research projects. 
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called for a scale version of the rocket engine to 
be mounted on the back of the SR-71 and fired 
when the aircraft achieved the desired speed 
and aldtude, 
The SR-71 has also been used to con- 
duct research in an environment (above 90% of 
the Earth's atmosphere) that no other aircraft 
could reach. For example, the Blackbird has 
carried experiments that looked at the ultravio- 
let (UV) ray penetration and W backscatter in 
the atmosphere. It has also used a forward- 
looking laser to gather more "pure" air samples 
and to try to predict clear air turbulence as far 
as two miles ahead of the aircraft. 
More than 30 years after its first flight, 
the SR-7 I remains a flexible, capable tool, and 
it is still the only aircraft capable of sustained 
Mach 3 flight at altitudes above 60,000 feet. As 
such, it offers a unique kind of service both to 
NASA and, as it turns out, the Air Force. The 
aircraft has already provided valuable atmo- 
spheric and aeronautical data, and all expecta- 
tions are that it can continue to play a valuable 
research role for some time to come. Yet al- 
tho~lgh it was not intended, one of the biggest 
contributions of NASA's SR-7 1 program was 
that it provided a way for items critical for an 
SR-7 1 reactivation to be preserved. The Air 
Force Blackbird program had been dismantled 
with a vengeance that seemed designed to 
ensure that it would never be resurrected. Had it 
not been for the existence of Dryden and its 
flight research program, the flexible, fast and 
secretive reconnaissance capabilities provided 
by the Blackbird probably would have been lost 
to the Air Force forever. 46 
High Flight Revisited 
The increased interest in the Earth's 
atmosphere among scientists that spurred 
interest in obtaining an SR-71 for NASA has, in 
fact, spawned numerous flight research projects 
at Dryden. As opposed to the X-15 days, how- 
ever, this new effort in high altitude flight is 
dominated not by piloted high-performance 
rocket aircraft, but by low-powered Remotely 
Piloted Vehicles (RPVs). 
RPVs have been used for flight research 
at Dryden since the 1960s, when model builder 
Dale Reed was conducting his experiments with 
lifting-body designs. Although his initial mod- 
els were free-flight designs, the development of 
radio-controlled aircraft technology allowed 
him to innovate further with his model research. 
By the late 1960s, he and fellow engineer Dick 
Eldredge had built a 14-foot-long radio-con- 
trolled "Mother" ship that they used to drop a 
variety of radio-controlled lifting-body designs. 
By late 1968, "Mother" had made 120 launch 
drops, including a sleek lifting-body design 
Reed dubbed the "Hyper 111." The Hyper I11 
followed the concept of the X-24B lifting body 
design, with a predicted low-speed lift-to-drag 
ratio as high as 5: 1. Reed envisioned the Hyper 
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Perseus high-altitude, 
remotely controlled research 
aircraft on lakebed at night 
(I99I). This high-altitude, 
lightweight, remotely-piloted 
aircraft-designed and built 
by Aurora Flight Sciences 
Corp. of Manassas, Vir- 
ginia-was part of what 
came to be called the 
Environmental Research 
Aircraft and Sensor Technol- 
ogy (ERAST) program to 
study high-altitude, long- 
endurance aircraft for 
evaluation (and ultimately, 
protection) of the upper 
atmosphere. 
(NASA Photo EC91623-7) 
Perseus high-altitude, 
remotely controlled research 
aircraft being towed over the 
lakebed in I994. Built by 
Aurora Flight Sciences 
Corp. of Manassas, Virginia, 
to carry scientific payloads 
to high altitudes for study of 
atmospheric conditions, 
Perseus had to be towed to 
about 700 feet and then 
released for flight under its 
own power. 
(NASA Photo 
EC94 42461 -2) 
pilots to identify with, 
which gave them much 
less support both within 
Dryden and in the greater 
aerospace community as 
well. So Dryden's Director 
Paul Bikle told Reed he 
could build the full-scale 
Hyper III, but only if he 
included a cockpit so the 
Center could conduct 
follow-on piloted flight 
research if the radio- 
111 as a hypersonic lifting body with small, controlled work went well. 
retractable wings that would be extended for The radio controlled research with the 
better maneuvering at slow speeds. Hyper III, which was "flown" by pilot Milt 
The Hyper 111 was along the lines of a Thompson in a simulator-type cockpit on the 
vehicle the Air Force was pursuing, and NASA lakebed, went well, although it had a lower lift 
to-drag ratio than pre- 
dicted. But for a variety of 
reasons, NASA headquar- 
ters turned down plans for 
follow-on piloted research, 
I and the vehicle was retiredE7 
I Dryden has conducted a I variety of other RPV 
u projects over the years, 
ranging from small models 
to a full-scale Boeine 720 
years, support for RPV 
thought it might have potential as a second- 
generation Space Shuttle. So in 1969, Reed 
received permission to build a lightweight full- 
scale version of the aircraft to be drop tested 
from a helicopter. Reed's initial idea was to 
make the aircraft a pure unpiloted vehicle, but 
unpiloted flight vehicles were not popular at 
Dryden in those days. RPVs were difficult for 
research has come with the 
desire and need to find out more about the 
Earth's atmosphere. Concerns about a dimin- 
ished ozone layer, ultraviolet ray penetration 
and greenhouse effects have launched an en- 
tirely new cooperative research effort at Dryden 
known as the Environmental Research Aircraft 
and Sensor Technology (ERAST) program. The 
program is an example of a new kind of govern- 
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ment-industry research partnership that is 
emerging as global competition and the high 
cost of developing new technology make it 
necessary for manufacturers to cooperate with 
each other in high-tech research. 
The ERAST program operates under 
guidelines called a Joint Sponsored Research 
Agreement (JSRA). Under the terms of a JSRA, 
government funding is split among several 
industry partners who agree to pursue different 
aspects of pre-competitive basic research and 
share the results with each other. These kinds of 
agreements were not allowed until 1984, when 
Congress passed the National Cooperative 
! I I  I ! !  
Research Aircraft Act. The act revised nearly 
100-year old restrictions imposed by the 
Sherman Antitrust Law prohibiting any kind of 
cooperative research and development effort 
among competing companies. 
The ERAST program was formed 
between NASA and four industry partners who 
were developing high-altitude RPVs: 
Aerovironment, Inc., Aurora Flight Sciences 
Corporation, General Atomics, and Scaled 
Composites, Inc. The goal of the consortium is 
to develop high altitude, long endurance aircraft 
that might evolve into commercially viable 
products.48 
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The DAST (Drones for 
Aerodynamic and Structural 
Testing) being calibrated in 
a hangar. The DAST was 
one of many remotely piloted 
vehicles used in Dryden 
research programs because 
they provide a safer way of 
obtaining data in high-risk 
situations than do piloted 
vehicles. 
(NASA Photo ECN 20288) 
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Right: NASA ERAST 
(Environmental Research 
Aircraft and Sensor 
Technology)/Aerovironment 
pod on Pathfinder aircraft 
at sunrise 
(NASA Photo 
EC95 43207-8) 
Centec Pathfinder solar 
powered, remotely controlled, 
high-altitude research aircraft 
on lakebed at sunrise. This I 
all-wing aircraft weighing less 
than 600pounds set a record 
for the highest altitude 
reached by a solar-powere 
airplane, 50,567 feet, on 11 
September 1995. 
Aerovironment, Znc. of 
Monrovia, California, built 
and operates the aircraf. 
(NASA Photo 
EC93 42240-37) I 
Bottom: Pathfinder in flight 
above lakebed. 
(NASA Photo EC93 42240-25) 
As of 1995, two of the ERAST aircraft 
had flown. The Perseus A, built by the Aurora 
Flight Sciences Corporation, was designed for 
sustained flight at 80,000 feet. It was built with 
an experimental gasolinefiquid-oxygen engine, 
because one of the technical challenges to light- 
weight, high-altitude flight is that the air is too 
thin to support normally aspirated gasoline 
engines. The Perseus A did, in fact, reach 
50,000 feet on one flight, but subsequent testing 
revealed that the engine was in need of more 
development work. The engine is a complex 
"closed-cycle" design that reuses its own 
exhaust, mixing it with liquid oxygen and fuel 
to keep the engine firing. This would allow it to 
operate at high altitudes, but it also creates a 
high-temperature, caustic engine environment 
that led to numerous engine problems. One 
Perseus was also lost in November 1994 when 
an autopilot gyro malfunctioned, but the com- 
pany planned to continue flight testing after 
additional engine development work was 
completed. 
The second flying ERAST aircraft is the 
solar-powered Pathfinder, built by 
Aerovironment, whose founder Paul 
MacCready designed the innovative human- 
powered Gossamer Condor aircraft. The Path- 
finder is an extremely lightweight aircraft with 
a wing loading of only 0.6 pounds per square 
foot 49 and six solar-powered electric motors, 
designed to reach altitudes of 65,000 feet. A 
follow-on version might be able to stay aloft for 
literally months at a time to monitor atmo- 
spheric conditions and changes. The Pathfinder 
was actually designed in the early 1980s and 
was evaluated as part of a classified "black" 
military program, but it was shelved because 
the technology needed to make extremely 
lightweight solar-powered engines did not yet 
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exist. Advances in electronic miniaturization 
and performance over the next 10 years, how- 
ever, brought the concept within the realm of 
feasibility and led to the current research pro- 
gram. In September 1995, the Pathfinder set a 
national electric-powered aircraft altitude 
record, reaching a height of 50,567 feet. 
The other two aircraft designs in the 
ERAST program are Scaled Composites' D2 
and General Atomics' Altus, both of which are 
powered by gasoline, aided by multi-stage 
turbochargers. Plans called for these two RPVs 
to begin flight research programs in 1996. It is 
too soon to know the outcome of the ERAST 
efforts, but researchers see applications for this 
type of technology and aircraft not only for 
atmospheric research but also as an inexpensive 
type of communications "satellite," as well as 
reconnaissance and weather-tracking tasks.50 
Conclusion 
The amount of research effort devoted 
to exploring the world of high speed and high 
altitude flight at the Dryden Flight Research 
Center, and the knowledge gained from those 
efforts over the past 50 years, have been sub- 
stantial. When the first group arrived at Muroc, 
reliable jet aircraft were still a thing of the 
future, and the speed of sound was a towering 
wall that seemed an impenetrable barrier to any 
flight beyond it. Yet as a result of the research 
conducted with the early X-planes, aircraft have 
been flying routinely at two or three times that 
speed for many years. The X-15 was a concept 
years ahead of its time--closer to the Space 
Shuttle of the 1980s than the Mercury and 
Gemini capsules of its day-and the hypersonic 
rocket plane developed numerous technologies 
that aided the space exploration that followed. 
The lifting bodies were not the exact shape 
chosen for that Space Shuttle, but they drarnati- 
cally influenced the thinking of decision-makers 
who chose to make the Space Shuttle a horizon- 
tal landing vehicle that would glide back to its 
runway landing. 
Because NASA's research goals and 
efforts reflect national concerns, there was a 
decline in high speed and altitude research as 
fuel economy and systems improvement be- 
came higher national priorities in the 1970s and 
1980s. In more recent years, however, an 
increasingly global economy, advances in 
technology and environmental concerns have 
prompted NASA researchers to revisit the field 
again. Once, the challenge was to develop the 
ability to go fast and fly high. Now, it is to fly 
high and fast without negatively impacting the 
environment or people below. Or to go into 
space more cheaply and more efficiently. Or to 
develop the ability to fly high for long enough 
periods of time so that changes to the atmo- 
sphere can be detected and measured. 
The rules have changed; the standards 
have gotten higher. Yet it is not human nature 
ever to say "We have learned enough." The 
projects may have to wait until technology can 
make them economical, or a need exists to 
make the technology worthwhile. But as long as 
we know we have not reached the limits of 
possibility, there will always be a desire to 
explore the world that is a little higher and a 
little faster than we have ever gone before. 
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YF-12 forebody heater 
undergoing a lamp check in 
the Thermal Loads Facility for 
a Mach 3 heating simulation 
to supportflight loads 
research on supersonic 
aircraft. The facility, which 
has gone under different 
names over the course of its 
history, was constructed in 
1965 to pelform combined 
mechanical and thermal load 
tests on structural components 
and complete flight vehicles. 
The measurement of structural 
loads had long been an 
important part offlight 
research through the use of 
strain gauges to measure the 
forces operating on the 
aircraft structures, but this 
method only worked at 
subsonic and transonic speeds. 
At the supersonic speeds of the 
YF-12, the high temperatures 
produced by friction with the 
atmosphere required more 
sophisticated techniques 
involving thermal calibration 
of the aircraft and the system 
of strain gauges. Because of 
these high temperatures, it 
was difSicult to separate the 
aerodynamic from the thermal 
effects upon the airplane. As a 
result, Dryden conducted one 
of the most complex series of 
tests ever done on an aircraft, 
combining both flight and 
ground-facility techniques and 
resources. The enormous data 
base collected during this 
effort led to methods for 
separating the aerodynamic 
and thermal forces operating 
on an aircraft-a capability 
that will be of great impor- 
tance for the design, structural 
integrity, and safety of future 
supersonic and hypersonic 
aircraft. 
(NASA Photo EC712789) 
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Dryden engineer Bill 
Burcham's diagram on a 
napkin that began Dryden's 
involvement with the 
Propulsion Controlled 
Aircraft program. In the 
diagram, DEFCS stands for 
Digital Electronic Flight 
Control System, a computer 
that integrates engine and 
flight controls; HIDEC 
stands for Highly Integrated 
Digital Electronic Control. 
(NASA Photo 
EC94 42805-1) 
the first 20 years of planned, exploratory flight research at Dryden 
focused predominantly on developing aircraft that could fly higher and faster, the 
second 20 years were characterized by research efforts to allow aircraft to fly ""bet- 
ter." Almost two dozen flight programs at Dryden since the late 1960s have explored 
technology and concepts to make aircraft more fuel-efficient and maneuverable and 
to create vastly improved operating systems. 
There were two catalysts that helped spur these research efforts at Dryden. 
One was a shift in national research priorities sparked by the end of the era of cheap 
fuel. The fuel crisis of the early 1970s made comercia1 aircraft that attained speed 
from brute horsepower, like gas-guzzling cars, a luxury the country could no longer 
afford. Increasing fuel efficiency suddenly became a higher public-policy prioniq, 
driving focused research programs in those areas? 
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r driving force behind the 1989, however, an IBM personal computer (PC) 
exponential growth of elec- with one megabyte of main memory could fit 
ter technology. When Apollo on a desktop and cost around $3,000. A mere 
oon in 1969, the onboard five years later, the memory available in PCs 
emory of 36,000 words,2 and had jumped to an almost hard-to-comprehend 
consisted of a simple number number called a gigabyte.3 
buttons marked "noun" and The advances were staggering, and they 
were issued by selecting were matched by equally significant leaps in 
rb key and then a number miniaturization and electronics. All of this 
cific word. Verbs told the technology opened up an entirely new field of 
ion to take; nouns identified aeronautical design. Flight computers made 
ch the action should be taken. unconventional, unstable aircraft configurations 
hnology had advanced far possible for the first time, allowing the design 
uild computers with one of significantly more maneuverable aircraft. 
The forward-swept wing X-29, the thrust- 
vectoring X-3 1, and even the General Dynamics 
course, a one-megabyte F-16 "Falcon" fighter jet were all products of 
1 took up the better part of the computer age. 
d cost around $365,000. By Advances in computers and electronics 
Y-1 instrumer 
compare witr 
,n next page) 
NASA Photo 
lane1 
zat of 
Flights of Discovegt 
I F-18 instrument panel 
(compare with that of X-I on 
preceding page) 
(NASA Photo 
EC95 43155-7) 
also made it possible to vastly improve aircraft 
systems. Electronic signals became a viable 
alternative to hydraulic and mechanical control 
linkages, and researchers began to explore 
"smart" components that could increase effi- 
ciency by seeking optimum engine and control 
settings or compensate for malfunctions in other 
parts or systems. 
All of these new technologies might not 
be as dramatic as a rocket-powered X-15 
streaking across the sky at Mach 6. Indeed, 
some of these modifications did not change the 
look of an aircraft at all. But the impact this 
research had on aircraft design, the capabilities 
of U.S. military and civil aircraft, and the 
competitiveness of the U.S. aircraft industry 
was just as significant as the high speed projects 
that had come before. 
Efficiency 
The Supercritical WingMission 
Adaptive Wing 
The Supercritical Wing (SCW) was a 
design concept envisioned by Dr. Richard T. 
Whitcomb, a research engineer at the NASA 
Langley Research Center. He had already won 
a Collier Trophy for developing the "area rule" 
approach to supersonic aircraft design? which 
was first incorporated into the Convair F- 102A 
and flight tested at Dryden. With regard to the 
SCW, Whitcomb theorized that a wing could be 
shaped to modify shock-wave formation and 
associated boundary-layer separations and 
therefore delay the typically sharp increase in 
drag that occurred as an aircraft approached the 
speed of sound. If the rise in drag could be 
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delayed until almost Mach 1, it could make a 
transonic aircraft much more fuel-efficient, 
either increasing its speed or range, or decreas- 
ing the amount of fuel it needed to burn. 
Whitcomb had worked on the concept 
since the early 1960s and had tested numerous 
shapes in the wind tunnels at Langley. But the 
question of how his design would perform on 
an actual aircraft still remained. To research the 
concept in flight, Langley chose a Vought F-8A 
Crusader, an older Navy jet fighter that could 
perform easily in the transonic range. The 
Crusader also had a distinctive variable-inci- 
dence wing that was raised by a hydraulic 
actuator to allow the aircraft to land at a slower 
speed with better cockpit visibility. This feature 
meant the wing could be replaced with a test 
airfoil more easily than most aircraft. 
Since Whitcomb's smooth, supercritical 
wing design could not integrate the F-8's 
adjustable- wing feature or wing flaps, the F-8 
SCW would need an extraordinarily long 
landing and take-off area. One of the main 
reasons the F-8 SCW research was conducted at 
Dryden instead of Langley, where Dr. 
Whitcomb worked, was Dryden's exceptional 
high-speed take-off and landing facilities. The F-8 modified Langley 
modified F-8 could take off from Edwards' research engineer Dr. 
15,000-foot paved runway toward the Rogers 
Dry Lake, and it could land on the lakebed itself. 
Richard whitcomb's 
Supercritical Wing, in flight 
(NASA Photo EC73 3468) 
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NASA acquired three F-8 aircraft, and 
the one modified with a Supercritical Wing 
began its flight research in March 1971. The 
program showed promise, and follow-on flights 
also incorporated fairings on the fuselage to 
give it a more efficient "area-ruled" shape. The 
results of this flight research indicated that a 
transport aircraft with a similar design could go 
as much as 20 percent faster. But even as the 
research was being conducted, OPEC (Organi- 
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) 
tripled the price of crude oil. Airlines suddenly 
F-8 Digital Fly-By-Wire and 
Supercritical Wing aircraft wanted efficiency, not speed. So Whitcomb 
infomution Over modified the wing design for maximum aerody- 
snow-covered mountains 
(NASA photo ECN 3495) namic efficiency. The modified wing showed 
the potential for substantial fuel savings, and 
the design was subsequently incorporated into 
many transport airplanes.6 
At the same time as the F-8 SCW 
research was investigating the civil applications 
of a supercritical wing, the military was begin- 
ning a research effort called the Transonic 
Aircraft Technology (TACT) program. The 
TACT research involved applying a 
supercritical wing to a General Dynamics F- 1 1 1 
to see how the concept might benefit military 
aircraft. The F-1 1 1 was chosen because like the 
F-8, it had an easily replaceable wing. Further- 
more, the Air Force was looking for retrofit 
technology that could improve the performance 
Improving Eficiency, Maneuverabiij~ and Systems Page 91 
- -  - 
I i'lh 
i, 
I kl:i 1W Y I I 1 I 'I Y Il~II I I : 11 l I I I, Ill I II I I 
of its active-duty F-1 1 1 s. In addition to Langley proven itself and was incorporated into future 
and Dryden, the TACT program involved the military aircraft designs. 
Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory and the 
NASA Arnes Research Center, which under- 
took the development of the advanced wing 
configuration. 
The F- 1 1 1 TACT began its flight 
research program in February 1972. In three 
The F-11 1 TACT actually kept flying 
through the early 1980s, testing different drag- 
reducing aerodynamic modifications. The 
program's success also influenced the develop- 
ment of a "next-generation" wing research 
effort under a program called Advanced Fighter 
F-111 Advanced Fighter 
Technology Integration I (AFTZ) research aircraft 
years of flight research, it showed that a 
supercritical wing could, in fact, improve the 
performance of a military aircraft, generating up 
to 30 percent more lift than a conventional F- 
11 1 wing. The research also showed that attach- 
ing external munitions to the wing did not 
cancel out these gains, and that a supercritical 
wing did not degrade performance at supersonic 
speeds. Ultimately, the Air Force decided not to 
retrofit the F- 1 1 1 s, but the technology had 
Technology Integration (AFTI). The initial 
AFTI experiment was something called a 
"Mission Adaptive Wing" (MAW) that was 
tested on the modified F-1 1 1 TACT aircraft. 
Venturing one step further than the 
Supercritical Wing, internal controls in the 
MAW flexed the aircraft wing to adjust the 
amount of its camber (curvature), depending on 
the flight conditions. It could flex enough to 
generate the additional lift needed for slow 
in flight 
(NASA Photo 
EC86 33385-5) 
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MD-1 I showing one 
application of the winglet 
concept in a production 
aircraf. Winglets produce a 
forward force component 
(thrust) in the vortices that 
usually swirl o f  of conven- 
tional wingtips, thereby 
reducing the overall drag of 
the airplane. Developed by 
Richard Whitcomb at 
Lungley Research Center, 
winglets demonstrated in 
flight research at Dryden in 
1979 and 1980 that they 
could increase an aircraft's 
range by up to seven 
percent at cruise speeds. 
(NASA Photo 
EC95 43247-5) 
speeds, eliminating the need for lift-producing 
devices such as slats and flaps; change to a 
Supercritical Wing planform for transonic 
flight, and adjust to a near-symmetrical section 
for supersonic speeds. The F-1 1 1 AFTI flight 
research lasted three years, from 1985 to 1988, 
and indicated that the drag reduction from a 
MAW design could increase performance in 
different flight conditions anywhere from 8 to 
20 percent. The information from the AFTI 
flight program came too late to be incorporated 
into the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) 
designs, but it may well be incorporated into the 
next generation of aircraft.7 
Winglets 
The search for ways to make transonic 
aircraft more fuel-efficient also led to another 
Dryden flight research program prompted by 
the work of Richard Whitcomb. This one 
involved the use of winglets, which are small, 
nearly vertical fins installed on an airplane's 
wing tips to help produce a forward thrust in the 
vortices that typically swirl off the end of the 
wing, thereby reducing drag. The winglet 
concept actually dated back as far as 1897, 
when an inventor took out a patent on the idea, 
but it was not until Whitcomb began a focused 
investigation into winglet aerodynamics that 
they matured into an applicable technology. 
Whitcomb tested several designs in the wind 
tunnels at Langley and chose the best configura- 
tion for a flight research program. 
The winglets were installed on a KC- 
135A8 tanker on loan from the Air Force and 
flight tested in 1979 and 1980. The research 
showed that the winglets could increase an 
aircraft's range by as much as seven percent at 
cruise speeds, a significant improvement. The 
first industry application of the winglet concept 
was actually in general aviation business jets, 
but winglets are now being incorporated into 
most new commercial and military transport 
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jets, including the Gulfstream 111 and IV busi- 
ness jets, the Boeing 747-400 and McDonnell 
Douglas MD- 1 1 airliners, and the McDonnell 
Douglas C- 17 military transport.9 
The AD-1 Oblique Wing 
A more radical approach to making 
wings more efficient was a concept called the 
"oblique wing," which involved a wing that 
would pivot laterally up to 60 degrees around a 
center point on top of the fuselage. At higher 
speeds, having the wing more closely aligned 
with the direction of flight would reduce the 
aircraft's drag ~ i ~ c a n t l y .  A researcher at the 
NASA Ames Research Center named Robert T. 
Jones pioneered the concept and had analyzed it 
on paper and in the center's wind tunnels. 
Based on his work, Jones predicted that a 
transport-size aircraft with an oblique wing, 
traveling at 1,000 miles per hour, might be 
twice as fuel efficient as conventional aircraft 
designs and could also create a milder sonic 
boom. 
To test the concept in flight, Ames and 
Dryden researchers proposed first building a 
low-cost, piloted vehicle that could investigate 
the flight mechanics of an oblique wing at low 
speeds. If the results were encouraging, funding 
might then be approved for a higher-perfor- 
mance research aircraft that could reach tran- 
sonic speeds. In 1977, construction began on 
the low-speed AD-1, named after the Ames and 
Dryden research centers sponsoring the research 
effort. The AD-1 was a twin-engine, jet-pow- 
ered composite aircraft designed by Ames, 
Dryden and the Rutan Aircraft Factory, and 
built by the Ames Industrial Company. The 
wing would be kept perpendicular to the fuse- 
lage for take-off and landing, and then pivoted 
around up to 60 degrees for the higher-speed 
portions of the flight. It was a simple vehicle, 
with unaugmented controls and a top speed of 
only 175 knots, but its entire design and con- 
struction cost less than $300,000. 
The aircraft completed 79 research 
flights between 1979 and 1982, demonstrating 
satisfactory handling qualities through a 45- 
AD-1 (Ames-Dryden 1) 
oblique-wing aircraft, 
which demonstrated in 79 
research flights between 
1979 and 1982 that such an 
aircraft was controllable 
and that a wing rotated to an 
oblique angle with the 
fuselage could provide 
improvedflight eficiency, as 
predicted by Robert T. Jones 
at Ames Research Center. 
(NASA Photo 
ECN 13305 Fr.4) 
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Laminar Flow Research 
Another way to increase the fuel effi- 
ciency of aircraft was through the use of lami- 
nar flow airfoil designs. "Laminar flow" is a 
term used to indicate air flow that follows the 
contour of an airfoil in a smooth manner, 
instead of burbling and separating from the 
wing. Because laminar airflow generates less 
drag it can make aircraft more fuel-efficient, 
which enables them to have either a longer 
range or larger payload capability. Larninar- 
flow designs actually date back to World War 
11, and the North American P-5 1 was known for 
its highly efficient, laminar-flow wing. But 
even the P-5 1's wing achieved laminar flow for 
only a very short distance from its leading edge. 
As fuel efficiency became a higher 
priority in the 1970s and early 1980s, however, 
finding ways to increase the amount of laminar 
flow on a wing began to generate more interest. 
Dryden and Langley conducted a number of 
laminar-flow experiments, starting with a 
Natural Laminar Flow (NLF) experiment on the 
variably-swept-wing F- 11 1 TACT in the late 
1970s. The goal of the NLF research was to see 
how changing the sweep of a wing affected the 
degree of its laminar flow. An extremely 
smooth NLF airfoil glove was bonded onto the 
F-1 1 1 TACT wing and flown at various sweep 
angles. The F- 1 1 1 TACTNLF program was 
followed up with similar research with a Navy 
Grumrnan F-14 "Tomcat," which also had a 
variable-sweep wing but could investigate 
sweep angles greater than those of the F- 1 1 1. 
Both of these flight research projects gave 
researchers valuable information on how much 
sweep could be incorporated into a subsonic 
wing before it began to lose its laminar-flow 
properties. The research also provided data on 
Two-seat F-16XL, showing 
asymmetric wings and (on 
the left wing, as viewed by 
she pilot) the bottom portion 
of the Supersonic Laminar 
Flow Control (SLFC) 
glove designed to help 
keep airfZow smooth. 
(NASA Photo 
EC95 43267-2) 
degree angle of wing sweep, and acceptable 
qualities up to a 60 degree wing pivot configu- 
ration. It even performed three landings with 
the wing pivoted 45 degrees. The concept has 
yet to be incorporated into any production 
aircraft, but the research provided engineers 
with additional information on both the 
airplane's dynamics and an unconventional 
approach to making aircraft more fuel efficient. 
It also showed, once again, the benefits that 
could be drawn from a simple, low-cost aircraft 
and flight research prograrn.10 
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the impact of other factors on subsonic laminar 
flow, ranging from the speed of the aircraft to 
bugs splattered on the wing's leading edges. 
Up until the late 1980s, however, most 
of Dryden's laminar-flow research had been 
limited to subsonic and low transonic speeds. 
Laminar flow had never been achieved with a 
production supersonic aircraft, because it did 
not occur natu- 
ral1y.l Creating 
supersonic laminar 
flow required some 
kind of active 
control mechanism 
to help keep the air 
flow smooth. 
Dryden researchers 
had begun investi- 
gating a possible 
method for sub- 
sonic laminar-flow 
control using a 
four-engine 
Lockheed "Jetstar" 
business jet. The 
Jetstar experiments 
the other hand, an active laminar flow control 
system might prove very cost-effective, indeed. 
On a Mach 2+ aircraft concept like the High 
Speed Civil Transport (HSCT) for example, the 
9 percent reduction in drag that a laminar-flow 
wing might offer could translate into a similar 
increase in either payload or range. Rockwell 
had begun research on this kind of technology 
involved bonding 
two kinds of perforated skins on the Jetstar 
wings and using a turbo compressor to suck air 
through the perforations to keep the air flowing 
smoothly along the contour of the wings. The 
Jetstar flew simulated airline operations in 
various areas around the country to investigate 
what impact factors such as different weather 
conditions and bug strikes had on its laminar 
flow. These flights did prove the feasibility of 
the concept, but the equipment necessary to 
make the system work was too heavy to make 
the approach worthwhile for subsonic aircraft. 
on its own, and in 
3 1988 Dryden ac- quired two cranked arrow wing F-16XL I prototypes that the 
Air Force was 
preparing to scrap 
but agreed to loan to 
the Center instead. 
Rockwell ap- 
proached Dryden 
and suggested a 
joint supersonic 
laminar-flow- 
control research 
effort, using the F- 
16XL aircraft and a 
test section glove 
manufactured by 
Rockwell. 
A first set of research flights began in 
1991, using a small, perforated titanium wing 
glove and a turbo compressor for the laminar 
flow control. The implementation was a little 
crude, but the experiments were still successful 
enough to prompt a follow-on research effort 
with the second F- 16XL. The second program 
is a more extensive effort among Dryden, 
NASA Langley, Rockwell, Boeing, and 
McDonnell Douglas. As opposed to the first 
research effort, which was designed to see if 
With a supersonic transport aircraft, on supersonic laminar flow was possible to 
Two-seat F-16XL with a 
look-down view of the glove 
being used for Supersonic 
Laminar Flow Control 
research beginning in 1995. 
On the wingtips are red 
flutter exciters to promote 
structural frequencies. 
Researchers then measure 
the response in the aiiframe 
with the glove installed to 
ensure the aircraft is safe to 
fly in that configuration. 
(NASA Photo 
EC9.5 43297-2) 
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achieve, the second program aims to find out 
more information about the behavior of super- 
sonic laminar flow under various flight condi- 
tions. 
The newest set of experiments uses a 
titanium glove approximately four times as 
large as the initial test section. It is perforated 
with 12 million microscopic holes and the 
active laminar-flow 
program that provided more funding and sup- 
port for that work. Even if the HSCT is never 
built, the information gained on supersonic 
laminar flow would be useful to future aeronau- 
tical engineers, but the program is clearly 
directed toward that particular application of the 
technology. 
As a result of the HSCT focus of 
Dryden's supersonic 
Single-seat F-16XL with control is provided 
cranked-arrow wings 
painted black and with white by a modified 
spots that served as points of BOeing 707 cabin 
reference for airjlow 
visualization studies using pressurization 
smoke Or tufts of cloth to pump. The goal of 
indicate patterns of airjlow 
(NASA photo the flight research 
EC94 42885-1) program, which 
began in October = 
laminar-flow re- 
search, the program 
staff at Dryden have 
found themselves 
working directly 
with the transport 
aircraft manufactur- 
1995, is to achieve has been a educa- 
laminar flow across tional experience for 
60 percent of the everyone involved. 
total wing chord The engineers at 
(from the leading Boeing and 
edge to the trailing McDonnell Douglas, 
edge). for example, were 
In one not accustomed to 
sense, the F- 16XL some of the consid- 
I ing industry, whch 
Supersonic Laminar 
Flow Control (SLFC) research is an unusual 
program for Dryden, because it is geared spe- 
cifically toward a particular application-the 
High Speed Civil Transport (HSCT). But it is 
also an example of how ongoing work at 
Dryden can sometimes suddenly receive addi- 
tional support and attention as national priori- 
ties shift. Dryden engineers have been working 
on laminar-flow research for a long time. But 
when the nation decided to pursue a formal 
HSCT program, the smaller-scale laminar-flow 
research that had been conducted at Dryden was 
suddenly pulled into a high-profile, focused 
Improving Eflciency, Maneuverability and Systems 
erations involved in 
high-performance flight research, such as the 
fact that an F- 16XL flying at supersonic speeds 
cannot execute turns without considering the 
airspace available and the sonic-boom footprint. 
By the same token, research engineers at 
Dryden understood the need for supersonic 
aircraft to time turns so that their sonic booms 
did not offend communities below them, but 
they did not have experience with some of the 
constraints of the transport industry, such as the 
need to maneuver in a manner that will always 
provide a smooth, comfortable ride for passen- 
gers. Consequently, the F-16XL partnership has 
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generated an unintended side benefit apart from Maneuverability 
the actual technology being investigated. The 
cooperative effort has helped to give Dryden's HiMAT 
research engineers some useful perspectives on 
X-29 with tracer smoke 
flowing from tiny ports in the 
nose to show airjlow while 
the aircraft was flying at a 
high angle of attack and with 
small strips of cloth called 
the needs and technology constraints of an In the 1950s and 1960s, the driving tufts attached to the aircraft for further visualization of 
industry that will ultimately apply some of the design objective of military fighter aircraft was airjlowpattems. 
technology they help to develop. l2 speed. Speed was life, and fast entry into and (NASA Photo EC91491-1) 
exit from a combat area was thought to provide 
the best combat edge for a fighter pilot. In the 
post-Vietnam era, however, that thinking began 
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program that began in the 
late 1970s. The HiMAT 
was a jet-powered, re- 
motely-piloted vehicle 
that incorporated numer- 
ous advanced design 
features, including a 
computerized flight 
control system, a forward 
canard, a swept wing, 
and graphite-and-fiber- 
glass composite construc- 
tion.13 The HiMAT was 
approximately half the 
size of a production 
HiMAT(Highly Maneuver- to change. In a dogfight, maneuverability was fighter and was launched from the same B-52 
able Aircraft Technology) 
remotely piloted vehicle in more important than speed alone. The advent of mother ship that carried the X-15s and the 
flight (NASA Photo ECN computerization also made more unconven- 
14281) 
tional, but potentially more maneuverable, 
design concepts possible for the first time. 
lifting bodies. It could perform maneuvers 
production fighters could not achieve, such as 
sustained 8 G turns at an altitude of 25,000 feet 
and a meed of Mach 0.9. 
I 
due to its very low wing 
loading. An F-16, by 
comparison, could sustain 
only approximately 4.5 
Gs in similar flight 
conditions. 
The two Rockwell- 
built HiMAT vehicles had 
a top speed of Mach 1.4 
3 and were flown 26 times between 1979 and 1983. Because of its ability to 
sustain high-G turns at 
high speeds, the HiMAT 
could execute turns 
X-29 inflight at an angle One of the first research efforts at almost twice as tight and therefore almost twice 
that highlights the forward 
wept wings (NASA photo Dryden to explore more maneuverable and as fast as operational fighters. The design also 
EC90 039-4) advanced aircraft configurations was the Highly demonstrated the ability of composite construc- 
Maneuverable Aircraft Technology (HiMAT) tion to provide unidirectional stiffness in a 
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Germans had built and 
flight tested a for 
swept wing bomber called 
the Junkers Ju-287. The 
HFB 320 Hansa business 
jet built in the 1960s also 
had a forward-swept wing. 
Proponents argued that a 
forward swept wing (FSW) 
could produce up to a 20 
percent decrease in the 
A 
drag produced by mane 
The X-29 
vering and could provide 
structure. The HiMAT helped manufacturers better control and performance at high angles of 
gain confidence in composite construction, but attack (AoA), or what researchers often called 
it also strongly influenced the design of a high "alpha."l5 The problem with the design 
piloted research aircraft that would go even was that at high speeds, the aerodynamic forces 
further in demonstrating and researching ad- on the wing would lead to something called 
vanced aircraft technology-the X-29.14 "structural divergence." In simple terms, that 
meant the wings would fail and rip away from 
the fuselage. Using conventional materials, the 
only way to make the wings strong enough not 
In a sense, the X-29 was the result of an to fail was to make them extremely heavy, 
industry-funded follow-on project to the which negated any advantage of a fonvard- 
HiMAT. The Grumman Corporation had also swept wing design. 
submitted a proposal for the HiMAT vehicle The composite materials demonstrated 
and, after losing the contract, the company in the HiMAT, however, offered the possibility 
conducted a series of wind-tunnel tests to see of a lightweight construction material that could 
why the design had not won the competition. give the unidirectional stiffness necessary to 
Retired Air Force Col. Norris J. Krone, Jr., an make a forward swept wing feasible. With 
aeronautical engineer who had written a thesis Colonel Krone's input, Grumman decided to 
on forward-swept-wing configurations, hap- conduct wind tunnel tests on an FSW version of 
pened to be at the NASA Langley Research its HiMAT vehicle. The tests proved successful 
Center when Grumrnan conducted its wind- enough that Grumman decided to build a full- 
tunnel tests there. Krone suggested that scale version, funded with its own money. 
Grumman might improve the aircraft's perfor- Krone, by that time, had gone to work at the 
mance by switching its aft-swept wing to a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
fonvard-swept wing design. (DARPA) and lobbied successfully for the 
Fonvard-swept wing designs were not development of a DARPA-funded forward 
new; indeed, as early as World War 11, the swept wing technology demonstrator aircraft. 
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A pair of X-29 forward- 
swept-wing advanced 
technology demonstrator 
research aircrafi silhouetted 
on the lakebed by the 
sunlight, with the shadow 
emphasizing the forward 
sweep of the wings 
(NASA Photo EC90 357-4) 
Grumman ultimately won 
the contract for what 
became the X-29, and the 
first of the two aircraft 
built for the program made 
its first flight from 
Edwards Air Force Base in 
December 1984. It was the I 
first time an "X3 aircraft 
had flown at Dryden in 10 
years. 
The X-29 was a h 
combined effort among 
DARPA, the Air Force, NASA, Grumman, and 
numerous other contractors, and its goal was to 
investigate a number of different advanced 
ahcraft technologies. The primary focus, of 
course, was the X-29's dramatic forward-swept 
wing conf*iguration. But the composite wing 
also incorporated a thin supercritical-wing 
section that was approximately half as thick as 
the one flown on Dryden's F-8. The aircraft 
also featured a variable-incidence canard 
located close to the main wing, three-surface 
pitch control (flaperons on the wing; the canard; 
and flaps on aft fuselage strakes), and an inher- 
ently unstable design. Artificial stability was 
provided by the aircraft's digital flight-control 
system (FCS) that made control surface inputs 
up to 40 times per second. 
An unstable design could be much more 
maneuverable, but if the computerized flight- 
control system failed, the aircraft would be lost. 
Researchers also calculated that if the failure 
happened at certain points in the X-29's flight 
envelope, the aircraft would break up before the 
pilot could eject. Consequently, the X-29's 
FCS had three digital computers, each of which 
had an analog backup. If one computer failed, 
the other two would '"vote" the malfunctioning 
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computer out and take over. If all the digital 
computers failed, the aircraft would still be 
flyable using the analog backup mode. 
Knowing how critical the FCS was, 
researchers spent hours upon hours trying to 
foresee any and every conceivable failure point 
that might endanger the aircraft. Yet even after 
the X-29 had been flying some time, research- 
ers discovered several "single-point-failure" 
problems that underscored the difficulty of 
predicting every contingency in an advanced 
technology aircraft. During a ground test, for 
example, a small light bulb short-circuited, 
sending strange voltages to the digital flight- 
control computers. It was a minor item, but if it 
had failed in the air it would have taken out all 
three digital computers simultaneously, as well 
as the telemetry system. The aircraft would 
have reverted to its analog flight-control sys- 
tem, but the only person who would have 
known it was still flying would have been the 
pilot himself. Fortunately, this X-29 problem 
was discovered on the ground. Several years 
later, however, a similarly unforeseen single- 
point failure would cause the loss of an X-3 1 
research airplane. 
The X-29 performed very successfully 
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throughout its flight research program. The 
flights conducted with the first X-29 aircraft 
follow-on research effort to explore the 
aircraft's behavior at low speeds and high 
F/A-18 High Angle of Attack 
Research Vehicle (HARV) 
durinn an ennine run, with 
explored its low-altitude, high-speed perfor- angles of attack was approved, using the second paddlk behind the nozzles 
deflecting the exhaust 
mance. The results showed, first and foremost, X-29. The follow-on program also investigated inflight, this 
that a highly unstable, forward-swept aircraft some possible benefits the X-29 configuration would have the effect of 
- 
rotating the rear of the 
could be flown safely and reliably. The X-29 might have for a future fighter aircraft. For one 
aircra/r downward. 
also was able to maintain a higher sustained G portion of the follow-on program, the X-29 was (NASA Photo ~C91075-38) 
load in turns and maneuver with a smaller turn also modified with a vortex flow control system 
radius than comparable fighters with aft-swept that injected air into the vortices coming off its 
wings. nose to investigate whether that technology 
Based on the success of the first phase, a could help control an aircraft at high angles of 
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attack. Although the vortex control system was use of digital flight-control systems, especially 
not designed to substantially affect the behavior with regard to highly unstable aircraft designs. 
of the X-29 itself, the technology showed a lot In addition, the X-29 program paved the way 
of promise for future designs. for future research into the realm of highly 
In general, the phase two flights showed maneuverable, high-angle-of-attack flight, both 
that the X-29 configuration performed much with Dryden's FIA-18 High Alpha Research 
better than expected at high angles of attack. Vehicle (HARV) and the International Test 
Pilots found they had good control response up Organization's (ITO) X-3 1 aircraft.17 
to an angle of attack of about 40 degrees, a 
marked improvement over conventional fighter The FIA-18 HARV 
designs. Even when the control response began 
to degrade between 40 and 50 degrees, it did so The X-29 follow-on research program 
"gracefully," in the words of one pilot, and one was just one of several research projects in the 
flight even reached an angle of attack of 67 late 1980s that were focused on trying to over- 
degrees. 16 
F/A-18 High Angle of Attack 
Research Vehicle (HARV) 
banking in flight (NASA The X-29 
Photo EC94 42513-1 9 )  program concluded in 
1992 after complet- 
ing 362 research 
flights in eight years. 
It is still too soon to 
say whether its 
forward-swept wing 
design will ever be 
incorporated into a 
production fighter 
aircraft. But the X-29 
had an immediate 
impact on aircraft 
design by adding to 
engineers' under- 
standing of compos- 
ites, which are being 
used more and more 
extensively in mili- 
tary and civilian 
aircraft. It also 
generated valuable 
come a limitation of 
flight every bit as 
challenging as the 
sound barrier had 
been 40 years earlier. 
The X-29 follow-on 
research, NASA's 
FIA- 18 HARV18 and 
I the X-3 1 aircraft all 
I attempted to expand 
the envelope beyond 
what researchers 
dubbed the "stall 
barrier" that lirnited 
aircraft performance 
at low speeds and 
high angles of attack. 
The tendency of 
aircraft to stall and 
become uncontrol- 
lable at high angles of 
attack and slow 
speeds was the 
greatest limiting 
factor in an airplane's 
information on the I maneuverability. The 
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X-31 Enhanced Fighter 
Maneuverability research 
aircraj?, equipped with 
thrust vectoring paddles and 
advancedflight control 
systems, is shown here 
banking over Edwards Air 
Force Base. The X-31 flew 
from 1992 to 1995, complet- 
ing a total of 555flights. 
(NASA Photo 
EC93 42152-8) 
X-29 explored one potential design feature that 
might produce better high alpha performance. 
But if aeronautical engineers were going to 
make substantial progress in designing aircraft 
that could operate more effectively in that 
realm, they had to understand it better. The F- 
18 HARV research program was designed to 
tackle this problem. 
The F-18 HARV is a combined effort 
among the NASA Dryden, Langley, Arnes and 
Lewis research centers. The HARV is a 
McDonnell-Douglas F- 18 modified with thrust- 
vectoring paddles to help stabilize the aircraft at 
extremely high angles of attack. This capability 
allows researchers to study and document the 
aerodynamic forces in that region more accu- 
rately. 
Phase one of the HARV effort began in 
1987, before the aircraft was modified with the 
thrust-vectoring paddles. Researchers used tufts 
of yam, dye, and smoke released through ports 
in the aircraft's nose to study air flow over the 
vehicle up to 55 degrees angle of attack. After 
two and a half years and 101 research flights, 
three Inconel thrust-vectoring paddles were 
installed on the aircraft exhaust nozzles. The 
paddles can withstand temperatures of almost 
2,000 degrees Fahrenheit and can rotate up to 
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25 degrees into the engine exhaust to help 
control the aircraft's pitch and yaw. 
With the thrust-vectoring paddles, the 
HARV reached a controllable AoA of 70 
degrees and could execute relatively fast rolls 
up to 65 degrees. In addition to providing data 
to improve wind-tunnel and computational 
design predictions, the F-18 HARV also pro- 
vided a testbed for numerous high alpha experi- 
ments. At one time, the aircraft was conducting 
no fewer than 26 separate experiments. In 
addition, although the HARV thrust vectoring 
was designed primarily as a tool to achieve 
controllable high alpha flight, the aircraft began 
to explore some of the maneuverability and 
control benefits of thrust vectoring. 
In 1995, the airplane was outfitted with 
two retractable nose strakes to continue its 
research into flight at high angles of attack. The 
strakes were deployed in high alpha conditions 
to influence the vortices coming off the 
aircraft's nose and significantly improved the 
controllability of the aircraft in those condi- 
tions. 
The particular thrust-vectoring technol- 
ogy used by the F-18 HARV is not likely to 
find application in a production aircraft. Aside 
from maintenance concerns, the system adds 
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2,100 pounds to the X-31 photographed head-on Ogy that might 
while inflight 
airplane's weight. aircraft that kind of (NASA Photo 
But the aeronautical maneuverability. EC94 42478-13) 
data produced However, Germany 
through its flights did not have the funds 
and testbed experi- to pursue a research 
ments have already aircraft on its own. So 
provided engineers German researchers 
and designers of approached the 
future aircraft with United States about a 
valuable information, possible joint project 
and the program (as to explore thrust- 
of 1996) is still vectoring technology 
gathering additional further. 
flight data. Further- The result was the 
more, even in X-3 1 program-a 
achieving control- highly unusual, 
lable high alpha international research 
flight, it generated effort involving 
interest in and DARPA, the U.S. 
support for the thrust Navy, Deutsche 
vectoring technol- Aerospace,20 the 
ogy, a design con- German Federal 
cept that would Ministry of Defense, 
receive even more Rockwell Interna- 
attention through the tional and, in the last 
X-3 1 research air- three years of the 
craft program.19 
The X-31 
The X-3 1 research aircraft was largely 
the brainchild of German aerodynarnicist Dr. 
program, NASA and the U.S. Air Force. The 
primary goal of the program was to research the 
tactical utility of a thrust-vectored aircraft with 
advanced flight-control systems. 
Like the X-29, the X-3 1 was designed 
with a movable canard, but the X-3 1 had a 
Wolfgang Herbst. Herbst recognized that in the delta-shaped, composite, twisted camber wing. 
close constraints of an air war in the European The wings, the carbon-carbon21 thrust-vectoring 
theater, maneuverability was a critical element paddles and parts of the flight control laws were 
for a successful fighter. If an aircraft could fly designed and built in Germany, while the 
good maneuvers at high angles of attack it 
would be able to turn inside and win over an 
opponent, and thrust vectoring was a technol- 
fuselage was built by Rockwell in the United 
States. Construction began in the late 1980s, 
and the first of the two X-31 aircraft flew in 
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F-15 Highly Integrated 
Digital Electronic Control 
(HIDEC) aircraft and F/A- 
18 chase aircraft. Among 
other things, by integrating 
the flight-control and air- 
data systems on the aircraft 
with electronic engine 
controls, the HIDEC 
technology permitted 
researchers to adjust the 
operation of the engines to 
suit the flight conditions of 
the aircraft. This extended 
engine life, increased thrust, 
and reduced fuel consump- 
tion. (NASA Photo 
EC91677-1) 
February 1990. 
The original plan was for the initial 
aircraft development work to be completed at 
Rockwell's Palmdale, California, facility. The 
aircraft would then be transferred to the Naval 
flight test center at Patuxent River, Maryland, 
for further flight research. But the development 
and flight testing of the airplane proved more 
challenging than anticipated. In a search for 
additional resources and funding, the X-3 1 
program team asked NASA and the Air Force 
Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base to 
become involved. So in 1992, the X-3 1 flight 
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research program moved to Dryden. 
The fact that the X-3 1 was an interna- 
tional effort made it a particularly complex 
program to manage. The biggest challenge was 
getting a diverse team of not just government 
and industry but government and industry 
partners from two different countries to work 
together well. Differences in cultures as well as 
in approach had to be resolved, and it took 
some time for the team members to build up 
trust in each other's expertise. Fortunately, 
when the flight research moved to Dryden, the 
representatives from all the various participat- 
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ing organizations were able to be housed to- 
gether in the new Integrated Test Facility (ITF) 
building.22 This arrangement helped strengthen 
the personal relationships among the partners 
and produced a highly successful integrated 
team. 
Not everyone at Dryden thought the X- 
3 1 was an appropriate research project for the 
Center to undertake, because its goal was to 
investigate practical military applications of 
thrust-vectoring technology. Others pointed out, 
however, that a lot of valuable research infor- 
mation could be gained by participating in the 
program. Interestingly enough, however, there 
was less tension between the NASA and mili- 
a nasty surprise. The aircraft "departed" and 
spun completely around before he regained 
control. The X-3 1 team suspected that asym- 
metrical nose vortices were the problem and 
thought nose strakes might provide added 
lateral stability for the aircraft. 
The process of adding nose strakes to 
the X-3 1 took just seven days, illustrating the 
efficient approach and "technical agility" the 
flight research engineers at Dryden and other 
NASA centers relied on to keep flight programs 
on schedule. On a Tuesday, the Dryden research 
engineers decided they wanted to add nose 
strakes. The strakes were already manufactured, 
but researchers needed to make sure that adding 
tary team members than in many previous joint 
efforts once Dryden made the decision to join 
the X-3 1 program, because there was only one 
agenda. 
Soon after the program moved to 
Dryden rear fuselage strakes were added to the 
design to help the aircraft's pitch control. Once 
that was done, the X-3 1 successfully reached 
stabilized flight at 70 degrees AoA. But when 
one of the team's research pilots attempted to 
reach that mark dynamically, while flying at a 
higher speed and pulling two or three Gs, he got 
them to the aircraft would not produce any 
undesirable side effects. They called an engi- 
neer at the Langley Research Center, who 
agreed to squeeze an X-3 1 model with the 
strakes into the schedule for one of the center's 
wind tunnels that Friday night. The results were 
good and, after analyzing the data over the 
weekend, the research team flew the X-3 1 with 
the strakes attached the following Tuesday. 
The X-3 1's flight-control system also 
went through five major software changes 
during its years at Dryden, but with the changes 
An F-15 equipped with 
advanced, digitally con- 
trolled engines that allowed 
stall-free performance 
throughout the aircraft's 
entire flight envelope, faster 
throttle response, improved 
airstart capability, and 
increased altitude. 
(NASA Photo ECN 18899) 
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F-16XL used in the first set 
of laminarflow control 
research flights, after the 
titanium glove had been 
removedfrorn the wing. 
Since doing laminarflow 
research beginning in 1991, 
the single-seat F-16XL has 
been used in sonic boom 
research and in the Cranked 
Arrow Wing Aerodynamic 
Project to gather data about 
various issues such as 
pressure distribution and 
skin fiction. 
(NASA Photo 
EC95 43029-2) 
. , -  
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he program contributed 
emely valuable infomation and credibility 
gy. As with the F-18 HARV, the X-31's 
its way onto production aircraft. But three 
second one was cleared back to flight status and 
taken to the Paris Air Show in June 1995. The 
Pratt & Whitney engine company was display- 
ing its experimental "pitch-yaw balance beam 
nozzle" thrust-vectoring engine at Paris (the 
same powerplant that was installed on Dryden's 
F-15 ACTIVE research aircraft discussed 
below). Pratt & Whitney's system bears no 
resemblance to that of the X-3 1. But after a 
blem caused showed the capabilities made possible by 
ed thrust-vectoring technology, the Pratt & 
ft's Whitney booth was swamped with potential 
control sys- not be transferred but, as with many research 
projects, the X-3 1 helped develop the basic 
technology, proved its potential and gave it a 
Flights of Discovery 
critical level of credibility. In the case of inte- developed 
grated thrust vectoring, the results were impres- control computer in 
sive enough that the technology may not only Using an u 
be incorporated into next-generation designs, strate not only the feasibi 
but also retrofitted to some existing fighter 
aircraft .24 configuration the technolo 
Aircraft Systems 
Digital Fly-By-Wire The researchers pro 
1969 to NASA's Associate 
One of the main technologies that made Aeronautical Research and T 
unconventional aircraft like the X-29 and X-3 1 just happened to be N 
possible was the computerized, fly-by-wire 
flight-control system, and Dryden played an 
important role in making that technology pilot and had flown numerou 
available. Researchers at Dryden did not invent including the X-15. A 
computerized flight-control systems, but they Dryden was proposi 
did conduct the first flight of a pure digital fly- of a more advanced digit 
by-wire aircraft. explained that there was no fl 
A fly-by-wire airplane uses electric 
wires instead of mechanical linkages to connect reportedly replied, "I just went to t 
the pilot's control stick with the airplane's one. Have you looked at the ApoXlo 
flight-control surfaces. When the pilot moves The Dryden engineers had not, bu 
the stick, an electronic signal is sent to the that meeting, they hooked up with t 
appropriate control surface to command a Laboratory, an instrumentation 1 
corresponding movement. The signals are 
processed through a flight-control computer, In the end, NASA Headq 
which can also integrate complex control laws proved the digital fly-by-wire res 
and control surface movements that would be a conventional F-8 aircraft. The r 
impossible with a simple mechanical system. 
The Digital Fly-By-Wire (DFBW) radical and, in fact, was probabl 
program at Dryden began in the late 1960s. The 
Center had worked on analog fly-by-wire estingly enough, however, the th 
systems for the Lunar Landing Research Ve- 
hicle (LLRV) program, and both industry and numerous design elements with t 
the research community were interested in earlier DFBW airplane concept. 
applying computerized flight-control systems to The concept of fly-by-wire aircra 
aircraft. In 1969, a group of Dryden engineers control systems was actually not new in 19 
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Aircraft had been flying for years with autopilot 
systems that were, in essence, simple fly-by- 
wire designs. Bombardiers in World War 11, in 
fact, relied on simple fly-by-wire systems to fly 
aircraft precisely over the target area. But all of 
those designs were supplemental control sys- 
tems. The main system linking the pilot's input 
to the aircraft's flight controls was still me- 
chanical. Some aircraft had control systems that 
were boosted by hydraulic or electric power, 
but there were still mechanical linkages to all 
the control surfaces. 
What made the F-8 DFBW such a leap 
forward was that it removed all of the aircraft's 
mechanical control linkages, replacing them 
with electronic systems. The decision to rely 
entirely on electronic systems was made for two 
reasons. First, it would force the research 
engineers to focus on the technology and issues 
that would be truly critical for a production fly- 
by-wire krcraft. Second, it would give industry 
confidenhe in applying the technology. If an 
experimental system could not rely entirely on 
digital electronic technology, it would suggest 
that digital fly-by-wire was still beyond reach. 
So the Dryden researchers decided the F-8 
DFBW had to be a pure fly-by-wire aircraft. 
The DFBW program consisted of two 
phases. The first goal was simply to prove that a 
DFBW aircraft could be flown safely and 
effectively. For this initial phase, an Apollo 11 
flight control computer served as the primary 
system, with a modified analog flight computer 
taken from one of the Center's lifting body 
vehicles as a backup. In addition to being a 
proven system, the Apollo computer had the 
advantage of an incredibly robust design. 
Knowing that a system failure in a spacecraft 
F-16XL in hangar for test 
section installation during 
1995. The titanium glove on 
the left wing was perjorated 
with 12 million microscopic 
holes that, together with a 
modified cabin pressuriza- 
tion pump, induced smoother 
airflow from the leading to 
the trailing edge of the wing. 
(NASA Photo 
EC95 43003-1) 
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F-15 Highly Integrated 
Digital Electronic Control 
(HZDEC) aircraft touching 
down on the runway at 
Edwards during tests of a 
computer-assisted engine 
control system that permitted 
a plane to land safely using 
only engine power if normal 
control su~aces  are dis- 
abled. The system worked 
effectively in a landing of the 
Propulsion Controlled 
Aircraft (PCA) 
in April 1993. 
would be disastrous, the Apollo engineers 
designed the system to be extremely reliable. In 
fact, the computer's demonstrated mean time 
between failures was more than 70,000 hours. 
Of course, its robust design meant that the 
Apollo computer would be far too heavy and 
expensive for a production aircraft, but it gave 
the researchers a welcome amount of confi- 
dence in flying a fully fly-by-wire aircraft for 
the first time. 
The tie-in to the Apollo system also had 
another, even more significant, advantage for 
the Dryden engineers working on the project. In 
retrospect, the project staff acknowledged that 
they had underestimated the effort involved in 
designing a full fly-by-wire system from 
scratch. But using the Apollo hardware let them 
tap into a multi-billion-dollar, seven-year 
research effort that had already faced and 
tackled many of the problems inherent in 
computerized flight control systems. One of the 
first things Dryden engineers realized after 
making the decision to eliminate all mechanical 
back-ups in the F-8 DFBW, for example, was 
that software verification and validation 25 
would be the single most critical issue in the 
program. But how exactly did one go about 
creating software that would have no critical 
errors in it? Nobody had ever designed a flight- 
critical system where a small software error 
could cost somebody's life. Nobody, that is, 
except the Draper Laboratory, which had 
developed an extensive software development 
process to address that very issue with the 
Apollo system. Using Dryden's specifications 
and the processes they had developed for the 
Apollo program, engineers at the Draper lab 
developed the software for the F-8 DFBW 
(NASA Photo EC93 2081 -1) 
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program. Dryden engineers, in turn, adapted demonstrated the feasibility of a fully digital MD-11 Propulsion 
those methods to develop all the subsequent Controlled Aircraft (PCA) fly-by-wire system, the program moved into a 
about to down in the 
flight-control system software used at the second phase. This segment involved replacing ntilestoneflrst throttles-only 
Center. 
The F-8 DFBW flew for the first time 
the Apollo hardware with a triply redundant landing of a transport 
aircrafr on 29 August 1995, 
digital computer system that would be closer to with FI'A-18 chsk aircrafl in 
on 25 May 1972, and the first flight and the the background something industry might use. By the time the (NASA Pbro 
phase one flights that followed were very phase two modifications began in 1973- 1974, EC95 43247-4) 
successful. After the F-8 had successfully General Dynamics had designed the analog fly- 
by-wire F-16 fighter, and 
some digital flight computers 
were being developed for 
aircraft. Dryden finally 
selected three Il3M AP 101 
computers for the F-8 system. 
Switching the airplane from 
the single Apollo computer to 
the three IBM computers was 
a lot harder than researchers 
anticipated, however. In 
MD-11 Propulsion 
Controlled Aircrafi (PCA) 
prepari~zg to touch down in 
the first throttles-only 
landing of a transport 
aircrafr 
(NASA Photo 
EC95 43247-2) 
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Apollo computer interj5ace 
box used in the first phase 
of the F-8 Digital Fly-By- 
Wire program 
(NASA Photo 
EC96 43408-1) 
addition to other issues, the computers were 
prototypes and were the company's newest 
digital computers designed for use in an air- 
craft. Not surprisingly, they did not operate 
flawlessly. When one of the three computers 
failed on the F-8's second flight and several 
failures occurred during ground testing, the 
aircraft was temporarily grounded. 
After a manufacturing problem with the 
computers was found and corrected, the F-8 
only gave Shuttle engineers more confidence in 
the system, since it provided actual flight test 
data on the equipment, but it also gave IBM a 
chance to work out problems in the hardware 
before it was installed in the Space Shuttle. 
In addition to proving the capability of 
both the basic DFBW concept and a production- 
like DFBW system, the F-8 proved a very 
capable testbed, and its research helped develop 
numerous other pieces of technology in its 13- 
DFBW became a very successful flight research 
aircraft. And although it was an unintended 
benefit, detecting and fixing the problems with 
the IBM computers aided the Space Shuttle 
program as well. A year after the IBM AP 101 
computers were selected for the F-8 aircraft, the 
Space Shuttle program managers chose the 
same equipment for the Space Shuttle flight 
control system. The F-8 DFBW research not 
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year program. In the phase one flights, the 
proposed side-stick controller for the new F- 16 
fighter was tested in the airplane to make sure it 
would be acceptable to pilots. The phase two 
research also investigated various new control 
laws developed by engineers at the Langley 
Research Center. In some cases, pieces of 
technology that were developed out of necessity 
for the F-8 were picked up by manufacturers or 
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other research programs. 18 Hornet became the first production digital 
The Resident Back-Up Software (RE- fly-by-wire aircraft. Other aircraft would fol- 
BUS), jFar example, was an F-8 DFBW software low. At its most basic level, fly-by-wire tech- 
program that looked for anomalies in the paral- nology reduced the weight and maintenance 
Pel software running on the three flight comput- costs of aircraft by replacing heavy mechanical 
ers, The experimental software was only flown systems with lightweight wires. But its real 
six or seven times, but that was sufficient for it significance was its impact on aircraft design 
to be picked up by industry and incorporated capability. Fly-by-wire technology made the 
into several experimental and production first inherently unstable fighter, the F-16, 
aircraft. The F-8 program also developed a possible. The highly maneuverable X-29 and X- 
remotely augmented vehicle system, which 31, as well as the F-117 Stealth Fighter and B-2 
downlinked the signals from the pilot's control bomber, not to mention the YF-22 Advanced 
inputs to a mainframe computer on the ground. Tactical Fighter, all would have been impos- 
That computer processed the signal and sible without computerized flight-control 
uplinked a command to actually move the systems. 
aiqlane's control surfaces. The system was By the same token, accidents in the 
developed to allow the testing of new control future may stern less from wings breaking off 
laws and software without having to make each than from problems in the aircraft's information 
new change robust enough for flight. and electronic systems. One problem encoun- 
Yet one of the significant contributions tered in Dryden's F-8 DFBW program, for 
of the F-8 DFBW program was simply proving example, stemmed from a short time delay in 
the feasibility of a DFBW aircraft and giving the system when it switched from the prilnary 
the technology enough credibility to encourage to the backup flight-control computers. The 
industry to incorporate computerized flight- transition involved a delay of about a second, 
control systems in new aircraft designs. There during which the aircraft would pitch up 
was great interest in the technology, and indus- slightly. In the simulator, the delay was not a 
try engineers were on the phone with their problem. But in an actual flight environment, 
Dryden counterparts regularly during the F-8 the pilot tended to sense the pitch-up and try to 
program. Bn fact, some F-8 researchers believe correct for it. The delay meant that the controls 
those personal contacts were crucial in transfer- would not respond immediately, and the pilot 
ring the DFBW technology. Because equally would end up with far too much control input 
important as the fact that Dryden had success- by the time the backup system kicked in. 
fully flown a DFBW aircraft was how it had It was an important lesson with far- 
done that, As Dryden collaborated with many reaching consequences that even the F-8 re- 
co~npanies on subsequent flight research pro- searchers did not fully realize at the time. To 
grams, the original Draper LabIApollo software this day, one of the biggest problems with 
development processes were incorporated by computerized control-system aircraft is a 
numerous industry manufacturers. phenomenon called a pilot-induced oscillation, 
In 1978, six years after the F-8 DFBW or PIO. When the linkage is no longer a simple, 
made its first flight, the McDonnell Douglas F- direct mechanical line between the pilot's 
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F-8 Digital Fly-By- Wire 
(DFBW) aircraftflying over 
the mountains near the 
Dryden Flight Research 
Center. The DFBWproject 
at Dryden demonstrated the 
feasibility of computerized, 
fly-by-wire flight control, 
which reduced the weight 
and maintenance costs of 
airplanes and made such 
inherently unstable aircraft 
control stick and the control surfaces, there is a 
greater possibility that the pilot's input and the 
aircraft's response will fall out of synchroniza- 
tion. Time delays, variable gain settings (con- 
trolling the amount of control surface response 
for a given input), and other software issues can 
cause a pilot to over-control an aircraft. 
The systems usually work well on 
lenge of computerized and increasingly com- 
plex flight control systems to find a way to 
adapt to these human responses. The 1992 crash 
of a prototype YF-22 Advanced Tactical 
Fighter (ATF) and a 1989 accident with a 
prototype Swedish JAS 39 "Gripen" fighter 
were both attributed to PI0 problems associated 
with their advanced flight control systems. Even 
as the F-16, X-29, andX-31 ground computers, and even in simulators. But Boeing's new 777 fly-by-wire transport aircraft 
possible forpilots tofly with 
the aid of theirflight-control none of that takes into account the dynamics of experienced PI0 problems in its flight test 
computers. putting a pilot into the loop in a real flight phase.26 In fact, one of the significant contribu- 
lNASA Photo ECN 34781 situation, where the consequences are very real tions of the F-8 DFBW was not part of the 
and very serious. In a high-performance flight 
environment, pilots react differently than they 
do on the ground, and it is the ongoing chal- 
official DFBW program, but was an unplanned, 
high-priority research effort that helped solve a 
potentially dangerous PI0 problem with the 
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Space Shuttle.27 
The PI0 problem that accompanied the 
advent of computerized flight-control systems 
illustrates a characteristic of technological 
progress described by scholar Thomas P. 
Hughes as "reverse salients." Hughes noted that 
new technology is often a double-edged sword 
that creates whole new fields of issues and 
problems even as it overcomes existing limita- 
flight control system, Dryden began an Inte- 
grated Propulsion Control System (IPCS) effort 
with a General Dynamics F-111E to look at 
electronic engine control. The IPCS research 
program was an Air Force Aeropropulsion 
Laboratory initiative which ran from 1973 to 
1976 and involved Lewis, Dryden, Pratt & 
Whitney, Boeing, and Honeywell. An F-111 
was chosen as the research plane because it was 
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tions.28 Computerized flight-control systems 
were no exception. The dependence of ad- 
vanced designs on computerized flight-control 
systems means that aircraft can do things today 
that they could never do before. But it also 
means that software has become as critical to an 
aircraft as the spar in its wing.29 
Digital Engine ControVIntegrated 
Control Research 
Soon after the F-8 DFEW proved it was 
possible to fly an aircraft with an electronic 
one of the few Air Force aircraft that had 
variable inlets and two turbofan engines. That 
allowed one engine to be modified with the 
second as a safety backup in case something 
went wrong.30 
The reasons for the interest in digital 
engine control were similar to those driving the 
digital flight control research. Computerized 
systems could not only controI the operation of 
an aircraft or engine more precisely and there- 
fore efficiently, they could also allow integra- 
tion of different components. Integrated sys- 
tems would allow a pilot to simply command 
F-15 with 10-degree cone 
experiment to improve 
predictions based on 
wind-tunnel data. The 
cone had been used as a 
standard reference device 
to measure the quality of 
flow in 23 transonic and 
supersonic wind tunnels. 
It was then flown at 
transonic and supersonic 
conditions in the natural 
atmosphere, mounted on 
the F-15, to compare flow 
conditions in the real 
flight environment with 
those in the wind tunnels. 
This experiment provided 
an assessment of the 
ability of models in each 
wind tunnel to simulate 
the actualflow on full- 
scale counterpart 
aircrafi Thus, the 10- 
degree cone provides 
valuable insights for 
interpreting data from 
models in individual 
tunnels and for choosing 
which tunnels should be 
used for some particular 
transonic and supersonic 
tests. (NASA Photo EC78 
9554) 
Flights ofDiscovey 
what he wanted the aircraft to do, and leave it 
up to the "smart" controls to execute whatever 
The potential advantages of an inte- 
grated flight and engine control system were 
combination of power and flight controls were then demonstrated convincingly with the 
necessary to make that happen. Clearly, this Center's YF-12C "Blackbird" in 1978. Because 
kind of technology would give an aircraft vastly of its unique flight environment, the Mach 3 
expanded capabilities. Blackbird was a challenge to control, both in 
The F-1 1 1 IPCS program replaced the terms of flightpath and inlet management. To 
hydromechanical controls for inlet position, fuel see if a computerized system could improve the 
flow, and afterburner on one of the aircraft's YF-12's performance, Dryden integrated the 
inlet control, 
autothrottle, air data 
and navigation 
I functions on the 
aircraft. The integra- 
tion was not opti- 
mized, but it made a 
dramatic improve- 
ment. The improved 
performance and 
flightpath control 
' ~1 increased the 
management also 
reduced the incidence 
Close-up of F-I5 
10-degree cone 
experiment. 
(NASA Photo 
ECN 9811) 
of inlet "unstarts," 
engines with a computerized, electronic system. which were violent disturbances that occurred 
The goal was simply to see if digital engine when the shock wave formed by the aircraft's 
I control could increase the performance of the high speed jumped from inside to outside the I engine by operating it more efficiently, while engine inlet. In fact, the improvements Dryden I still functioning as reliably as a mechanical demonstrated with the integrated controls were 
1 control system. As with many pioneering significant enough that the system was retrofit- 
concepts, the F-1 1 1 IPCS system was somewhat ted on the entire operational SR-71 fleet as part 
rudimentary. But although it was not an ideal of an avionics upgrade in 1983.32 
set-up, the research still proved the worth of the These experiments generated additional 
basic Digital Electronic Engine Control (DEEC) interest within both NASA and industry in the 
concept. Even at its worst, the technology still digital engine control and integrated control 
performed as well as a conventionally con- 
trolled engine.31 
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concepts. To pursue this research further, 
Dryden recruited an F- 15 fighter it had obtained 
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in 1976 from the Air Force as a Flight Research it could explore integrated systems technology. 
Facility. The F-15 was used for a number of The first project was called the Adaptive Engine 
different research projects in the late 1970s, but Control System (ADECS). 
in the early 1980s, it began flight research with The concept behind ADECS was that 
an advanced digitally controlled engine de- conventional engine operation had to be based 
signed by Pratt & Whitney. The Air Force had on a "worst case" scenario of what the aircraft 
told Pratt & Whitney that the engine with might be doing. If the airplane was at a very 
Digital Electronic Engine Control (DEEC) high angle of attack, for example, the airflow 
technology was too high-risk for the service to going into the engine would be irregular, so the 
fund 3s a production concept. So the company engine could not be operating close to its stall 
approached Dryden and asked if the center margin. Unfortunately, that also meant that 
would consider a Joint flight research Program when the aircraft was in straight and level 
to develop the engine technology further. flight, the engine was still operating well above 
The experimental engines were put on its stall margin, even though the slack was not 
Dryden's F- 15 and flown from 198 1 to 1983. necessary at that point. This led to inefficient 
The flight research identified several problems engine operation. By integrating the flight- 
with the engine design, which Pratt & Whitney control and air-data systems of the HIDEC 
subsequently corrected, but it also showed the aircraft with electronic engine controls that 
potential of the technology. The DEEC engines adjusted the engine exhaust nozzles, researchers 
allowed engine stall-free ~erfomance through- could adjust the operation of the engine to suit 
out the entire F- 15 flight envelope, faster the flight condition of the aircraft. 
throttle response, improved airstart capability The results of the ADECS flight re- 
and an increase of 10,000 feet of altitude in search indicated that the system could reduce 
afterburner capability. The results were impres- engine temperature while holding engine thrust 
sive enoergh that the Air Force committed to constant, which could extend the life of the 
full-scale development and production of what engines as much as 10-12 percent. ~y allowing 
became the F-100-PW-220/229 engines. Pratt & higher engine pressures in less demanding flight 
Wbitney also applied the Full Authority Digital environments, the system also increased the 
Engine Control (FADEC) technology to its PW thrust of the engines by 8-10 percent, allowing 
2037 commercial turbofan engines, which were an increase in climb rate of 10-25 percent or a 
incoqorated into Boeing's 757 transport air- reduction in fuel consumption of 7-17 percent. 
craft, As a result of the HIDEC flight research, 
fF;ollowing the DEEC research, Dry den integrated control-sy s tem technology was 
engineers wanted to continue exploring technol- incorporated into Pratt & Whitney's Improved 
ogy that could integrate engine- and flight- Performance Engines and the engines designed 
control systems. The result was the Highly for the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF). 
Integrated Digital Electronic Control (HIDEC) The limitation of the ADECS technol- 
Program, which was implemented on the same ogy was that it was based on preprogrammed 
I?-15 Flight Research Facility aircraft, modified tables that assumed average engine performance 
with digital flight and engine control systems so on an average day. To generate truly optimum. 
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performance would require real-time onboard 
sensing of engine and aircraft behavior. This 
next step was accomplished through a follow- 
on HIDEC research project called Performance 
Seeking Control (PSC). The PSC technology 
also added control of the engine inlet ramps to 
the other variables in the system. This advanced 
system offered a three to five percent increase 
in thrust over the ADECS technology.33 
Self-Repairing Flight Controls and 
Propulsion Control Research 
Integrated engine- and flight-control 
systems offered the potential of more than just 
performance increases, however. If an aircraft 
could sense problems with individual compo- 
nents and could manage all the other flight and 
engine controls, it might be able to compensate 
for damage or malfunctions in an emergency 
situation. The first research project in this area 
using the F- 15 was a Self-Repairing Flight 
Control System (SRFCS) concept sponsored by 
the Air Force. Dryden's F-15 was chosen for 
the research because it was already equipped 
with the digital system technology to make such 
a research effort possible at a reasonable cost. 
The SRFCS itself was developed by the 
McDonnell Aircraft Company and General 
Electric's Aircraft Control Division. In essence, 
it used new integrated flight-control software 
that would adjust the operation of the remaining 
flight-control surfaces to compensate for the 
damage whenever a malfunction in a compo- 
nent was detected. The research flights, which 
took place in 1989 and 1990, demonstrated that 
an integrated control system could compensate 
successfully for loss of individual control 
surfaces. The aircraft would not have its full 
maneuvering capabilities, but the SRFCS was 
also configured to alert the pilot to the problem 
and the new operating limitations of the air- 
plane.34 
An even more ambitious research effort 
in the area of emergency aircraft control was 
prompted by the 1989 crash of a United Air- 
lines DC-10 in Sioux City, Iowa. Dryden's 
propulsion branch chief Bill Burcham was on a 
business trip when he read about how Captain 
A1 Haynes and his crew had flown and at- 
tempted to land the crippled DC- I0 usia-ig only 
the throttles after losing the aircraft's hydraulic 
system. Burcham was traveling with James 
Stewart, Dryden's F-15 HIDEC program 
manager, and the two began talking about 
whether a computerized propulsion-control 
system could have allowed the DC-l 0 to land 
safely. Burcham drew a diagram on a cocktail 
napkin of how such a system might work, and 
in five minutes, the two men had outlined a 
Propulsion Controlled Aircraft (PCA) research 
effort for the F- 15. 
Burcham actually began by going down 
to the Center's simulation room and at teqting 
to fly an F-15 simulator using the throttles only. 
By increasing or decreasing thrust, he could 
make the airplane climb or descend, and by 
using asymmetric thrust with the two engines, 
he could make it yaw left and right. It was not a 
pretty way to fly an airplane, but it seen-ied the 
idea could work. Burcham then enlisted the 
help of Gordon Fullerton, a former Space 
Shuttle commander who had gone to work at 
Dryden as a research pilot when he left the 
space program. After a few attempts, Fullerton 
was able to put the simulator F- 15 on the 
runway every time, so the researchers felt 
confident trying the concept in flight. The goal 
of the initial research flights was to see how 
well the aircraft could be controlled usiir~g only 
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the throttles, without the computerized system. 
Typically, simulators are more difficult to fly 
than the actual aircraft, so Fullerton expected 
the first Right to go well. 
But as researchers at Dryden had been 
learning for years, flight into new territory did 
not always go as expected. As Fullerton re- 
called from that first throttles-only F-15 flight, 
""Ias looking at the sky, and then the dirt, and 
all over. I could barely herd [the airplane] 
througl~ the sky in the general direction of the 
airpoa." It turned out that the aircraft perfor- 
mance In the simulator assumed identical 
engines and very smooth response. The engines 
in the real airplane, however, had slightly 
different performance and response. The differ- 
ences were small, but without the stability 
augmentation provided by the flight-control 
system, they were enough to make the aircraft 
almost uncontrollable. 
The good news was that as soon as the 
computerized throttle-control system was 
implerner~ted, the aircraft became very control- 
lable, It took nine flights to refine the system 
satisfactorily, but in April 1993 the F- 15 made 
its first complete PCA landing. The concept not 
only worked, it clearly made the difference 
between a controllable and uncontrollable 
airplane. 
Yet the most significant application for 
the technology would not be in a fighter, where 
the pilot had the option of ejecting, but in a 
transport aircraft. So after the F-15 flights, 
Birrcham talked to the McDonnell Douglas 
ying the system on an MD-11 
ell Douglas agreed to work 
the program, and an MD- 1 1 
onstrated the first throttles- 
transport aircraft in August 
CA system. The PCA software 
is also being researched in a Boeing 747 simu- 
lator at the NASA Ames Research Center. It is 
still too soon to say whether the system will 
find its way into today's or tomorrow's airlin- 
ers, but the PCA technology could be a power- 
ful weapon in preventing accidents caused by 
flight-control or hydraulic-system failures. It is 
a compelling argument that makes it likely the 
PCA software will find its way onto air trans- 
port aircraft sometime in the future.35 
The F-15 ACTIVE 
Although it was not a direct outgrowth 
of the HIDEC/F-15 program, one of the signifi- 
cant applications of integrated engine- and 
flight-control systems has been with thrust- 
vectoring aircraft such as the X-3 1. Thrust- 
vectoring technology depends on an integrated 
system that can vector the engine thrust depend- 
ing on the aircraft's flight attitude and situation. 
The thrust-vectoring paddles on the X-31 and 
Dryden7 s F- 18 HARV were not a suitable 
system for a production aircraft, but Pratt & 
Whitney and others have been working on a 
gimballing nozzle design that could be commer- 
cially applied. Like the first electronically 
controlled engine, the Pratt & Whitney "pitch- 
yaw balance beam nozzle" concept is high risk, 
so NASA agreed to work on a flight research 
program to develop the technology further. 
The resulting research program is a joint 
effort among Pratt & Whitney, Dryden, the Air 
Force, and McDonnell Douglas Aerospace and 
is called the Advanced Control Technology for 
Integrated Vehicles (ACTIVE) program. The 
aircraft selected for the project is a highly 
specialized F- 15 that had been used by the Air 
Force for a Short Take-Off and Landing 
(STOL) program but which the Air Force 
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F-15 Advanced Control 
Technology for Integrated 
Vehicles (ACTIVE) aircraft 
showing the thrust-vectoring 
nozzles that promised to 
improve aircraft 
eficiency and control 
(NASA Photo 
EC95 43273-4) 
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xperiment on Dryden's 
trol surface deflec- 
Flights of  Discovery 
Main hangar at the Dryden 
Flight Research Center 
showing a pair of F/A-18s 
inside 
(NASA Photo 
EC9.5 43079-6) 
tion was consistent with what the pilot had 
commanded and make any necessary correc- 
tions. The smart actuator technology was 
sponsored by the Naval Air Warfare Center and 
built by the HR Textron company in California. 
It was a marked advance over conventional 
actuators, which had to send signals back 
through a central flight-control-system com- 
puter to accomplish that task. Two follow-on 
research efforts scheduled for flight in 1996 
involve an Electrically Powered Actuator 
Design (EPAD) sponsored by the USAF Wright 
Laboratories. The two EPAD designs, an 
electrohydrostatic actuator and an electrome- 
chanical actuator, do not even need the 
aircraft's central hydraulic system to operate. 
The electrohydrostatic version has its own 
hydraulic fluid to move the actuator, and the 
electromechanical model uses an electrically 
powered screw to move the control surface. 
The SRA has also been used to research 
fly-by-light technology. In 1993, the aircraft 
flew a Fiber-Optic Control System Integration 
(FOCSI) experiment sponsored by the Lewis 
Research Center that compared fiber optic 
airframe and engine sensors with electrical 
ones. The results indicated that some designs 
were more reliable than others. A follow-on 
research effort is planned for 1997 that would 
depend on fiber-optic sensors to operate se- 
lected control surfaces in a flight-critical appli- 
cation. One of the reasons the F-18 SRA is a 
good testbed for this kind of research is that it 
has two of most components, including engines 
and vertical stabilizers. Consequently, engineers 
can modify one control surface or engine with 
experimental sensors or components and still 
have another that is conventionally configured, 
which increases the safety margin of the re- 
search. 
The SRA has also explored technology 
such as a flush-mounted air data system devel- 
oped by Dryden and Langley researchers, and 
also an actuator made of composite materials. 
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In addition, the plane is scheduled to research a 
propulsion-controlled aircraft system similar to 
the one flown on Dryden's F- 15. The goal of 
that project, which is a cooperative effort 
between Dryden and McDonnell Douglas, is to 
collect information necessary to implement a 
PCA system on an F-18 aircraft. McDonnell 
Douglas also hopes to use that data to imple- 
anent a PCA system on its testbed C-17 military 
cargo aircraft at Edwards Air Force Base. If 
these research efforts go well, PCA systems 
could well be included in future production F- 
18s and C-17s. 
Many of the research projects being 
flown on the F- 18 SRA are technologies that 
could lead to more advanced aircraft. As with 
the original fly-by-wire system, the technolo- 
gies are still too high-risk for industry to com- 
mit to them in production aircraft. But the F-18 
SRA is providing a testbed that can research 
individual components safely and develop the 
technology and confidence in its reliability 
systems. 
As changes in technology and national 
priorities focused attention on making aircraft 
"better," Dryden's research efforts shifted to 
support that goal. In the late 1960s and 1970s, 
Dryden and other NASA centers worked to- 
gether to develop efficiency-oriented concepts 
like the supercritical wing and winglets. Other 
programs, like the F-8 DFBW, the X-29, the X- 
3 1, and the F- 15 and MD- 1 1 Propulsion Con- 
trolled Aircraft also helped develop a wide 
variety of improved aircraft design concepts. 
Most of these projects were joint efforts with 
other centers, the military, andlor industry. But 
by researching these concepts in flight, Dryden 
helped these technologies gain a critical level of 
maturity and credibility that allowed military 
and industry leaders to consider them for 
production aircraft. 
The production versions of the technol- 
ogy did not always look or operate much like 
the systems researched at Dryden. The 
lmost all of could be flown reliably and safely. That proof 
fly-by-wire was critical in convincing designers and pilots 
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that fly-by-wire technology could be a real 
alternative to mechanical systems. When Bill 
Burcham began his research into propulsion- 
controlled aircraft, many people told him the 
system could never land an aircraft safely. But 
the moment Gordon Fullerton touched down in 
Dryden's PCA F-15, the debate ended. What- 
ever else anyone could say about the technol- 
ogy, a throttles-only landing was clearly pos- 
sible. By the same token, the success of the X- 
29 and X-3 1 flights shattered decades-old ideas 
about aircraft design. Previously unthinkable 
concepts like post-stall maneuvering suddenly 
became real design possibilities. And as the 
horizons and minds of design engineers open 
and expand, they may see other new approaches 
or designs that could benefit future aircraft. It is 
difficult to quantify this kind of contribution, 
but it is one of the most important benefits of 
Dryden's advanced, exploratory research. 
Of course, in exploring the new realm of 
computerized and electronic flight and engine 
systems, NASA and its partners also learned 
important lessons about the behavior of some of 
this new technology. The same complex 
technology that allowed advanced aircraft 
designs to have greatly expanded capabilities 
also created more opportunities for something 
to go wrong. Phenomena like pilot-induced 
oscillations and single-point failures in software 
systems are a sharp reminder to engineers that 
even as technology solves old problems, it can 
open doors into entirely new problem areas. 
Dryden's research into ways to make 
aircraft "better," whether through improved 
efficiency, maneuverability, or aircraft systems, 
is far from finished. The hyperspeed with which 
computer technology and information systems 
continue to progress is constantly opening new 
doors and creating new possibilities for improv- 
ing aircraft design. Some of the advances may 
not make their way into production designs for 
a number of years, and some of them may not 
ever be commercially applied. But with people 
willing to explore and pursue the new territory 
continually appearing over the technological 
horizon, the difference between the impossible 
and the possible can become simply a matter of 
time. 
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b Chapter Five: 
Supporting National 
Efforts 
hile Dryden was pursuing its various "exploratory" research projects 
over the years, the Center was also providing support for other programs and efforts, 
both in aeronautics and in space. Its unusual research aircraft, desert surroundings, 
and cadre of flight research specialists gave Dryden unique capabilities for testing 
new concepts and vehicles and attacking particular problems that surfaced in opera- 
tional air- and spacecraft. Its support for America's space program has included 
efforts such as developing and flying a lunar landing research vehicle, pursuing a 
solution to a potentially dangerous pilot-induced oscillation with the Space Shuttle, 
and assisting efforts to find a more cost-effective way of putting satellites in space. 
Dryden has also provided both government agencies and industry with a wide vai-  
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design included a small emergency rocket that 
Supporting the Space Program could jettison the craft to an altitude of perhaps 
6,500 feet, but it was still unclear how a pilot 
Early Efforts would land the aircraft safely from that point. 
Using a prototype Douglas F5D "Skylancer" 
Dryden's involvement in NASA's space the Center acquired in 1961, Dryden research 
program dates back to 1959, when the Center's pilot Neil Armstrong explored several possible 
F-104 aircraft were used to test the drogue techniques and developed a procedure that 
parachutes being designed for the Mercury would have enabled a safe return to landing for 
space capsules. The F-104s performed multiple Dyna-Soar pilots. As it turned out, the Dyna- 
drops of the parachutes from above 45,000 feet, Soar program was canceled before the craft was 
and the flight research uncovered several ever built, but the technique developed at 
critical design Raws that were then able to be Dryden provided the X-20 project managers 
col-rected before the system was used on the with valuable information they had not been 
actual Mercury spacecraft. able to obtain from other sources.1 
Dryden researchers also provided some Dryden's involvement with NASA's 
backup support for the military X-20 "Dyna- space program continued in the early 1960s 
Soar" program that was being developed about with flight research to support the agency's 
that same time. The Dyna-Soar was a delta- "parawing" project. The parawing was an 
wing vehicle that was to be launched on top of a inflatable, steerable winglparachute that was 
booster rocket and then flown back to a hori- being investigated as a possible alternative to 
zontal landing. Large rocket booster safety and the simple parachutes used by the Mercury 
performance in those days was uncertain, and space capsules. A parawing might enable 
planners wanted to design a workable escape follow-on Mercury Mark I1 capsules (which 
system for the pilots in the event of a launchpad became the Gemini spacecraft) to be guided to a 
booster-rocket explosion. The Dyna-Soar gentle land touchdown instead of the ocean 
F-100 and F-IOOA on 
lakebed, showing 
modifications to the tail that 
solved the aircraft's deadly 
tendency to go out of control 
during rolling maneuvers. 
The larger tail on aircraft 
FW-778 (the F-100A) is 
clearly visible as compared 
with the unmodified F-100 
(FW- 773) 
(NASA Photo E 1573) 
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splashdowns simple parachute systems re- and, after initial ground-tow tests, was taken 
quired. The parawing concept was based on aloft behind a Stearman biplane and an L- 19 
research by a Langley Research Center engineer Bird Dog. 
named Francis M. Rogallo, and the soft wing/ Eventually, the vehicle was equipped 
parachute was known as a "Rogallo wing." with the same kind of inflatable wing North 
In the spring of 1961, NASA's Space American was testing and dubbed the Paresev I- 
Task Group initiated research into the applica- B. In two years, the Paresevs completed 300 
bility of Rogallo's design to spacecraft. North ground tows and 60 air tows. But altho~~glh t e 
American Aviation was awarded a contract to Dryden Paresev finally got to the point where it 
build and test a prototype Rogallo wing, and had acceptable handling characteristics, the full- 
Dryden was asked to support that test program. size test vehicle being developed by North 
Some engineers at Dryden, however, thought American was not as successful. I11 1964, as 
that it would be helpful to try flying a small costs and time delays increased, NASA dropped 
paraglider before North American tested its the parawing program and research with the 
full-size Rogallo wing. Paul Bikle, the Center's Paresevs ended. 
director at that point, agreed and approved the The value of the Paresev research at 
construction and flight of a single-seat Dryden was that it offered a low-cost way to 
paraglider in December 1961. The result was investigate some of the flight-control issues and 
the "Paresev I," a somewhat unsteady-looking problems that a parawing concept might entail. 
vehicle that resembled a hang glider attached to Clearly, there was still a gap between a small 
a three-wheeled dune buggy. test vehicle and a full-size, space-capable 
The unpowered craft was initially towed system. But some of the information was still 
behind a ground vehicle, and the pilot, who sat useful. And although the inflatable parawing 
out in the open, controlled its movement by concept has yet to be applied to a spacecradi, it 
tilting the wing fore, aft, and side to side. The may still be used on a future design.2 
flying characteristics of the Paresev were less 
than ideal, to say the least, and research pilot Lunar Landing Research 
Milt Thompson considered it more difficult to Vehicles (LLRVs) 
fly than even the early lifting-body aircraft. The 
craft's crude control system led to several tense One of Dryden's biggest contibutions 
moments during the research flights and ulti- to the space program was its work with Qe 
mately caused an accident with the vehicle. Lunar Landing Research Vehicles (LLWVs)- 
Pilot Bruce Peterson was flying the Paresev I on tubular craft so bizarre looking that they were 
a ground tow test when it began an increasingly commonly referred to as the "flying bedsteads." 
severe rocking oscillation and finally nosed The LLRVs themselves were the brainchild of 
over into the lakebed. Fortunately, Peterson was Dryden engineer Hubert "Jake" Drake, but the 
not seriously hurt and the vehicle was com- research was part of a NASA-wide effort to 
pletely rebuilt with a better wing and control develop the experience and techniques neces- 
system. The Paresev I-A, as the rebuilt vehicle sary for a successful Moon landing. 
was named, had better handling characteristics When President John F. Kennedy issued 
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his 1961 challenge to 
have an American walk 
on the Moon before the 
end of the decade, 
NASA and industry 
researchers went into 
high gear. They had 
eight short years to 
answer all the ques- 
tions, develop all the 
technology, and over- 
come all the obstacles 
necessay to achieve 
that goal. One of the 
questions was how the 
astrona~rts were going 
to successfully land and 
take off again from the 
Moon's surface. Aero- 
dynamic features would 
be useless in the 
Moon's airless environment, so the lunar 
mod~lle would have to be controlled entirely by 
propulsion systems. 
The Grumman Aircraft Corporation was 
given the contract to design and build the actual 
lunar module, but NASA managers knew they 
would also need to find some way to train the 
astronauts to operate the lander in the Moon's 
reduced gravity. NASA planned, of course, to 
design a ground simulator for the craft, and the 
Langley Research Center was developing a 
tethered test machine on a large gantry. But 
Drake, a product of Dryden's hands-on, flight- 
oriented atmosphere, believed that the only way 
to get coq le t e  information on flying the lander 
would be to build and operate a free-flying test 
vehicle. As luck would have it, Drake was not 
alone in his thinking. Several engineers at Bell 
Aircraft were also pursuing a design for a free- 
Paresev in flight, providing 
a low-cost way to test the 
flight-control issues of a 
parawing concept for 
possible use in returning 
spacecraft to Earth 
(NASA Photo E 8013) 
flying lunar lander simulator. In addition to its 
history with the X-1 project, Bell was a premier 
helicopter manufacturer, a pioneer in vertical 
take off and landing (VTOL) aircraft research, 
and therefore an obvious partner in the effort. 
Dryden and Bell got approval to begin 
work on the LLRV in December 196 1, and in 
February 1963 Bell was awarded a contract to 
build two of the vehicles. The vehicles, which 
looked something like a cross between a child's 
jungle gym and a science fiction contraption, 
were not an entirely new concept. "Flying 
bedsteads'' had been used to investigate VTOL 
aircraft technology as early as 1954. But the 
LLRVs had the unique task of investigating the 
flight and propulsion controls, pilot displays, 
visibility, and flight dynamics of a vehicle 
designed to land on the Moon. 
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l l ' s  "Eagle" LM was 
descending to that first 
historic Moon landing, 
Neil Armstrong real- I 
 NASA signed an 1 Lunar Landing Research Vehicle (LLRV) in flight agreement (NASA Photo ECN 506) 
ized the craft was 
heading for an undesir- 
able touchdown spot. 
So although the LM 
was equipped with an 
automatic landing 
system, Armstrong took 
over and flew the craft 
manually for the final 
30-40 seconds of its 
descent, guiding it to a 
more suitable site. It 
Shuttle support facili- 
ties at Edwards Air 
, Force Base. The clear 
skies, open landscape 
and lakebed landing 
site at Edwards would 
provide more leeway 
and options for return- 
ing Shuttle pilots than 
anv other location. 
4 
NASA planned to 
transport the Shuttle 
back and forth between 
Edwards and the 
was his flights in the Kennedy Space Center 
LLTV, Armstrong reportedly said later, that launch site in Florida on the back of a Boeing 
gave him the confidence to take over from the 747, and the agency had already bought and 
automatic system.6 modified one of the jumbo jets for that purpose. 
The LLTVs were far from perfect Computer and simulator calculations 
aircraft, as Armstrong and two other pilots predicted that the mated Shuttle1747 pair could 
discovered when control or system problems 
forced them to eject from the complex and 
totally non-aerodynamic vehicles. But the 
LLTVs were unquestionably extremely useful 
for America's piloted lunar space missions. As 
chief astronaut Donald "Deke" Slayton said at 
the time, there was "no other way to simulate 
Moon landings except by flying the LLTV." 7 
fly together safely, but NASA wanted to verify 
that prediction in a controlled flight-test envi- 
ronment before the Shuttle went into operation. 
NASA also wanted to glide-test the orbiter to 
make sure it could execute a safe landing before 
attempting an actual mission. To accomplish 
both of these goals, NASA's Johnson Space 
Center designed a three-phase test program. The 
The Space Shuttle 
first, "unmanned-captive," phase would test the 
Shuttle1747 combination without any crew in 
the orbiter, so that if there was a problem, the 
Although the lifting-body shapes that Shuttle could be jettisoned. The second, "cap- 
were researched at Dryden were not selected as tive-active," phase would test the combination 
the final shape for the Space Shuttle, the Center with a two-person crew aboard the orbiter. The 
has played an important support role with the third phase would be "free-flight" tests in which 
Shuttle since the very first flight tests of the the orbiter and its two-person crew would be 
orbiter in 1977. While Rockwell was building carried aloft on the 747 and then launched off 
the first Shuttle orbiter, the Air Force and its back to glide back down to a landing. 
Page 134 Flights of Discovery 
Joe Walker in a Lunar 
Landing Research 
Vehicle (LLRV) 
(NASA Photo ECN 453)  
As a safety precaution during the tests, a 
special escape system was installed in the 747. 
Ejection seats were impractical, especially with 
the Shuttle on top of the aircraft, so a laundry 
chute-type slide was installed right behind the 
cockpit that would exit out the bottom of the 
plane. The pilots would wear parachutes, and an 
explosive charge would blow a panel off the 
bottom of the chutelslide prior to the pilots' 
emergency exit. To insure that they could reach 
the exit even if the aircraft was spinning or out 
of control, a rope with knots tied in it was 
installed on the floor from the front of the 
cockpit to the escape chute. 
The first unmanned-captive test flight 
went off without a hitch, which was fortunate 
because it was attended by a level of media 
attention and exposure beyond anything Dryden 
and its staff had ever experienced. After five 
captive tests and three successful captive-active 
tests, managers were ready to begin the more 
difficult free-flight portion of the test program. 
Researchers knew the air-launch of the 
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Shuttle from the 747 
would be a high-risk 
maneuver. There were 
concerns about the 
orbiter causing aerody- 
namic buffeting of the 
747's tail and the 
consequences of an 
incomplete separation. 
But the biggest con- 
cern was the risk of the 
Shuttle recontacting 
I the 747 after separa- 
installed in the Boeing 
jet to close off the hydraulic lines to the rudder 
so the rest of the control surfaces would be 
operable even if the tail were lost. Engineers 
conducted numerous simulations, wind tunnel 
tests, and studies to try to predict the behavior 
of the two aircraft after they separated. But 
concerns remained. Finally, Chuck Yeager, who 
had not only broken the sound barrier with the 
X-1 but had also flown a French rarnjet-pow- 
ered aircraft off of a French transport aircraft 
after World War 11, was brought in as a consult- 
ant. As veteran research pilot Bill Dana remem- 
bered it, "Chuck listened politely to Dryden's 
interpretation of the laws of physics and aerody- 
namics, and then he walked over to a model of 
the mated 747lShuttle combination and said, 'If 
you mount the Shuttle on the 747 with a posi- 
tive angle-of-attack difference and get some air 
flowing between the two, nothing can happen 
but separation.' So we studied the problem 
some more and Chuck, of course, was right."8 
Indeed, the first four free flight tests of 
the Shuttle went flawlessly, and the launch of 
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the orbiter off the 747 was never a problem. 
The biggest and scariest problem encountered 
during the approach and landing test (ALT) 
program was on the fifth and final flight, and it 
involved the control system of the orbiter itself. 
The fifth ALT flight was the first to attempt a 
landing on Edwards' paved runway instead of 
the Rogers lakebed. In addition, Shuttle pilots 
Fred Haise and Gordon Fullerton9 were at- 
tempting a spot-landing at a particular point on 
the runway to see whether the orbiter could be 
landed precisely enough to permit landings at 
sites other than Edwards. Adding to the pres- 
sure on the pilots was the fact that Prince 
Charles of England was on hand to watch the 
landing, in a gazebo out by the runway. 
The flight was also the first time Haise 
and Fullerton had flown the orbiter without its 
tail-cone faring, so they were relying on their 
practice in NASA's Gulfstream I1 in-flight 
simulator to judge how much to adjust their 
approach profile. But as often was the case, the 
simulator performance was not quite the same 
as the actual aircraft, so Haise was about 40 
knots too fast as the Shuttle approached the 
runway. He deployed the orbiter's speed brakes 
and was trying very hard to still hit the target 
touchdown spot. But with the stress putting 
Haise in a keyed-up, or what pilots sometimes 
call a "high-gain," mode, he over-controlled the 
craft and entered a pilot-induced oscillation 
(PIO), both in roll and pitch. After the Shuttle 
bounced on one tire and then another, Fullerton 
finally got Haise to relax his pressure on the 
controls and the Shuttle landed safely. But the 
incident uncovered a potentially serious prob- 
lem in the Shuttle's control system. In the high- 
stress environment of an actual re-entry and 
747 wake vortex research 
vith smoke generators. A 
Learjet and T-37 Cessna 
are flying through the wake 
to measure the forces and 
effects of the vortices. (NASA 
Photo ECN 4243) 
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landing from space, pilots could easily get into 
the same difficulty that Haise did, with poten- 
tially disastrous consequences. 
NASA immediately began a high- 
priority, agency-wide research effort to identify 
the cause of the problem and develop a solution. 
Dryden assigned a flight-controls group to 
research the issue, and the Center's F-8 Digital 
Controller pilot Gary Krier quickly told Manke 
to turn the time delay off, and Manke managed 
to regain control and climb to a safe altitude. 
But it was close. Researchers estimated that if 
the oscillation had gotten any larger, Manke 
would have stalled and lost the airplane. Even 
after Manke gained a little altitude, the control- 
room engineers sat in stunned, relieved silence. 
Top: F-104 shown head-on 
while engaged in Space 
Shuttle tile research. Flights 
of this aircraft in rain and 
through clouds provided 
valuable data on the extent 
to which the tiles could 
withstand rainy conditions 
during launch. 
(NASA Photo EC90 224) 
Top Right: PA-30 Twin 
Comanche general aviation 
aircraft, one of the types 
studied in the 1960s by the 
Flight Research Center in an 
investigation of their 
handling characteristics. It 
was later used to train pilots 
to operate Remotely Piloted 
Vehicles from the ground. 
No longer part of the Dryden 
fZeet of aircraft, it now 
resides at Kings River 
College, Reedley, California. 
(NASA Photo 2089) 
Fly-By-Wire was recruited to support the effort. 
Dryden's engineers suspected that the 270- 
millisecond time delay in the Shuttle's fly-by- 
wire control system was causing the problem, 
so the F-8 conducted a series of approach and 
landing tests with increasing time delays pro- 
grammed into its control system. For safety, the 
aircraft was equipped with a switch that would 
turn off the experimental time delay and return 
the aircraft to its standard fly-by-wire control 
system. 
The F-8 performed well until the added 
time delay reached 100 milliseconds. On that 
flight, as pilot John Manke was completing a 
touch-and-go landing and takeoff, he entered a 
severe PI0  at a high angle of attack and low 
speed. Hearts stopped in the control room as 
researchers watched the jet fighter porpoise up 
and down in increasingly severe oscillations. 
Finally, Krier keyed his mike again and said, 
"Uh, John? I don't think we got the data on 
that-we'd like to have you run that one again.' 
Laughter erupted, brealung the tension and 
illustrating once again the balancing power of 
humor in a high-stress environment.l0 
Clearly, there seemed to be a critical 
threshold in the time delay of a control system. 
One solution would have been to redesign the 
control system of the Shuttle, but that would 
have seriously delayed its development. Fortu- 
nately, the Dryden researchers were able to 
come up with another fix. They designed a 
suppression filter for the outer loop of the 
control system that would correct the problem 
without forcing any changes to the basic control 
laws. The filter was installed, and the Space 
Shuttles have used it ever since, accumulating a 
perfect safety record for landings. Another 
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result of the F-8 flight research was a specifica- Dryden continued to support the Shuttle mis- 
tion for future military fly-by-wire aircraft, sions through ground support of the landings 
limiting their control-system time delays to less and with its three-story steel Mate-Demate 
Device (MDD), which is 
I used to mount and remove Convair 990 landing on the lakebed during the final 
- - I the Shuttles from their two Space Shuttle tire test 
(NASA Photo 1 Boeing 747 carrier ships. EC95 43230-4, I In 1993, the Kennedy 
I Space Center in Florida became the primary - 
landing site for the Shuttle 
program, but Edwards 
continues as an important 
backup location if the 
weather in Florida is not 
suitable for a landing. 
than 100 milliseconds. I l Space Shuttle Support Research 
For a couple of years following the 
developmental research on the Shuttle, In the 1980s, Dryden once again took on 
Dryden's efforts in support of NASA's space a research role with the Space Shuttle program. 
program lessened. But the Shuttle-and the In one effort, Dryden conducted a series of 
flight tests on the tiles 
being used for the 
orbiter's thermal-protec- 
tion system. Since the 
Shuttle would be launched 
in Florida, where rain was 
a common occurrence, 
managers at the Johnson 
Space Center wanted to 
determine what kind of 
damage rain would inflict 
on the critical thermal 
tiles. Dryden researchers 
installed some of the rigid 
world's attention-returned to Dryden in April thermal tiles on a special flight-test fixture 
198 1 when pilots John Young and Robert L. underneath one of the Center's F- 104 aircraft 
Crippen landed the orbiter Columbia at and measured the results from flight in both 
Edwards after the first Space Shuttle mission. actual rain conditions and behind a KC-135 
Convair 990, equipped with 
a new landing gear test 
fixture representative of the 
Shuttle's landing gear 
system, is taking off on a 
flightfrom Dryden. In the 
background is a T-38flying 
safety chase. 
(NASA Photo 
EC92 12221-2) 
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spray tanker. 
The KC- 135 proved incapable of simu- 
lating rain impact damage and was dropped 
from the tests, but the flights in actual rain and 
cloud conditions provided some very valuable 
data. Tiles that had been through several launch 
cycles, for example, appeared to fail at lower 
impact forces than new tiles. But the research 
indicated that it might be possible to launch or 
land the Shuttle in light rain, although there 
were numerous variables that needed additional 
investigation. Related research with the F-104 
and the Shuttle tiles also indicated that the 
flexible protective tiles could actually withstand 
launch airloads as much as 40 percent higher 
than those they were designed to bear. 12 
Following the Challenger accident in 
January 1986, NASA began looking not only at 
the booster rockets, but also at any other poten- 
tial weak spots that could cause problems for 
future missions. One of the other areas investi- 
gators identified was the Shuttle's landing gear 
and tires. Because of the difficulty of protect- 
ing tires and gear in the extreme temperatures 
and environments experienced by the Shuttle, 
the orbiters were equipped with only four small 
wheels, two on each main gear. The main gear 
systems of a similar-weight commercial air- 
liner, by comparison, would incorporate any- 
where from eight to sixteen wheels. 
Although the Shuttle tires had been 
tested at the Langley Research Center test track 
and on a stationary device called a dynamom- 
eter, the "dyno" could not test all the real-life 
effects the tires had to endure. Several engi- 
neers from the Johnson Space Center and 
Dryden agreed that it would be helpful to 
research the actual limits and failure modes of 
the Shuttle tires and wheels in realistic condi- 
tions, if a suitable test aircraft could be found. 
NASA crew in front of 747 
Shuttle Carrier Aircraft with 
Shuttle Columbia mounted 
above it, in 1981. Crew, 
from viewer's left: Tom 
McMurtiy, pilot; Vic I Horton, flight engineer; Fitz 
Fulton, command pilot; and 
Ray Young, flight engineer. 
(NASA Photo ECN 15325) 
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As it turned out, NASA already had a transport 
aircraft that could achieve both the gross weight 
and speeds of the Shuttle. The airplane was a 
Convair 990-a plane whose heavy, overbuilt 
design helped prevent it from being a commer- 
cial success but made it perfect for flight re- 
search. It had been operated by the Arnes 
Research Center but was in storage in Marana, 
Arizona, when the Johnson-Dryden joint land- 
ing-systems research program was organized. 
The Convair was pulled out of storage 
and modified with a separate test gear mecha- 
nism in between the aircraft's existing main 
landing gear. The test mechanism used landing 
gear components from the Shuttle and was 
powered by a high-pressure hydraulic system 
that allowed it to be extended and tested at 
various loads after the Convair touched down 
on its own gear. This set-up also provided an 
important margin. of safety for testing tire 
failures, since the test apparatus was supple- 
mental to the Convair's existing gear. 
The initial goal of the research was to 
analyze failure modes of the Shuttle tires and 
gear. But while the Convair was still being 
modified for the work, the NASA managers in 
charge of the orbiter program decided that a 
more important priority was learning about tire 
wear on the Shuttle. Ground analysis had led 
program managers to limit the Shuttle to land- 
Space Shuttle prototype 
Enterprise, tested at Dryden, 
being worked on in a hangar 
(NASA Photo EC83 22740) 
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ing with less than a 12-15-knot crosswind. This 
also limited launches, because conditions had to 
be good enough for the Shuttle to perform an 
emergency return-to-launch-site (RTLS) ma- 
neuver in order for a launch to be approved. But 
if data from flight tests showed the tires could 
withstand greater forces, the crosswind limit 
could be increased. 
The flight research with the modified 
Convair 990 occurred between 1993 and 1995. 
A simulated (smaller) 
version of the Shuttle's solid 
rocket booster (SRB) 
mounted under the wing of 
NASA's B-52 in preparation 
for the flight testing of the 
parachute system to be used 
in SRB recovery 
(NASA Photo ECN 9874) 
During that time, the aircraft was taken twice to 
Florida to test the tires at the speeds and weight 
the Shuttle would have if it had to perform an 
emergency RTLS. The results were surprising, 
and not encouraging. The tests indicated that 
the tires might not even sustain crosswinds as 
high as the predicted 12- 15 knot limit. The 
Kennedy Space Center runway had grooves cut 
into the concrete, which improved traction in 
wet weather but created extra friction wear on 
the tires, especially the small, heavily-loaded 
tires of the Space Shuttle. As a result of the 
Convair tests, NASA decided to smooth the 
runway surface somewhat, raising the cross- 
wind capability of the tires from 15 to 20 knots. 
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The Convair also conducted high-speed landing 
research on the tires, showing they could land 
safely at speeds up to 242 miles an hour-17 
miles faster than the top speed for which they 
were rated. 
In addition, the Convair investigated the 
performance of the tires in low pressure condi- 
tions. Pressure in the Shuttle's tires is moni- 
tored while the orbiter is in space, and the 
established procedures required the Shuttle to 
return and land immediately if any tire pressure 
went below 310 pounds per square inch (psi). 
Yet after the Convair test gear showed that the 
tires could still operate safely down to 200 psi, 
the required minimum pressure was reduced to 
270 psi, giving the Shuttle some extra operating 
margin. 
Near the end of the Convair landing 
systems research program, the researchers 
finally got back to their initial area of interest- 
the failure modes of the tires and wheels. In two 
August 1995 flights a test tire was intentionally 
failed and kept rolling under load, first on the 
paved Edwards runway and then on the Rogers 
lakebed. The results on the runway were dra- 
matic. As the wheel was ground down by the 
concrete surface, the fire ignited by the heat 
stretched as high as the passenger windows and 
beyond the tail. The same test on the lakebed 
produced very different results. The tire and 
wheel kept rolling, and there was no fire. The 
research results still have to be analyzed further, 
but the information provided by the Convair 
tests will help managers reevaluate the best 
course of action for the Shuttle if it ever has to 
land with a defective tire.13 
Dryden's B-52 Launch Aircraft 
In several instances, Dryden became 
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involved with space-related research efforts 
because of its unique B-52 mothership aircraft. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, Dryden 
conducted a series of drop tests for the para- 
chute system designed to recover the Shuttle's 
solid rocket boosters. The Marshall Space 
might Center and the Martin Marietta company 
had developed a test 
cone to check the 
deployment mecha- 
nism and the maxi- 
mum loads for both 
the booster's drogue 
and main parachutes, 
but they needed a 
launch vehicle for the 
unit. Dryden's B-52, 
with its wing pylon 
runway surfaces both at Edwards and at the 
Kennedy Space Center, but a drag chute could 
enhance the safety of the landings and also 
reduce the wear on the Shuttle's braking sys- 
tem. Dryden's B-52 was recruited as the test 
aircraft because it was already equipped for a 
drag chute and was heavy enough to produce a 
load on the chute 
similar to that of the 
orbiter. A series of 
landing tests on both 
Rogers Dry Lake and 
the Edwards runway 
showed the drag chute 
worked well, and it 
was installed and used 
for the first time on the 
new orbiter Endeavour 
modified specifically in 1992. The other 
for drop tests of various aircraft and objects, orbiters were subsequently retrofitted with the 
was an ideal platform. drag-chute mechanism. 
In 1990, the B-52 was tapped once again A group of industry entrepreneurs also 
by the Johnson Space Center to test a drag chute approached Dryden in the late 1980s about 
that was being developed for the Space Shuttle. using the Center's B-52 to help them test a new 
The orbiter was already landing on concrete and potentially more cost-effective way of 
B-52 testing a drag chute 
being developed for the 
Space Shuttle to increase the 
safety of landings and 
reduce the wear on the 
orbiter's braking system 
(NASA Photo EC90 262-27) 
Space Shuttle Columbia with 
reflection in a pool of water 
created by recent rain on 
the normally dry lakebed, 16 
November 1982 
(NASA Photo EC82 21081) 
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Space Shuttle Atlantis 
mounted on top of a 747 
Shuttle Carrier Aircraft 
for its return to Kennedy 
Space Center following 
its landing at Dryden at 
the end of the STS-66 
mission, which lastedfrom 
3 to I4 November 1994. 
(NASA Photo 
EC94 42853-6) 
launching small payloads into orbit. Under the launch aircraft would replace the first stage of 
sponsorship of the Advanced Research Projects what would otherwise have been a four-stage 
Agency (ARPA, now the Defense Advanced launch system. The launch aircraft would 
release a winged 
Shuttle prototype Enterprise booster rocket, 
separating from 747 Shuttle - -  - . . 
Carrier Aircraft for 
approach and landing test 
(ALT) research 
(NASA Photo ECN77 8608) I 
I which would carry a 
second booster 
rocket and payload 
even higher. The 
final rocket stage 
carried the 1,500- 
pound payload into 
orbit. Orbital Sci- 
ences named the 
vehicle "Pegasus" 
and teamed with the 
Hercules Corpora- 
Research Projects Agency), the Orbital Sci- 
ences Corporation had developed an air- 
launched rocket-booster system in which the 
tion for manufacture 
of the rocket motors and Scaled Composites for 
the booster system's wing. But the vehicle still 
needed a suitable launch aircraft and, with its 
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custom launch pylon, Dryden's B-52 was a 
logical choice. 
Dryden research pilots carried the first 
Pegasus aloft under the B-52's wing in April 
1990. The launch was successful, and it marked 
one of the first times a commercial company 
had successfully launched a payload into Earth 
orbit. Five additional launches between 1990 
and 1994 were also successful, opening a door 
not only to potentially less expensive but also to 
nongovernmental access to space.14 
Safety and Problem 
Solving Efforts 
Aircraft Design Problems 
Even before the research station at 
Muroc was established, the National Advisory 
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Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) had been 
involved in helping the military and manufac- 
turers iron out problems in new aircraft designs. 
The NACA's wind tunnels were frequently- 
used resources, and NACA test pilots often 
helped evaluate prototype aircraft. As aircraft 
technology began advancing more rapidly in the 
1940s and pressure to get new aircraft into 
service increased, the NACA' s assistance 
became even more important. 
With the dawning of the supersonic jet 
age, new production aircraft were beginning to 
push into the same areas that were being re- 
searched with the X-series aircraft at Dryden. 
So at the same time as Center pilots and engi- 
neers were exploring new research territory, 
they were also being tapped to help solve 
developmental problems in some of the 
country's new supersonic aircraft. 
Space Shuttle Atlantis in 
Dryden's Mate-Demate 
device, about to be mated to 
the Shuttle Carrier Aircraft 
for its flight back to the 
Kennedy Space Center 
following its Space 
Transportation System-44 
flight from 24 November to 1 
December I991 
(NASA Photo EC91 659-2) 
Flights of Discovery 
One of the earliest production aircraft in-flight structural failures of the aircraft led the 
Dryden assisted was the Northrop F-89. The F- Air Force to ground the airplane. Dryden was 
89 was a high priority air defense program, and already experiencing a phenomenon kilown as 
the Air Force had placed an order for more than "inertial coupling" with the X-3 research 
1,000 of the jet aircraft. But in early 1952, six plane,l5 and researchers suspected that the F- 
F-100 protruding through 
the hangar wall following 
Scott Crossfield's emergency 
landirzg in which he skillfully 
executed a dead-stick 
landing in the less than 
docile aircraft, then decided 
to glide off the lakebed and 
coast to a stop in front of the 
NACA hangar. Not realizing 
that he had used up the 
braking power, Crossfield 
went partly through the 
lzarzgar wall without doing 
extensive damage to the 
aircraft, which flew again. 
(NASA Photo E 1366) 
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planes parked inside but ran the nose of the F- 
lOOA through the side wall of the hangar, 
causing at least as much damage to his pride as 
he did to the airplane. 
Following that incident, however, the 
I 
research effort proceeded without a hitch and 
was very successful. The flights showed that 
e 
inertial coupling was, indeed, the cause of the 
F- 100AYs difficulties, and that a larger tail and 
slightly extended wing span would alleviate the 
problem. North American made the modifica- 
tions, and the F-100 "Super Sabre" became one 
of the country's lead fighters in the 1950s. But Lockheed was having numerous problems 
The next military aircraft development with its basic F-104 flight test program and at 
program Dryden supported was the Lockheed one point found itself without a single instru- 
F- 104 "Starfighter." Dryden initially requested mented Starfighter. Dryden' s prototype YF- 
and received a pre-production model of the 104A was the only remaining instrumented 
Mach 2 fighter for its own research efforts on aircraft, and Lockheed asked the Center to 
phenomena such as roll coupling and pitch-up. return it. Instead, Dryden suggested that it 
F-15 Remotely Piloted 
Research Vehicle mounted 
under NASA's B-52 in 
preparation for flight testing 
of the 3/8 scale model of the 
"Eag1e"fighter to test the 
spin characteristics of the 
design before committing to 
a piloted test program in a 
full-scale F-15. (NASA 
1 Photo ECN 3804) 
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F-104 (tail number 826), 
F/A-18 (tail number 841) 
and T-38 chase aircraft (tail 
number 821). Through the 
years, Dryden has used a 
variety of chase and support 
aircraf, including all three 
of these. This particular 
formation flew in March 
1990 on the 30th 
anniversary of research pilot 
Bill Dana'sfirstflight in an 
F-104, with Bill again in the 
cockpit of that aircraft, 
Gordon Fullerton in the 
T-38, and Jim Smolka in the 
F/A-18. First acquired in 
August 1956, F-104s were 
the most versatile work- 
horses in Dryden's stable of 
research and support 
aircraft, with 11 of them 
flying mostly research 
missions over the next 38 
years. Tail number 826flew 
the last of these missions on 
31 January 1994. By then 
the 11 F-104s had 
accumulated over 18,000 
flights at Dryden in a great 
variety of missions ranging 
from basic research to 
airborne simulation and 
service as an aerodynamic 
testbed. (NASA Photo 
EC90 128-5) 
complete the F-104 testing for Lockheed, using As NASA's focus turned to space flight 
Dryden research pilots and instrumentation. in the 1960s, the agency became less involved 
Lockheed and the Air Force agreed, and Dryden in production aircraft development programs, 
conducted a series of flight tests for Lockheed but Dryden did help iron out problems with 
engine inlet, which 
over a nine month period of time in 1957. As a corrected the problem. Later on, Dryden pro- 
result of the cooperative flight tests, Lockheed vided additional assistance to the F- 1 1 1 pro- 
built mechanical aileron limits into the plane, gram by drop testing the parachute system for 
installed a yaw damper, and added several the F- 11 1's crew escape pod, using the Center's 
operational cautions into the pilots' operating B-52 launch vehicle. Four different series of 
handbook. The sleek and fast F-104 with its research experiments from 1977 to 1995 
razor-thin wings still commanded respect from worked toward both extending the life of the 
pilots who flew it, but the changes made as a parachutes and investigating ways to decrease 
result of the flight testing at Dryden helped it the velocity at which the cockpit pod hit the 
become a highly successful Air Force fighter. ground.l6 
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In the early 1980s, Dryden7s assistance Dryden obtained a B-47 bomber and used it to 
was sought again after the Navy lost several gather useful information on the dynamics and 
Grurnrnan F-14 "Tomcat" fighters in spin characteristics of a large, flexible swept-wing 
incidents. The aircraft was having engine aircraft. That data, in turn, helped engineers 
difficulties at high angles of attack, and if one design future swept-wing aircraft, including the 
engine stalled or flamed out, the asymmetric Boeing KC-135 and B-707 transport and every 
thrust from the remaining engine had a ten- other swept-wing Boeing aircraft that followed. 
dency to send the plane into a spin. The Tomcat Then in 1973, Dryden began flight 
had a flat spin mode that was proving very testing three remotely piloted 318 scale models 
difficult to recover from and had resulted in the of the F- 15 "Eagle" fighter that was being 
loss of several aircraft and crews. The Navy developed by McDonnell Douglas and the Air 
asked Gr~lmnnan to look into the problem, and Force. Program managers wanted to test the 
Grurnrnan enlisted NASA's help in developing spin characteristics of the design on a scale 
a solution. Working with Grumman, engineers model before committing to a piloted test 
at Drydeaa and Langley came up with a new program, and Dryden had both experience in 
control law that they thought might help the F- remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) and a B-52 
14's spin response. The new control law was aircraft capable of launching such a model. The 
then tested extensively in simulators before it F-15 RPV flights were successful, and the 
was gingerly explored in flight with an F-14 results gave McDonnell Douglas and the Air 
loaned to Dryden for the research. Force the confidence they needed to go ahead 
The flight research showed that the new with a spin test program on a full-scale, piloted 
control law did, in fact, make a significant F-15.18 
improvement in the controllability of the F-14 Dryden's work with production aircraft 
in spins, Yet by the time the research was programs has never been the primary focus of 
completed, Navy priorities had apparently its research. But the Center was well suited for 
changed and the control law was not imple- tfus lund of support work. For one thing, the 
mentecf in fleet F- 14s. The F- 14 spin research daily requirements of keeping research aircraft 
program ill~astrated why technology transfer can flying meant that Dryden's staff was already 
be such a complex and sometimes difficult very experienced in trouble-shooting aircraft 
process, even if the technology itself is valid. and coming up with practical test methods and 
Nevertheless, the concept had been proven. And solutions. But these efforts also benefited 
although "ce control law was not incorporated greatly from the "technical agility" of Dryden7s 
into fleet aircraft at the time, it may be retrofit- staff. Support projects tended to materialize 
ted into IF- 14D model fighters.17 suddenly when an aircraft program ran into 
Over the years, Dryden was also in- trouble, requiring quick action and quick an- 
volved in several research efforts with produc- swers. Dryden was able to support these vari- 
tion aircraft that did not stem from any particu- ous efforts, on short time frames, because its 
lar problems, but served instead to provide management and staff were accustomed to 
additional information on a specific aircraft or juggling different programs and switching gears 
type of design. In the early 1950s, for example, and priorities quickly. 
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Aviation Safety 
In addition to supporting various 
tary aircraft design programs, Dryden also 
provided support to national civil aviation 
efforts, especially in the area of safety. Th 
Center's focus on high-speed flight mean 
was less involved in civil aviation resear 
other NASA centers, since civil aircraft t 
to have lower performance than military d 
signs. But in 1957-1958, Dryden was ask 
conduct a series of research flights for wha 
then the Civil Aeronautics Administration 
(absorbed into the Federal Aviation Administra- 
tion during 1958). Boeing was getting ready to 
introduce its first jet airliner, the B-707, and the 
CAA needed to establish new approach proce- 
dure guidelines on cloud-ceiling and visibility 
minimums for the new generation of jet trans- 
ports. Using the military KC-135 variant of the 
707, Dryden pilots conducted a series of flights 
that gave the CAA the data it needed to develop 
safe instrument guidelines and approach proce- 
dures.19 
In the 1960s, the aviation community 
became concerned about an increasing number 
of accidents among general aviation (GA) 
aircraft. In an effort to see whether there were 
any common design weaknesses or problems in 
GA airplanes, Dryden was asked to investigate 
the handling characteristics of several different 
designs throughout their flight envelopes. In the 
end, Dryden pilots surveyed a total of seven 
different GA aircraft in order to include a cross- 
section of aircraft types in the study. The results 
showed that there was no single weakness or 
design problem and the designs were generally 
adequate, although the criteria for handling 
qualities in small aircraft had not kept pace with 
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concern in aviation safety-wake vortices. 
Wingtip, or wake, vortices are very powedul 
tornado-like disturbances in the air corning off 
the wingtips of an airplane that trail behind the 
aircraft. The bigger and heavier the ail~lane, the 
more powerful these disturbances are, and a 
small plane trailing too closely behind a larger 
one can easily be flipped upside down by these 
powerful vortices at the edges of the larger 
aircraft's wake. Wingtip vortices are a particu- 
larly dangerous hazard during approaches or 
departures from airports since trailing aircraft 
have little altitude in which to recover. So when 
jumbo jets began mixing with smaller aircraft 
at airports, the aviation community began 
looking for more detailed infornnation on the 
behavior and strength of wake distun'bances 
from large aircraft. 
In late 1969, Dryden pilots began 
investigating wake vortices by flying an instru- 
mented F-104 fighter behind a B-52 bomber 
and C-5 transport. The C-5's vortices were so 
strong that on one flight, they caused the F-104 
to roll inverted and lose 3,000-4,000 feet of 
altitude, even though the fighter was flying 10 
miles behind the larger airplane. In 1973. 
Dryden expanded its wake vortex research to 
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include a Boeing 727. The following year, 
Dryden got approval to use NASA's 747 
Shuttle Carrier Aircraft for some additional 
wake-vortex research before the jumbo jet was 
modified for Shuttle use. Following a trail left 
by wingtip smoke generators installed on the 
747, research pilots flew a Learjet business 
plane and a T-37 Air Force jet trainer through 
the 747's vortices to measure their forces and 
effects. After the 747's wake caused the T-37 
to perform two unplanned snap rolls and de- 
velop a roll rate of 200 degrees per second 
despite trailing the jetliner by more than three 
miles, one research pilot speculated that a safe 
separation between the two aircraft in a landing 
configuration would have to be three times that 
distance. 
As more jumbo jets entered service, 
Dryden expanded the research to examine the 
wake vortices of Lockheed' s L- 10 1 1 and 
McDonnell Douglas' DC- 10 as well. Follow-on 
flights also looked at how use of wing flaps, 
speed brakes or spoilers might affect the forma- 
tion and behavior of wing vortices. Although 
the results indicated that use of wing devices 
could help reduce the severity of the vortices, 
researchers were unable to find a configuration 
that was practical. For example, certain flap 
combinations reduced wingtip vortices, but only 
if the gear remained retracted. The wake-vortex 
flight research conducted at Dryden did, how- 
ever, play a central role in helping the FAA 
establish safe separation minimums for airline 
traffic at airports across the country.21 
In 1984, the FAA once again teamed up 
with Dryden to conduct another research project 
concerned with flight safety. The FAA was 
evaluating an anti-misting jet-fuel additive that 
seemed capable, at least in laboratory testing, of 
preventing fuel fires in airplane crashes. The 
concept seemed so promising, in fact, that the 
FAA was preparing to publish a Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) as a first step 
toward requiring the additive in certain types of 
jet aircraft. Before proceeding with the NPRM, 
however, the agency wanted to test the additive 
in a real airplane crash. Dryden's desolate 
surroundings and the staff's experience in 
remotely piloted vehicle research made it a 
logical support resource for the test. Dryden 
engineers rigged up an old Boeing 720 jetliner 
with remote controls, fueled it with the anti- 
misting fuel, and guided it to a controlled crash 
landing on the lakebed. Iron posts had been set 
Above Left: Remotely piloted 
Boeing 720 Controlled 
Impact Demonstration 
aircraft following impact 
with iron posts (cutters) 
implanted in the lakebed to 
pierce the fuel tanks and test 
an anti-misting fuel for its 
ability to prevent fuel fires 
during airplane crashes 
(NASA Photo EC84 31806) 
Above Right: Remotely 
piloted Boeing 720 
Controlled Impact 
Demonstration aircraft 
burning after failure of anti- 
misting fuel to prevent aafire 
in a simulated post-crash 
situation 
(NASA Photo EC84 31809) 
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Boeing 720 Controlled 
lnzpact Demonstration 
aircraft flying above 
cutters (iron posts) on 
lakebed, showing the setting 
for the demonstration 
portrayed in the photos on 
the preceding page 
(NASA Photo 
EC84 31672-12) 
up on the lakebed to ensure that the fuel tanks 
would be ripped open upon impact, since that 
was the scenario most likely to result in a post- 
crash fire. The experiment was called the 
Controlled Impact Demonstration (CID), and 
the FAA expected that it would be a relatively 
tame event. 
The expectations were wrong. In one of 
the Center's most dramatic moments of discov- 
ery, the remotely piloted 720 settled gently onto 
the desert floor . . . and exploded into a stagger- 
ing fiery inferno. Needless to say, plans to 
require the fuel additive were discontinued, and 
from that point forth, Dryden researchers 
informally referred to the CID experiment as 
the "Crash In the Desert." Nevertheless, the 
experiment was a very strong illustration of 
why flight research is such an important ele- 
ment in technology development. The fuel 
additive worked well in laboratory testing. But 
in the real world environment of an airplane 
crash, it was clearly a failure.22 
Conclusion 
Throughout its history, Dryden's unique 
resources, organizational style and single 
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mission focus have enabled it to play a key role 
not only in exploratory research but also in a 
wide variety of other government and industry 
aerospace efforts. The Center's open sky and 
lakebed landing sites provided a safe location 
for projects such as testing and landing the 
Space Shuttle or testing a new fuel additive in 
an actual crash situation. Its unique B-52 
research aircraft allowed NASA to test a new 
drag chute for the Shuttle and provided a laul~ch 
vehicle for everything from scale model aircraft 
and parachute systems to a low-cost method for 
putting payloads into space. Its ongoing re- 
search partnerships with military and industry 
put the Center in a position to help aircraft 
development programs when they ran into 
trouble. 
But the driving force behind the success 
of Dryden's many support efforts was the 
attitude and experience of its staff members. 
They didn't do the wind tunnel testing or in- 
depth theoretical analysis that researchers at 
other centers did, but they had all unparalleled 
level of experience in flight research. They 
could figure out how to rig a jetliner to be flown 
by remote control, or how to design a free- 
flying lunar landing simulator. They could 
design a flight research program to safely 
investigate aircraft characteristics that had 
killed other pilots. And they had the endlusiasm 
and creativity to pursue these projects with 
success. The employees at Dryden prided 
themselves on their ability to trouble-shoot 
aircraft and find quick solutions to operational 
problems. So whether the problem was a dan- 
gerous pilot-induced oscillation in the Space 
Shuttle, a need to train astronauts to land on the 
Moon, or a flawed aircraft design that was 
costing pilots' lives, it was the kind of work at 
which Dryden excelled. 
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Still, the Center staff could not have 
taken on so many unscheduled support efforts 
in addition to its exploratory research without a 
management environment that stressed flexibil- 
ity. Staff members were already used to jug- 
gling several research projects at once, and the 
daily operational philosophy at the Center 
might have been summarized as "all plans 
subject to change." It was simply a fact of life at 
a flight research center where mechanical 
problems, weather, and other factors could 
always force last-minute changes in schedules 
and priorities. But Dryden's flexible, innovative 
management style created a kind of "technical 
agility" that allowed the Center to support a 
surprisingly wide variety of other government 
and industry efforts even as it continued its 
exploratory research. 
Dryden's research in support of other 
programs was not always as glamorous as its 
work on the frontiers of science and flight, but 
those support efforts had direct, real-life conse- 
quences. The Center's work with the F-89, 
F- 1 OOA, F- 104 and F- 1 1 1 helped save pilots' 
lives and helped turn the designs into successful 
fighter aircraft. The Lunar Landing Research 
Vehicle gave Neil Armstrong the confidence he 
needed to land the Lunar Module manually on 
the Moon's surface. The Center's PI0 flight 
research and suppression filter design solved a 
potentially dangerous problem with the Space 
Shuttle, and the landing systems research with 
the Convair 990 might save future astronauts' 
lives in an emergency situation. And Dryden's 
wake vortex research helped national efforts to 
maintain the safety of civil aviation. Testing 
tires or thermal tiles for the Space Shuttle might 
not be as exciting as flying an X-15 to the outer 
reaches of the atmosphere, but those efforts, and 
the many support projects like them, were every 
bit as important. 
F-15 Advanced Controls for 
Integrated Vehicles 
(ACTNE) research aircra8 
in flight over Edwards in 
March 1996. The Pratt & 
Whitney nozzles can turn up 
to 20 degrees in any 
direction and enable the 
aircraft to use thrust control 
in place of conventional 
aerodynamic controls, 
thereby reducing drag and 
increasing fuel economy or 
range. 
(NASA Photo 
EC96 434585-1 3) 
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Future Directions 
he Dryden Flight Research Center begins its second 50 years, it 
faces a very different world than the one the original X-1 team knew. Advances in 
technology have revolutionized Americans' daily lives and changed our view of 
what is possible in fields ranging from data processing and communication to trans- 
portation, aircraft design, and space flight. We have moved from an essentially 
manual, manufacturing-based society into the automated information age where 
F/A-18 vertical tails. personal computers, satellite comrnunications and the information superhighway 
These aircraft serve as 
chase planes for have become an integral part of individual, business and government transactions. 
Dryden's research From a time when space flight was a science-fiction fantasy and the speed of sound 
airplanes 
(NASA Photo seemed an impenetrable barrier, we have moved into an era where the Space Shuttle 
EC96 43505-9) flies regularly to and from space and aircraft reach speeds of Mach 2 and beyond. 
Future Directions 
Yet along with the vastly expanded 
capabilities of today's world have come new 
concerns, issues and priorities. The price of fuel 
has risen sharply, making fuel efficiency a 
much higher priority for both end users of 
aircraft and national policy-makers. There is 
much more concern about protecting the envi- 
ronment and atmosphere. Advances in technol- 
ogy and changes in warfare have created 
tougher demands on military aircraft, requiring 
designs that are radar-resistant and maneuver- 
able, for example, as well as fast. An increas- 
ingly global economy and improved technology 
bases in other countries have helped shake the 
United States' unquestioned position as the 
world's technological and economic leader and 
have contributed to an unfavorable balance of 
trade. Consequently, while international part- 
nerships are on the rise, the issue remains of 
F/A-18 High Angle-of-Attack 
Research Vehicle, X-29, 
F-15 Highly Integrated 
Digital Electronic Control 
aircraft, single-seat F-I6XL, 
three F/A-18s in a row with 
the middle one being the 
F-18 Systems Research 
Aircraft, Pegasus in front of 
B-52 mothership, T-38, 
F-104, B-52, SR-71, 747 
Shuttle Carrier Aircraft, 
with Dryden Flight Research 
Center facilities in the 
background. 
(NASA Photo EC90 280-1) 
how to cooperate without giving away critical 
U.S. technology. Furthermore, while new 
aerospace technology has greatly expanded 
capabilities, its cost and complexity make it 
even riskier for industry to research or apply. 
This inherently makes government involvement 
in technology development more important. But 
the United States government also faces budget 
difficulties, leaving less funding available for 
federal research and development work. 
What all of this means for Dryden is 
simply that for all the technological progress 
made since that first small group of engineers 
arrived in the desert in 1946, the challenges the 
Center faces are no less demanding. Technol- 
ogy has become more capable, but the problems 
have become more complex. Even as new 
technology has overcome existing obstacles, it 
has opened doors onto whole new sets of 
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Flow-visualization smoke 
marks strong vortex flows 
along the leading edge 
extension (LEX) of the NASA 
F/A-18 High Angle-ofAttack 
Research Vehicle during 
tests of the white LEX fences 
located close to the fuselage, 
ahead of the wing. The LEX 
fences caused the vortices to 
burst and lose energy, 
reducing the structural loads 
on the rudders and 
increasing the life of the 
aifiame. This modifcation 
has been added to Dryden's 
F/A-18fleet as well as to 
F/A-18s in military service. 
(NASA Photo 
EC89 0096 149; 
questions or problems. Computerized flight- 
control systems, for example, have made highly 
unusual aircraft such as the highly unstable X- 
29 and the thrust-vectored X-3 1 possible. But 
that same technology has created new problems 
and has greatly increased the system complexity 
of aircraft. As a result, there are more opportu- 
nities to overlook something, and software 
configuration control is now as flight-critical an 
element as the spar in an aircraft's wing. 
In 1946, the X-1 was designed to tackle 
the issues and problems with basic transonic1 
supersonic flight. Today, research aircraft are 
trying to meet more complex challenges. Super- 
sonic speed itself is no longer the cutting edge 
of possibility. But achieving supersonic larni- 
nar flow, integrated flight and engine control 
operations, or thrust-vectored maneuvering at 
supersonic speeds still is. And the requirements 
and restrictions of a changing world demand 
that we continue to operate at that cutting edge. 
Our spacecraft must create less waste and 
pollution and deliver payloads into space more 
cost-effectively. In addition to flying high and 
fast, today's aircraft must also operate more 
economically and without damaging the envi- 
ronment. Indeed, we need to find a way to learn 
more about changes and damage to the atmo- 
sphere itself. We have made great progress, but 
the goalposts are continually moving outward 
as our world changes and we expand our 
knowledge base and technical ability. 
A 1976 NASA report noted that "how to 
meet international competition with improved 
performance and better economics and still 
provide increased environmental protection and 
greater safety is a task requiring the best efforts 
of government and industry."l That statement 
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was true then, and it is 
even more true today. 
The challenges have 
changed; the problems 
are more complex. 
But the role and 
importance of Dryden 
are the same today as 
they were in 1946. 
With its many govern- 
ment and industry 
partners, Dryden is 
still working at the 
boundary between the 
known and the un- 
known, trying to learn enough and push tech- 
nology enough to allow the country to meet the 
challenges not only of the present but also of 
the near and distant future. 
Current Projects 
Like many of the focused research 
programs throughout Dryden's history, the four 
major research efforts the Center is currently 
pursuing reflect some of the nation's present- 
day aerospace priorities. Interestingly enough, 
some of them also incorporate ideas that date 
back as far as the Wright brothers but are being 
revisited as new technologies andlor mission 
needs have developed to support their use. 
One of the major efforts underway at 
Dryden is, once again, a high speed research 
(HSR) program, focused primarily on support- 
ing the High Speed Civil Transport (HSCT). 
Dryden had supported supersonic transport 
research in the 1960s, but the HSCT has more 
challenging requirements for fuel-efficiency 
and low environmental impact. So Dryden's 
current HSR efforts include projects such as the 
F- 16XL supersonic laminar-flow research-a 
technology that could help make a supersonic 
aircraft efficient enough to be economically 
viable. The need for the HSCT to be environ- 
mentally sensitive has also prompted new 
research into the characteristics of sonic booms, 
using its SR-71 Blackbird aircraft. 
The increasing concern about damage to 
the environment and the atmosphere is behind 
the Environmental Research Aircraft and 
Sensor Technology (ERAST) program at 
Dryden as well. The ERAST research is trying 
to develop high-altitude, low-speed, remotely- 
piloted aircraft that could be used to gather 
currently unavailable information about the 
atmosphere. And remotely-piloted research 
vehicles are likely to play a larger role in future 
research efforts.2 
The changing requirements of military 
aircraft are driving other Dryden research 
efforts in the area of high-performance aircraft 
operation. The F- 15 ACTIVE research, for 
example, is working toward a practical applica- 
tion of thrust-vectoring technology, which has 
the potential of making aircraft much more 
F/A-18 High Angle-ofAttack 
Research Vehicle showing 
the results of releasing a 
glycol-based liquid dye from 
very small holes around the 
nose of the aircraft during 
flight at about 30 degrees 
angle of attack. The ailflow 
pattern revealed by the lines 
on the fuselage and wing 
helped researchers from 
Dryden, Ames and Langley 
research centers to visualize? 
what was happening in flight 
and to compare forebody 
flows with predictions 
obtained from wind-tunnel 
testing and computational 
fluid dynamics simulations. 
(NASA Photo 
EC88 01 1.5- 79) 
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r -1 om, (joregrounaj z 
SR-71 in formation du. .."& 
1995, when this single-seat 
F-16XL and the SR-71 were 
studying the characteristics 
of sonic booms. This project 
was part of NASA's High 
Speed Research program 
dedicated to developing 
-1 
maneuverable.3 The Center's plans also include 
a joint effort with the Air Force's Wright 
Laboratory to pursue further research on tailless 
aircraft, which could improve the stealth capa- 
bilities and reduce the weight and drag of 
aircraft designs. In addition, Dryden and the 
Wright Laboratory are working together on an 
advanced flexible-wing project. The flexible- 
wing research plans to use aeroelastic, or 
twisting, properties of a wing to help control an 
aircraft, reducing the drag and structural weight 
of the wing and thereby increasing the aircraft's 
overall efficiency and performance. This project 
is especially interesting because the base con- 
cept behind the research is similar to the wing 
warping approach used by Orville and Wilbur 
Wright to control their pioneering Wright Flyer 
back in 1903.4 Some of these projects are still 
in the planning stages, but the common thread 
running through all of them is that they focus on 
technology to meet the expanded maneuverabil- 
ity and stealth requirements of high-perfor- 
mance military aircraft designs. 
The fourth current research thrust at 
Dryden is being driven by the need to find more 
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cost-effective methods 
of getting payloads 
into space. Histori- 
cally, the cost and 
complexity of launch 
systems have kept 
industry from attempt- 
ing its own launch 
infrastructure andlor 
operations. But de- 
creasing federal 
budgets mean that 
NASA itself needs to 
find more economical 
ways of accessing 
space. Whether the operations are managed by 
NASA or industry, they must be made more 
affordable. In 1993, a NASA study initiated by 
Congress concluded that advances in technol- 
ogy could make a fully reusable launch vehicle 
practical in the near future. This kind of vehicle 
might be cost-effective enough that industry 
could afford to build and operate it, relieving 
the burden on NASA. In order for industry to 
commit the significant resources necessary for 
this kind of venture, however, the report also 
concluded that numerous relevant technologies 
needed to be matured and demonstrated. Thus 
was born the Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) 
technology program, which includes several 
different research efforts that Dryden is sup- 
porting.5 
The primary thrust of the RLV program 
is the X-33-a technology demonstration craft 
designed to answer the question of whether the 
technology exists to make a rocket-powered, 
single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) vehicle a viable, 
profitable concept. It is a question that encom- 
passes a multitude of challenges. First, there are 
the obstacles inherent in the actual physics of a 
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single-stage-to-orbit vehicle. It has never been 
done before, and researchers estimate that only 
one percent of a SSTO vehicle's gross liftoff 
weight could be devoted to its payload. The rest 
of its weight would be taken up by the structure 
and propellant necessary to get it into orbit. But 
even if those challenges are met, there is still 
the question of whether the vehicle can be built 
and operated cost-effectively enough to make it 
a viable economic proposition. 
The X-33 effort began in April 1995 
with a 15-month concept definition and design 
phase. Three industry teams-lockheed- 
Martin, McDomell Douglas/Boeing, and 
RockwelUNorthrop-Grumman-have devel- 
oped different concepts for an X-33 vehicle. 
Lockheed-Martin's design is a vertical-takeoff1 
horizontal-landing lifting body; McDonnell 
Douglas/Boeing pursued a vertical-takeoff and 
vertical-landing vehicle; and Rockwell/ 
Northrop-Grurnrnan designed a vertical-takeoff1 
horizontal-landing winged craft that, not sur- SR-71B Blackbird at sunset 
prisingly, bears some resemblance to during early 1995 (NASA Photo 
Rockwell's Space Shuttle orbiters. Dryden EC95 43351 -2) 
provided support for each of the design teams, 
including its scheduled flight tests of the linear 
aerospike engine for Lockheed's proposed 
design.6 NASA planned to recommend one of 
the designs to Congress in June 1996, leading to 
the actual construction and test flying of an X- 
33 vehicle. The X-33 would not be put into 
actual orbit, but it would be flown to an altitude 
that would expose the critical technologies to 
the environment necessary to evaluate their 
acceptability. 7 
The X-33 is designed primarily to 
mature and demonstrate the technology neces- 
sary for commercial RLVs that would follow. 
Future research efforts also may explore other 
reusable launch vehicle options, such as plane- 
launched systems similar to the Pegasus con- 
cept and designed for small payloads. In addi- 
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Single-seat F-16XL known 
as "ship number one" 
during 1992 when the 
aircraft was equipped with 
an active experimental wing 
section designed to promote 
laminar (smooth) aigow 
over a larger proportion of 
the wing than occurred 
naturally. Tests with this 
aircraft during 1991 -1 992 
showed that laminarflow 
was achievable over a 
significant portion of the 
wing during supersonic 
flight. A more extensive 
"glove" for active laminar 
flow research continued this 
effort on a two-seat F-16XL 
during 1995 and 1996. 
(NASA Photo 
EC92 09032-2) 
tion, Dryden is 
supporting a 
Johnson Space 
Center program 
that is investigat- 
Dryden's extensive 
=a lifting-body research, 
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the X-CRV design 
would probably not 
ing one potential 
payload for an X- 
33 type of RLV. 
The research craft 
is called the X- 
CRV, or Experi- 
mental Crew 
Return Vehicle, 
and it is, interest- 
ingly enough, a 
legacy of the 
lifting-body and Paresev research conducted at 
Dryden in the 1960s and early 1970s. The X- 
CRV design is based on the Martin X-24A 
lifting body, and it is envisioned as a means for 
getting crew members back to Earth from a 
space station in case of an emergency. The 
lifting-body shape would enable the vehicle to 
fly back from space and control its general 
touchdown location. But to allow the emer- 
gency vehicle to land without a trained pilot on 
board, the X-CRV is being designed to use a 
parafoil device, deployed under Mach 1 speeds, 
for its final descent and touchdown. 
In December 1995 Dryden began drop 
tests of a scale-model X-CRV from a small 
airplane, and plans called for the Center to 
eventually flight test a vehicle from Mach 0.8 at 
40,000 feet down through landing. Yet some 
would argue that Dryden's largest contribution 
to the effort was made more than 30 years ago, 
when a small group of engineers and techni- 
cians built a stubby plywood-and-tubing craft 
they dubbed the "flying bathtub." If it had not 
been for that M2-F1 effort, which led to 
. - 
' 1  be a lifting body 
ohape. The X-CRV 
design choice was a undoubtedly also influenced by yet 
another 1960s mili- 
tary research project 
called the X-23, or 
"Prime" program. In 
that classified pro- 
gram, a model 
shaped much like the 
X-24A lifting body was launched into space and 
brought back, accumulating actual reentry data 
that is now proving extremely useful to X-CRV 
engineers. * 
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In the same way as the X-1 reflected the 
"need-for-speed" philosophy that dominated 
post-World War I1 defense strategies, the 
current Dryden research efforts reflect the 
concerns of the more complex, computerized, 
cost- and environment-sensitive society in 
which we now live. Of course, these planned 
research projects will undoubtedly be supple- 
mented with other support or problem-solving 
efforts that develop as new problems or high- 
priority needs arise. They will also continue to 
change as the needs and concerns of the nation 
evolve in the years to come. 
Exactly how Dryden's research will 
change remains to be seen. Trying to predict 
specifics about the future is always a risky 
proposition, but it is especially so with a place 
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like Dryden, where projects arise quickly in 
response to unforeseen needs and one techno- 
logical breakthrough can make a dramatic 
impact on future research directions. One year 
before the F-8 Digital-Fly-By-Wire research 
airplane flew at Dryden, for example, few at the 
center would have predicted the amount of 
effort that would be devoted to computerized 
flight control systems over the next 10 years. 
By the same token, one external change, such as 
a dramatic increase in fuel prices, could also 
significantly affect the priorities attached to 
different research projects. 
Yet if current trends are any predictor, 
there are certain general characteristics that 
seem likely to define Dryden's research in at 
least the near future. An increasingly global 
economy may strengthen the need for high- 
speed global transportation, fueling research 
efforts such as the High Speed Civil Transport. 
Many of the changes in aircraft design will be 
internal system improvements, but advanced 
technology may also generate more interest in 
configurations that were previously impossible 
to design or support. The need for more cost- 
effective access to space will undoubtedly 
continue. Indeed, decreasing budgets will create 
an ongoing challenge to do the same work with 
fewer people and with less money. 
Budget constraints have already re- 
sulted in an increased emphasis on joint partner- 
ships, as illustrated by the recent Air Force 
Flight Test Center Alliance agreement with 
Dryden. Partnership efforts have always played 
a big part in the Center's work, but those 
agreements will undoubtedly become even 
more important if federal budgets continue to 
decrease and NASA has to rely more on indus- 
try funds and participation to make research 
projects possible. The current trend of 
downsizing military budgets will also tend to 
focus more research on civil applications of 
technology, including subsonic transport air- 
craft operations. Interest in learning more about 
our atmosphere and the impact our actions have 
on it means that efforts in high-altitude, low- 
speed sampling aircraft and technology are 
likely to continue. Finally, researchers will 
undoubtedly continue to find themselves revisit- 
ing old concepts and configurations, drawing on 
Pathfider silhouette at 
sunrise in 1995. This 
unpiloted, remotely- 
controlled aircraft that uses 
the Sun's energy to power its 
engines, reached the record 
altitude for a solar-powered 
aircraft of 50,567 feet during 
a 12-hourflight on 11 
September 1995. The all- 
wing aircraft, weighing less 
than 600 pounds, is being 
evaluated by a NASA- 
industry alliance in a 
program to develop 
technologies for operating 
unpiloted aircraft at 
altitudes up to 100,000 feet 
on environmental sampling 
missions lasting up to a week 
or more. The effort is 
labeled the Environmental 
Research Aircraft and 
Sensor Technology (ERAST) 
program and is part of 
NASA's mission to study and 
protect the environment. 
(NASA Photo 
EC95 43207-6) 
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I still holds true. TO 
really learn about flight 
1 requires mounting a 
machine and experi- 
t :ncing its behavior in 
7 8 f?b#'% ,,L,, 
actual trial.10 The 
- 
u reasons for this are 
many, and they have 
D 1 been proven over and 
Team.@omAerovironrnent, the legacy of past research efforts. One of the 
znc. gening Pathfinhfinder oldest lessons of research is that sometimes for fliah't from the lakebed 
- " " "  
in September 1995 ideas have to wait for technology to catch up 
with them. Concepts once discarded as unsup- 
ES95 43373-1 7) - - 
portable or unnecessary may become both 
possible and practical as technology and mis- 
sion needs change.9 
The Role of Flight Research 
Yet regardless of how the specific 
research directions at Dryden change in the 
years to come, one thing that will not change is 
the importance of flight research itself. In some 
cases, such as atmospheric research, flight is the 
only way to obtain any data. But the value of 
flight research goes far beyond those few 
instances. What Wilbur Wright said in 1901 
Future Directions 
over by the people who 
have worked at Dryden 
over the years. 
It is often said at 
Dryden that there are 
no secrets in flight 
research. On one level, 
that means that mem- 
bers of a flight research 
project learn to speak 
frankly, because 
overlooked items or 
mi~takes can cost 
someone's life. But it also helps explain the 
value of testing an idea in flight. The conse- 
quences and results of flight research are real, 
tangible, and inescapable. It is a place where 
new technology faces a moment of truth, where 
theory and reality meet face to face. It is also by 
necessity a multidisciplinary effort that allows 
all the elements of a technology or system to 
come together in a real world environment. 
Individually, or in a simulated situation, ele- 
ments of the technology may appear to work. 
But as research efforts at Dryden have repeat- 
edly demonstrated over the years, laboratory 
predictions and real-life performance are not 
always the same. This is especially true when 
one of the elements in the loop is a human 
being. Pilots do not react the same in a sirnula- 
tor as they do in an actual flight situation, where 
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the consequences and stresses are significantly 
higher. 
In addition, computers and simulators 
can only model what is known. Yet to advance 
technology we have to stretch into the un- 
known, and the only way to truly explore 
beyond a frontier is to actually go there. This 
was true in the days of Magellan, and it is still 
true today. In order to know what lies beyond 
our current aeronautical knowledge; in order to 
tell if our predictions of what lies beyond are 
accurate, we need to test our theories, at some 
point, in the real world. Indeed, there have been 
few, if any, research projects in Dryden's 50- 
year history where prediction and actual perfor- 
mance have matched in every aspect. Every 
effort has had at least one moment of discovery, 
where researchers found themselves surprised 
by their results. 
Furthermore, as Hugh L. Dryden him- 
self once said, flight research separates the real 
from the imagined. Applying concepts to actual 
flight hardware, as opposed to laboratory 
computers or simulators, quickly brings to the 
surface the critical issues and obstacles that 
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have to be tackled in order for a technology to 
succeed in a real-life environment. Making the 
decision to remove the mechanical backup 
controls on the F-8 Digital-Fly-By-Wire, for 
example, made it instantly clear to researchers 
that software integrity and configuration con- 
trol, more than any other issue they might have 
pursued in simulators, was the crucial issue for 
that technology. And because flight research 
forces the resolution of critical technological 
issues, it unavoidably matures technology 
beyond the level achieved by simulation or 
laboratory work. This has important implica- 
tions for technology transfer, because often 
there is too large a gap between basic laboratory 
research and a practical application of a tech- 
nology for industry to bridge. The risks or costs 
of maturing the concept without the intennedi- 
ary step of flight research are often simply too 
high. 
By the same token, proving a technol- 
ogy in actual flight conditions helps give it a 
level of credibility that is equally important in 
getting industry to commit to its commercial 
development. Whether the concept is a fly-by- 
Flights of Discovery 
Group photo at edge of 
lakebed showing (viewer's 
left to right) a full-scale 
X-15 mock-up, two-seat 
F/A-18, SR-71, 
X-31, and X-29 
(NASA Photo 
EC93 41012-3) 
Side-view of the Linear 
Aerospike SR-71 Experiment 
(LASRE) pod on NASA 
SR-71, tail number 844. This 
hot0 was taken during thefit- 
check of the pod on 15 
February 1996, at Lockheed 
Martin's Skunkworks in 
Palmdale, California. The 
LASRE will be flight tested 
ring 1996 at Dryden. LASRE 
is designed to flight test the 
inear aerospike rocket engine 
mnted on a 10-percent-scale, 
half-span model of Lockheed 
zrtin 's X-33 Reusable Launch 
bhicle concept. Among other 
,rtners involved in the project 
are Rockwell's Rocketdyne 
Division, builder of the 
v-ospike engine, the Marshall 
Space Flight Center, Dryden, 
the Air Force's Phillips Lab, 
and Lockheed Martin 
Astronautics. (NASA Photo 
EC96 43419-25) 
wire control system or a new wing design, the 
barriers to transferring the technology are as 
much psychological and financial as they are 
technical. Flight research is an extraordinarily 
effective method of overcoming those barriers, 
and sometimes a single flight can change what 
people believe is possible. Furthermore, the 
government/industry partnerships required by a 
research discipline that involves actual hard- 
ware generate relationships and experience that 
can significantly affect a company's decision to 
apply a given technology. Flight research is one 
of the only types of research where a degree of 
technology transfer can occur simultaneously 
with the research itself. 
These technology-transfer consider- 
ations will only become more important as 
global competition increases. For many years, 
the United States held an undisputed position as 
the technological and economic leader of the 
world. Today, advances in the technology bases 
and products of other countries are beginning to 
change that picture. In 1986, the United States' 
high-technology imports exceeded exports for 
the first time. Aerospace is one of the only 
fields in which a positive balance remains, but 
even there, the edge held by American manu- 
facturers is slipping.ll What this picture looks 
like in 20 years will be determined in large part 
by how well American aerospace products can 
measure up against the technology offered by 
international competitors. And that, in turn, will 
be influenced both by near-term applications of 
technology and longer-term contributions to the 
nation's technology base to support future- 
generation aircraft designs. 
A Unique Flight Research Resource 
Despite the advances in computers and 
aeronautical research facilities since 190 1, 
flight research is, and will remain, a crucial 
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element in the process of furthering aeronauti- 
cal knowledge and technology. And when it 
comes to flight research, the Dryden Flight 
Research Center has few equals. Ever since its 
beginnings in 1946, Dryden has been a spe- 
cialty shop. Walt Williams brought the first 
group of engineers from Langley to Muroc to 
assist not in the design or theoretical analysis of 
the X- 1, but in its flight research activities. 
Since that time, the employees at Dryden have 
continued to provide that service for NASA, 
other government agencies, and industry. The 
ideas come from many places, and most of 
Dryden's research 
projects are part- 
nership effort, ,f 
one kind or an- I 
other. Yet for ha 
century, Dryden I 
has been able to 
provide the physi- 
cal environment, 
facilities, and staff 
expertise to take 
those ideas and 
But there are other factors that have 
played an equally important role in the Center's 
success. Dryden has always been a small, 
remote facility, requiring its staff to develop a 
frontier resourcefulness, flexibility and versatil- 
ity that helped the Center adapt to NACA and 
NASA's changing needs and priorities over the 
years. Its small size also allowed an informal 
management style that encouraged innovation 
and helped empower individual employees to 
solve problems as they arose. These traits led to 
research efforts such as the M2-F1 lifting body 
and have played a role in the success of virtu- 
ally every research 
I 
project the Center 
I has undertaken. 
Dryden' s focus 
1 on the single mis- sion of flight I research also allowed all its staff 
research efforts to 
flight. 
Part of the reason Dryden has flourished 
as a flight research center is its unique physical 
location. Its clear skies, unpopulated surround- 
ings, and dry lakebed landing sites have made it 
ideally suited for a wide variety of flight activi- 
ties, from research with the X-1 to landings of 
the Space Shuttle. It also has benefited immea- 
surably from its ongoing partnership with the 
Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards. Aside 
from the specific joint-research projects the two 
Centers have done together, the physical facili- 
ties and support provided by the Air Force have 
always been critical to Dryden's operations. 
members to gain a 
great deal of experi- 
ence in that area, 
and the daily 
requirements of a 
Center revolving around flight operations meant 
that its employees soon developed a talent for 
quick, pragmatic problem-solving . Of course, it 
helped that most of the people drawn to Dryden 
inherently enjoyed that kind of work. One 
advantage of Dryden's remote and harsh loca- 
tion has been that the people who have come to 
work at the Center have come not for the 
surroundings or pay, but because they love 
flight and want to work with living, breathing 
airplanes. As a result, Dryden employees tend 
to have what one staff member described as a 
"technical passion"l2 that has played a signifi- 
cant role in the success of their research efforts. 
HL-10 mounted on a 
pedestal in front of the 
Dryden main gate at sunset 
in 1992. This current 
landmark at the research 
centerfirstflew in late 1966 
and became the first lifting 
body to fly supersonically. It 
set other records, but more 
importantly, it contributed 
substantially to the decision 
to design the Space Shuttles 
without the air-breathing 
engines that would otherwise 
have been used for landings. 
(NASA Photo 
EC92 2131-01) I 
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Space Shuttle Columbia 
atop NASA 's 747 Shuttle 
Carrier Aircraft over 
Dryden as sister Shuttle 
Endeavour sits on the 
runway following its landing 
I1  October 1994, at the end 
of mission STS-68. 
Columbia was being ferried 
from the Kennedy Space 
Center, Florida, to Air 
Force Plant 42, Palmdale, 
California, for six months of 
inspections, modifications, 
and systems upgrade. 
(NASA Photo 
EC94 42789-5) 
Dryden Contributions 
The fact that many employees chose to spend F-1 1 1, and its later work with F-14 and F-15 
their careers at the Center also has enabled them spin-testing fall into this category. But there are 
to carry forward the experience gained from one other examples, as G l l .  Reaction controls and 
project to the next. navigation equipment used on the X- 15 were 
applied to the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo 
spacecraft, as well as the Space Shuttle. The 
Lunar Landing Research Vehicle trained astro- 
This combination of factors at Dryden nauts to land on the Moon. The digital elec- 
has allowed it to make a wide variety of contri- tronic engine-control technology has been 
butions over the years. Sometimes, the Center applied to numerous commercial engines, and 
played a role in developing tangible items that the F- 15 ACTIVE program is helping to de- 
were applied directly to operational air- or velop a production version of a thrust-vectoring 
spacecraft. Certainly the Center's trouble- engine nozzle. A thrust-vectoring engine sys- 
shooting efforts with the F- 100A, the F- 104, the tem, in turn, will draw heavily on the integrated 
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X-29s on lakebed near 
sunrise with the Moon still 
visible. (Pitot tube of second 
aircraft at viewer's left.) 
Both of these forward-swept- 
wing aircraft wereflown at 
Dryden from 1 984 to 1992 
as technology demonstrators 
to investigate a host of 
advanced concepts and 
technologies. These 
included advanced 
composite materials, the 
forward-swept wing, and a 
computerized fly-by-wire 
flight control system that 
overcame the aircraft's 
inherent instability. The 434 
total missions 
flown by the two X-29s 
provided an engineering 
data base that is available in 
the design and development 
offuture aircraf. 
1 (NASA Photo I I EC90 357-7) I 
I 
engine- and flight-control research done with 
Dry den' s F- 15 HIDEC aircraft. The 
supercritical wing and winglet concepts flown 
at Dryden have helped make a whole generation 
of business and transport aircraft more fuel- 
efficient. Improvements for the YF- 12 inlet 
system were retrofitted into the entire SR-7 1 
fleet. 
Dryden' s pilot-induced-oscillation 
research and suppression filter identified and 
solved a potentially dangerous problem with the 
Space Shuttle. Its Controlled Impact Demon- 
stration illustrated conclusively that anti- 
misting fuel did not help prevent post-crash 
fires, and its wake-vortex research helped 
maintain safety in the national airspace system. 
And while it has not yet been applied, the 
propulsion-controlled aircraft system developed 
by Dryden researchers may well be integrated 
into future airliners, helping to prevent tragedies 
resulting from massive hydraulic damage or 
failures. 
Not all of Dryden's contributions were 
tangible pieces of technology, however. Many 
research projects simply expanded the available 
knowledge base in aeronautics and, to a lesser 
degree, space. Much of the research with the 
YF- 121XB-70, the F- 18 High Alpha Research 
Vehicle, the X-29, the HiMAT, and even the X- 
15 and the early X-series research aircraft fall 
into this category. Many engineers have drawn 
upon this knowledge and data in designing new 
aircraft, but the trail between the research and 
its applications is not as easy to trace. Indeed, 
one of the difficulties in evaluating flight 
research in an exact way is that contributions to 
knowledge are often so difficult to isolate or 
quantify. 
In yet other cases, the "technology" 
transferred fro& Dryden to industry was not so 
much a particular item but a process. The 
software qualification and configuration control 
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process the Center used for its Digital-Fly-By- lifting-body research at Dryden gave Shuttle 
Wire program, for example, aided numerous managers the confidence to design the vehicle 
manufacturers in designing their own fly-by- for unpowered landings. The system hardware 
wire aircraft. More recently, the Cedars-Sinai and software on today's fly-by-wire aircraft are 
Hospital was able to benefit from Dryden's not the same as those flown on Dryden's F-8. 
quick and pragmatic design and fabrication But the mere fact that Dryden had flown an 
procedures. Because unique parts often have to aircraft totally dependent on fly-by-wire flight 
NASA's F-15 Highly 
Integrated Digital Electronic 
Control (HZDEC) aircraft 
cruises over California's 
Mojave Desert on a flight 
out of Dryden. The aircraft 
was used to carry out 
research on engine and 
flight control systems. 
Among other things, in April 
1993 it demonstrated the use 
of computer-assisted engine 
controls as a means of 
landing an aircraft safely 
with only engine power if its 
nomzal control sul-faces such 
as elevators, rudders and 
ailerons are disabled. This 
Propulsion Controlled 
Aircraft technology was 
later demonstrated on the 
McDonnell Douglas MD-11 
transport aircraft. 
(NASA Photo EC90 312-30) 
be designed and built quickly in order to keep a controls gave companies and users the confi- 
flight program on schedule, Dryden staff mem- dence to incorporate the technology into pro- 
bers have developed a knack for building a duction aircraft. Like the early explorers and 
piece and then creating the drawings after the pioneers, Dryden's contribution was sometimes 
fact. Physicians at Cedars-Sinai described a simply a matter of going into uncharted waters 
need they had to help them perform laparoscopy first and proving that they were navigable. 
surgery. But the physicians could only describe 
what they needed the part to do, not what it 
should look like. Dryden researchers and Conclusion 
technicians were able to listen to the physicians' 
needs and design a part to do the job, without a Since its inception, the facility known 
lot of time or extensive drawings.13 today as the Dryden Flight Research Center has 
Even harder to trace are those instances been a unique place. It is situated in a bleak, 
where the real value of Dryden's flight research desolate area that has blistering summers and 
was simply to generate enough confidence in a bone-chilling winters. Yet to the aeronautics 
technology or idea for someone to apply it. The and space community, Dryden is a place of 
Space Shuttle was not a lifting body. But the many gifts. Its clear skies, open landscape and 
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lakebed landing sites have allowed numerous 
flight activities to take place there that could not 
have been accomplished elsewhere. Its small 
size, single-mission focus, and informal, flex- 
ible, innovative and pragmatic approach have 
created a staff with both technical passion and 
technical agility-traits that have allowed the 
Center to adapt to 
changing times and 
important. 
Flight research is a unique discipline. It 
is an area where researchers are forced to 
address issues critical for flight and must 
develop a very pragmatic, flexible approach. It 
can give technology the maturity and credibility 
necessary for industry to commit to its use. In 
addition, the partnerships 
flight research requires 
- - 
support a wide variety I 
of programs and 
priorities. 
Some of 
Dryden's projects 
have been longer- 
range exploratory 
research, while other 
efforts have been to 
support the nearer- 
term needs of industry 
or the nation's air and 
space programs. 
Sometimes the 
Center' s contribution 
was a specific tech- 
nology, sometimes it 
was a process or new 
insight or piece of 
knowledge, and 
sometimes it was simply a matter of going into 
new territory first and leaving a trail for others 
to follow. But its various types of research and 
contributions have made Dryden an extremely 
valuable resource for the nation's aerospace 
efforts and industry for half a century. And as 
the world becomes more complex, with an 
increasingly global economy and a growing 
concern about the ability of the United States to 
retain its competitive and economic edge, the 
role Dryden plays will become even more 
and the very process of 
flight itself can greatly 
assist technology-transfer 
efforts, proving that a 
new idea or technology 
is, at the very least, 
possible. The technology 
may still prove impracti- 
cal, but once it has been 
proven in flight, few can 
argue that it can't be 
done. In addition, flight 
generates a moment of 
truth for technology and 
ideas because it is that 
unique spot where the 
rubber meets the road, 
where all of the elements 
of a technology come 
together in a real-life 
environment for the first time. And unlike 
laboratory work, it is an area where the cost of a 
deficiency or mistake can be someone's life. 
By the same token, flight is an area of 
research where results are particularly difficult 
to predict. Simulators and computers have 
advanced greatly, but they can only model what 
is known; they cannot yet accurately predict the 
exact behavior of a new system in actual flight 
conditions, especially when it involves a human 
pilot. In addition, while computers have im- 
Drop test of a model of the 1 
Experimental Crew Return 
Vehicle (X-CRV) in 1995. 
The X-CRV is envisioned as 
a means for getting crew 
members back to Earth from 
a space station in case of 
emergency. Its design is 
based on the Martin X-24A 
lifting body flown at Dryden 
from 1969 to 1971, but to 
permit the emergency 
vehicle to land without a 
trained pilot, the X-CRV is 
being designed to use a 
parafoil device for final 
descent and touchdown. 
(NASA Photo 
EC95 43218-8) 
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proved the capabilities of ground facilities, they 
have also made aircraft more complex. When 
all the variables of such complex technologies 
are brought together in a constantly changing 
flight environment, it is almost impossible to 
predict or cover every possible contingency. 
So despite the advances in technology, 
flight research is still an exploration into the 
realm of the unknown. We have learned to 
function above the Earth and at high speeds, but 
we still do not fully understand all the dynamics 
and forces at work there. Yet it is in this mar- 
gin, on the ragged boundary between what is 
known and the mysteries that lie beyond, that 
discovery happens. Discovery is more often 
than not a quiet process, a puzzled moment 
when something does not react as expected. But 
it is in these moments that our understanding of 
our world expands. 
For the past 50 years, the Dryden Flight 
Research Center has been a place where those 
moments have been welcomed. The people who 
work there are trained and encouraged to look 
for the unexpected and have the passion to 
pursue the reasons for anomalies that occur. In a 
way, the people who work at Dryden are no 
different from Columbus, Lewis and Clark, the 
Wright brothers, or anyone else who has ever 
stood at the forward edge of knowledge and 
ventured into the unknown territory ahead. 
Their tools are research aircraft and engineering 
formulas instead of sailing ships or frontier 
knives. But in a sense, the effort is the same. 
And as with any exploration, it is not without its 
risks. The pilots and crew are the only members 
of the research team who actually put their lives 
Artist's concepts of the X-33 
Reusable Launch vehicles. 
On the left is the proposed 
design for the single-stage- 
to-orbit vehicle by a team 
headed by Rockwell. This is 
a Space Shuttle-like vehicle 
that would take off vertically 
and land horizontally. In the 
center is the vehicle being 
designed by a team 
including McDonnell 
Douglas; it would take off 
and land vertically. The 
third design, by 
a Lockheed Martin team is a 
lifting-body that would be 
launched vertically and 
landed horizontally. This is 
the design that features 
Rockwell's linear aerospike 
engine to be tested in 
supersonic flight by NASA's 
SR-71 aircraft. (NASA Photo 
EC9.5 43320-1) 
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on the line, but every employee of Dryden feels 
the burden of protecting those lives. The chal- 
lenge of reaching far enough to learn something 
new without reaching so far that the risks 
become too high is one Dryden's researchers 
face every day. Yet it is their success in con- 
tinually striking a balance between those two 
that has allowed Dryden to make the contribu- 
tions it has. 
Over half a century, Dryden has grown 
from a desert outpost into the nation's premier 
flight research center. Its priorities and projects 
have changed; its challenges have evolved. But 
it has continued to make contributions because 
at its core, it has always remained a unique 
place where people could expand the bound- 
aries of what was known or possible. It has 
been a place where people searched for the 
unexpected and overlooked and worked to 
separate the real from the imagined. And dis- 
covery by discovery, it has helped shape the 
world in which we live and expanded our 
understanding of that place they call the sky. 
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the early days of turbojet engines, aerodynamic efficiency 
was of great concern for engineers in part because the 
engines were not very powerful. Designs like the F-104 
had to be extremely efficient aerodynamically in order to 
achieve the performance desired. But the fuel crisis of 
the 1970s suddenly made fuel efficiency in and of itself a 
top priority for the airlines, manufacturers, and national 
decision-makers, turning attention and funding toward 
focused research programs to improve aircraft fuel 
efficiency and reducing the support for some other high- 
speed efforts such as the SST. 
Phil Felleman, phone interview with author, 19 
February 1996. 
A "gigabyte" is approximately one billion bytes. 
Other information in this section from Kenneth J. Szalai 
and Calvin R. Jarvis, interview with author, Edwards, 
California, 30 August 1995; Marcy Rosenberg and E. 
Drake LundeII Jr., 'TBM and the Compatibles: How They 
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Kevin Shine, IBM PC Technical Representative, phone 
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increase in its frontal area at the point where the wings 
joined the I'uselage. By indenting the fuselage at that 
point, and even sometimes adding a "bump" to the nose 
area ahead of the wing, Whitcomb was able to keep the 
overall frontal area more consistent. This, in turn, created 
less drag as the aircraft passed through the difficult 
transonic speed range. Whitcomb's concept is generally 
regarded as a critical advance that enabled the design of 
operational supersonic aircraft. 
Boundary layer separation is the point where the air no 
longer flows along the contour of the wing but "sepa- 
rates" from the wing. 
Dr. Richard T. Whitcomb, "Research on Methods for 
Reducing the Aerodynamic Drag at Transonic Speeds," 
paper, presented at The Inaugural Eastman Jacobs 
Lecture, NASA Langley Research Center (Hampton, 
Virginia, 14 November 1994), 4-8; Weneth D. Painter, 
interview with Richard Hallion, 8 August 1977; Richard 
P. Hallion, On the Frontier, 201-206. 
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Louis Steers, phone interview with author, 22 
November 1995; Hallion, On the Frontier, 209. 
The Air Force tanker version of the commercial 
Boeing 707 jetliner. 
Whitcomb, "Methods for Reducing Aerodynamic 
Drag," 8-9; "KC- 135 Program Review," NASA Confer- 
ence Publication 221 1 (Proceedings of Dryden Sympo- 
sium, Edwards, California, 16 September 1981), 1 15-1 17, 
128. 
Hallion, On the Frontier, 250-251; Kenneth J. Szalai 
and Calvin R. Jarvis, interview with author, Edwards, 
California, 30 August 1995; "The AD-1 Program, 1976 to 
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Flight Research Center. 
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sonic laminar flow research with an F-104 research plane. 
See Richard D. Banner, John G. McTigue, and Gilbert 
Petty, Jr., "Boundary-Layer-Transition Measurements in 
Full-Scale Flight," NACA Research Memorandum 
H58E28, (Washington, D.C.: NACA, 28 July 1958). 
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l7 Rogers Smith, interview with author, Edwards, 
California, 19 August 1995; Gary Trippensee, interview 
with author, Edwards, California, 27 August 1995; Steve 
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Glossary of Acronyms 
AAF Army Air Forces 
ACTIVE Advanced Controls Technology 
for Integrated Vehicles 
ADECS Adaptive Engine Control System 
AF Air Force 
AFFTC Air Force Flight Test Center 
AFT1 Advanced Fighter Technology 
Integration 
ALT Approach and Landing Test 
AoA Angle of Attack 
ARC Ames Research Center 
ARPA Advanced Research Projects 
Agency 
ATF Advanced Tactical Fighter 
CAA Civil Aeronautics Administration 
CXD Controlled Impact Demonstration 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency 
DAST Drones for Aerodynamic and Structural 
Testing 
DEEC Digital Electronic Engine Control 
DEFCS Digital Electronic Flight Control 
System 
DFB W Digital Fly-By-Wire 
DFRC Dryden Flight Research Center 
EPAD Electrically Powered Actuator Design 
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Sensor Technology 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FADEC Full Authority Digital Engine Control 
FBW Fly-B y-Wire 
FCS Flight Control System 
FOCSI Fiber-optic Control System Integration 
FRC Flight Research Center 
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HARV High ~ngle-of-~t tack Research 
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Control 
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Langley Research Center 
Lewis Research Center 
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Lunar Landing Research Vehicle 
Lunar Landing Training Vehicle 
Lunar Module 
Mission Adaptive Wing 
Marshall Space Flight Center 
National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
Natural Laminar Flow 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries 
Propulsion Controlled Aircraft 
Pilot Induced Oscillation 
Performance Seeking Control 
Research Aircraft Integration Facility 
Resident Back-Up Software 
Reusable Launch Vehicle 
Remotely Piloted Research Vehicle 
Remotely Piloted Vehicle 
Return to Launch Site 
Shuttle Carrier Aircraft 
Supercritical wing 
Supersonic Laminar Flow Control 
Systems Research Aircraft 
Self-Repairing Flight Control System 
Supersonic Transport 
Single-Stage-to-Orbit 
Short Take-Off and Landing 
Transonic Aircraft Technology 
Vertical Take-Off and Landing 
Experimental Crew Return Vehicle 
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Appendix 
Concepts and Innovations to which the 
Dryden Flight Research Center has Contributed 
In the course of its fifty year history, Dryden has evaluated-in the demanding and realistic 
environment of actual flight-a great many concepts and configurations developed by its own 
researchers or those from other NASA centers, other agencies, or industry. Evaluating, improving 
or correcting otherwise promising concepts has provided a stimulating environment for the genesis 
of other new concepts and solutions. The following tabulation provides a partial list of major 
contributions to aeronautics made by Dryden personnel either in conjunction with partners or on 
their own initiative. 
YEAR@) CONTRIBUTIONS: SIGNIFICANCE: 
1946-1 958 Completed "Round One" flight investigations Performed subsonic, transonic, and supersonic 
of the early X-Series and D-558 series of research to help evaluate and interpret wind tunnel 
aircraft data (special emphasis on transonic nonlinear 
characteristics). This research used an entire 
stable of new configurations with which flight 
loads, buffet, aeroelastic effects, pitch-up, 
directional instability, longitudinal control, and the 
effects of wing sweep were investigated. This 
research contributed to design principles leading 
to reliable and routine flight of production aircraft 
at transonic and supersonic speeds. 
1947 Provided technical guidance and data analysis This was the first time that a piloted airplane was 
for the first flight through Mach 1.0 on the XS- flown through the speed of sound. In addition to 
1 (X- 1 No. 1) airplane overcoming the sound barrier, this flight demon- 
strated that an airplane could be controlled 
through the transonic region where very non- 
linear aerodynamic characteristics occur. 
1947-1967 Analyzed and documented flight results Though the sonic barrier (Mach one) was by far 
obtained from first-time supersonic and the most intimidating hurdle, Mach numbers of 
hypersonic speeds 2.0 to 6.0 were also noteworthy because of other 
challenges, such as diminished stability, aerody- 
namic heating, and energy management. Flights at 
Edwards achieved the following records: Mach 
2.005 on 20 Nov. 1953 (D-558-2); Mach 3.2 on 
27 Sept. 1956 (X-2); Mach 4.43 on 7 March 1961 
(X-15); Mach 5.27 on 23 June 1961 (X-15): Mach 
6.04 on 9 Nov. 1961 (X-15); and Mach 6.7 on 3 
Oct. 1967 (X-15). 
1947- 1962 Developed generalized energy management Led to the concept of determining a potential 
algorithms for flight planning and safe flight of landing "footprint" for such aircraft, with varia- 
low lift-to-drag ratio, unpowered aircraft tions in scale during the different stages of a 
mission. Such algorithms have been applied to the 
Space Shuttle. Will be used for future unpowered 
space vehicles, providing multiple landing 
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SIGNIFICANCE: 
trajectories that account for uncertainty in space- 
craft characteristics and atmospheric conditions. 
Allowed for unexpected or emergency conditions 
and failures. 
1954- 1957 Identified, in flight, previously predicted inertial Provided corrective measures for inertial coupling 
coupling and conducted follow-on research in the F-100 aircraft and all subsequent interceptor1 
fighter aircraft. 
1 956- 1962 Conceived and developed side-control stick Provided the technology for the first in-flight 
concept and reaction control piloting techniques demonstration of flight control using a reaction 
control system on an F-104 airplane. Used a 
ground-based analog computer simulation and a 
reaction-controlled mechanical simulator, which 
enabled movement about three axes. 
1956-1 957 Demonstrated the influence of the "area rule" Verified the area-rule concept and the equivalent 
concept on the YF-102 and F-102A body concept in flight using two airplanes that had 
the same airfoil and planform, but were designed 
with and without the area-rule. Also, through this 
effort established the eight-foot slotted-throat wind 
tunnel (then newly modified) as a credible tran- 
sonic research facility. The area-rule subsequently 
became a fundamental design concept for all 
supersonic cruise aircraft. 
1957- 1958 Conceived and flew wing-glove boundary layer Pioneering demonstration showing that extensive 
transition experiment on the F-104 areas of laminar flow can be obtained naturally at 
supersonic speeds for practical wing surface 
conditions. 
1958 Conceived and developed high-speed power-off Flight development of safe technique for landing 
landing techniques for low liftldrag vehicles the X-15. Later applied to lifting bodies and Space 
Shuttle. 
1959-1 968 Demonstrated blending of reaction controls with Provided methodology and demonstration of 
aerodynamic controls for reentry from high- reentry control concept that was later used for the 
altitude rarified-atmospheric flight using the X- Space Shuttle. 
15 airplane 
1959-1968 Demonstrated servo-actuated ball nose on the Accurate measurement of air speed and flow angle 
X-15 at supersonic and hypersonic speeds. 
1961- 1962 Developed and evaluated piloted, unpowered Resulted in a practical application of the Rogallo 
paragliders as a potential method of landing wing concept, and enabled the birth of the modern 
spacecraft sport of hang gliding. Evolved to proposed 
application for space station crew return vehicle. 
196 1 - 1963 Flew the first airplane to the edge of space - the The X- 15 demonstrated reentry flight from up to 
X-15 sixty miles, encountering phenomena that were 
important in designing the Space Shuttle reentry 
flight profile. The following records were 
achieved by the X-15; 217,000 ft. on 1 1 Oct. 1961: 
314,750 ft. on 17 July 1962; and 354,200 ft. on 22 
Aug. 1963. 
1961 -1965 Provided high-quality flight data to better Discovered that hypersonically: 1) boundary layer 
understand hypersonic aerodynamic and heating is turbulent, 2) boundary layer heating is lower 
theory along with comparable wind tunnel than predicted, 3) skin friction is lower than 
predictions on the X-15 
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predicted, and 4) surface irregularities cause local 
hot spots-all of which led to improved design 
tools for future hypersonic vehicles, irrcluding the 
Space Shuttle. 
1962- 1967 Conceived, developed, and flew the Lunar Provided the basis for realistic training vehicle for 
Landing Research Vehicle Apollo astronauts and the controls design data 
base for the lunar module. 
1963 Simulated supersonic transport operations with Developed FAA air traffic control procedures fgr 
A-5A aircraft future supersonic transports. 
1963-1966 Developed and evaluated the lightweight lifting Demonstrated feasibility of piloted lifting body 
body, the M2-F1 and the controllability and landability of the 
lifting-body shape. 
1963 to Developed and utilized the Flight Test Fixture Provided efficient, cost effective method to 
present Experimental Facility concept expose a wide variety of experiments to a real 
flight environment. 
1965- 1972 Determined responses to high-altitude gust Established baseline information for large, 
inputs and control usage in supersonic flight on flexible aircraft on operational handling qualities, 
the XB-70 and YF-12 pilot ratings, and gust (turbulence) variations with 
altitude for future supersonic passenger aircraft. 
1965-1972 Determined atmospheric features associated Provided high-altitude clear-air-turbulence 
with high cruise altitude turbulence prediction techniques for supersonic passenger 
transport operation, 
1966 to Pioneered developmental work in Parameter Provided powerful analytical tools for analysis of 
present Identification aerodynamic characteristics of aircraft from flight 
response; useful in other dynamic systems 
analysis. 
1966-1968 Performed an in-depth lift-drag project for Most comprehensive drag correlation ever 
correlation of flight and wind tunnel data on the achieved; revealed sources of major inaccuracies 
XB-70 with wind-tunnel data at transonic speeds. 
1967 First in-flight experience in severe shock Elevated the shock-interaction problem to rts 
interaction aeroheating on the X-15 Inconel-X being recognized as a key temperature cconstraii~t 
pylon on future hypersonic aircraft. The knowledge 
gained from this was first applied to the Space 
Shuttle. 
1967 Developed the constant angle-of-attack test Provided an efficient approach to obtain aerody- 
technique for in-flight ground-effect measure- namics ground-effects data. Obtained evidence 
ment on the XB-70 and F-104 that aerodynamic ground effect is influeilced by 
sink rate. 
1968-1972 Identified the effect of dynamic pressure Verified that high-frequency pressure Ructuatioi~s 
fluctuations on engine stall using the F-111A cause engine stalls and improved design method- 
ology for F-15, F-16, and F-18 airplanes. 
1970 to Developed highly flexible flight simulation This methodology was applied to flight testing of 
present methodology most complex envelope-expansion efforts and 
also to pilot training, mission planning, and 
ultimately to aircraft system flight qualification. 
Flexible, friendly user interface allows produaive 
operation by the individual user with little or no 
support. 
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1971-1986 Developed Remotely Piloted Research Vehicle Allowed the pilot to demonstrate concepts in flight 
concept using ground-based FORTRAN from ground cockpit, and enabled rapid idea-to- 
programmable computers to emulate crucial flight demonstration of advanced control and 
flight control systems and to provide ground- 
based cockpit and displays 
display concepts without extensive validation and 
verification. Unpiloted 318 scale F-15 was able to 
quickly emulate full-scale F-15 and provide flight 
data in hazardous high angle-of-attack regime 
prior to exposing full-scale piloted airplane to 
those conditions. Also unpiloted HiMAT took 
advanced aerodynamic design concept and 
structural materials to flight much earlier than 
piloted aircraft could have. 
197 1- 1988 Evaluated the supercritical airfoil concept on 
the F-8 SCW, F-1 11 TACT, HiMAT, AFTIR- 
11 1, and X-29 
F-8 Supercritical Wing (SCW) research provided 
early and thorough demonstration and analysis of 
the supercritical airfoil in flight. Later applica- 
tions demonstrated the affects of various plan- 
forms and sweep. Supercritical airfoils are now 
widely used throughout the world. 
1972-1973 Conducted a pioneering thermal calibration and Demonstrated that thermal loads can be separated 
separation of aero- loads for Mach 3 YF-12 from flight loads by a combination of laboratory 
airplane and flight results. 
1972 Flew first aircraft with full digital flight control Laid the groundwork for and proved the concept 
system with no mechanical backup on the F-8 of digital fly-by-wire application that later flew 
DFB W (Digital-Fly-By-Wire) operationally in the Space Shuttle, FIA-18, B-2, 
and the current generation of commercial trans- 
ports. 
1973-1978 Developed sensor system for precise measure- Provided highly improved reference measurement 
rnent of true gust velocity and demonstrated it methods for load alleviation and propulsion 
at high supersonic cruise altitudes on the YF-12 system evaluations in high-altitude turbulence. 
YF- 12: Demonstrated light-bar artificial horizon Concept incorporated in operational SR-7 1 fleet as 
1973-1974 (peripheral vision display), tested on the YF-12 improved indicator of horizon through laser 
T-37: 1988, and T-37 projection. 
1974- 198 1 Applied aerodynamic lessons learned in flight Verified effectiveness of air deflectors and defined 
to ground vehicle (truck or motor home) drag the benefits of full streamlining. Results contrib- 
reduction uted to fuel savings estimated at 15 million barrels 
per year. 
1974-1976 Flight tested an integrated digital propulsion Demonstrated performance and stability improve- 
control system on the F-1 1 1 ments with digital inledengine control systems, 
technology applicable to the F-22 and High Speed 
Civil Transport. 
1974- 1978 Performed in-depth mixed compression inlet Interpreted and documented pressure recovery, 
research on the YF-12 distortion, unstart and stall dynamics, and control 
for engine inlets; compared results to full scale 
and subscale wind tunnel test results. This 
technology was intended for the supersonic 
transport concept. 
1975-1977 Conducted power-off landings to measure Basic airframe noise "floor7' documented for 
airframe noise on the Jetstar and establishing engine noise reduction goals. 
AeroCommander airplanes. 
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1975-1977 Conceived and flew the YF-12 hollow-cylinder Benchmark, laboratory-quality fluid-mechanics 
"Cold Wall" experiment experiment. A major contribution to predicting 
aerodynamic heating. 
1975-1977 Flew the redundant computer systems with the Tests provided confidence for flight-wofihiness in 
associated algorithms in the F-8 DFBW the digital control concepts. They revealed many 
modifications that had to be made before being 
flown in the Space Shuttle. 
1975-1978 Developed and demonstrated a Mach 3 cruise Accuracy of altitude control and ride quality was 
autopilot on the YF- 12 greatly improved. 
1975-1981 Investigated wing tip vortices behind bombers Assessed vortex strength on trailing aircraft to 
and transports with probe airplanes evaluate separation distance and evaluated flap 
configurations for hazard attenuation. 
1976 Demonstrated agility and turn capability at Extended the agility and performance standards 
elevated load factors as well as overall flying for the next generation of fighter aircraft. 
qualities of the YF- 17 Aircraft 
1976 to Pioneered research efforts in unpiloted, non- This technology provided a capability for high 
present airbreathing, high-altitude loiter aircraft altitude atmospheric study of the ozone layer and 
technology greenhouse effects. Also has the potential for use 
in studying and surveying within the atmosphere 
of Mars. 
1977-1980 Studied the effects of time delay for digital This flight research quantified the effect of pure 
flight control systems on the F-8 DFBW time delayed response occurring in digital 
systems. These delays can cause serious safety 
problems for aircraft and spacecraft. 
1977-1981 Conceived, developed and tested a pilot- Developed flight control system modifications to 
induced-oscillation suppression system for the reduce pilot induced oscillations during landing of 
Space Shuttle the Space Shuttle. 
1977-1986 Performed theoretical and experimental buck- Enabled determination of design guidelines and 
ling research buckling characteristics for hypersonic wing panel 
without destroying the test part. 
1978 Performed benchmark flight research using the Provided benchmark reference of flow quality for 
10-Degree-Cone boundary-layer transition transonic and supersonic wind runnels, and a 
experiment on the F- 15 rational means for rating the various tunnels for 
flow quality. 
1978 Developed and flew a cooperative integrated Improved flight control precision and reduced the 
propulsiodflight control system on the YF-12 occurrence of inlet unstarts. Incorporated in the 
operational SR-7 1 fleet. 
1978-1980 Conducted comprehensive study of variable- External compression inlet pressure recovery, 
geometry external compression inlet on the F-15 steady state and dynamic distortion, drag, and lift 
were measured in flight and compared to wind- 
tunnel and analytical methods; also documented 
effects of scale and Reynold's number. 
1978-1985 Demonstrated in flight and improved a NASA Improved departure spin resistance for the F-14 
aileronlrudder interconnect concept on the F-14 aircraft. Final product to be incorporated into 
fleet for F-14 models A, B and D. 
VEAR(S) CONTRIBUTIONS: SIGNIFICANCE: 
1 978- 1 992 Evaluated and improved an in-flight wing Applied an electrical-optical system that provides 
deflection measurement system used on F-11 11 digital data more precisely and with greater ease 
TACT, HiMAT, X-29 airplanes than photographic methods. 
1979-198 1 Evaluated the winglet concept on the KC-135 Defined the potential for drag reduction and 
airplane increase in range for large transport-type aircraft 
for various aero load conditions. Concept now 
applied to many transport and business aircraft. 
1979-198 1 Evaluated oblique wing concept using the AD-1 Evaluated low-speed oblique-wing flying quali- 
airplane ties, stability, and control at asymmetric sweep 
angles up to 60 degrees. The concept was 
proposed for supersonic transport and military 
applications. 
1979-1995 Evaluated non-intrusive air data pressure source Related applications followed on atmospheric 
arrays on the KC-135, F-14, and F-18 research aircraft, military derivative systems, high 
angle-of-attack (AoA) research aircraft, and 
potentially for reentry vehicles. Concepts were 
extended through the transonic region and to 
extremely high AoA. 
1980 Pioneered the development of fiberglass wing Provided a low cost method to evaluate innova- 
glove technique for high performance airfoil tive high-speed airfoil concepts at full-scale flight 
flight research conditions. 
1980-1983 Conceived and tested flight test trajectory Integration of flight-test parameters into single 
guidance algorithms display allowed pilots to fly different flight-test 
maneuvers more accurately and get higher quality 
data. 
-- 
1981 Conceived and tested the flight test maneuver Automated the flight test trajectory guidance 
autopilot system to fly flight research maneuvers to 
produce more repeatable and more accurate data. 
198 1-1987 Performed in-flight testing of Shuttle tiles for Established criteria for orbiter tile erosion in 
air-load endurance and rain damage moisture. Altered launch criteria in rain, and 
restricted ferrying the Shuttle cross country in bad 
weather. 
198 1- 1984 Evaluated Digital Electronic Engine Control on Flew contractor Digital Electronic Engine Control 
the F-15 in flight and suggested and tested improvements. 
1981 & 1987 Pioneered in-flight boundary layer transition Provided empirical understanding of the effects of 
experiments for effects of wing sweep on the F- sweep on boundary layer transition. Established 
111 andF-14 that extensive lengths of natural laminar flow can 
occur on a lifting surface (wing). 
Hidden Line: Developed generalized and practical solution to A powerful addition to computer graphics which 
1982 the hidden-line problem and the silhouette resolved the problem of perspective and silhou- 
Silhouette: problem ettes in computerized designs, now commonly 
1986 used in all types of applications and disciplines. 
1985-1 990 Conceived and developed the half-cycle theory Provided very practical fatigue theory for life- 
cycle prediction of aerospace structures. 
3 986- 1987 Conceived and tested active engine stall margin Provided engine and airplane performance 
control on the F-15 Highly Integrated Digital improvements without adding weight, used on F- 
Electronic Control flight test 15E and F-22 airplanes. 
Flights of Discovery 
YEAR(S) CONTRIBUTIONS: SIGNIFICANCE: 
1987-1988 Quantified the effects of engine control system Provided criteria for digital engine control design 
delays on flying qualities on the F-104 for use in precise formation flying. 
1991 - 1996 Evaluated propulsive control (thrust vectoring) Significant enhancement of high angle-of-attack 
on HARV and X-3 1 agility and maneuverability. Made significant 
contribution to applicability of comp~itational fluid 
dynamics (CFD) to high angle-of-attack Rows by 
providing comparison of CFD, wind-tunnel and 
flight data at the same scale. 
1992 Invented the Anderson Current Loop for Potential major improvement over the classical 
evaluating signals from sensors Wheatstone Bridge circuit used in applications 
such as stress measurement. 
1993 Demonstrated the Smart Actuator controlled Electronics that close the flight control loop are 
with an optical data link on the F-18 Systems built into the control surface actuator rather than in 
Research Aircraft the flight control computer. Reduced the many 
wires that normally connect an actuator with the 
primary flight control computer to four fibcr optic 
cables. Reduced aircraft weight and vull~erability 
to electro-magnetic interference. 
1993-1994 Conducted inlet research at extremely high Inlet high frequency pressure recovery and 
angle of attack on F- 18 HARV distortion measured at angles of attack up to 100 
degrees and in spins, providing data for vertical 
short take-off and landing (VSTOL) and agile 
fighter airplanes. 
1993-1995 Conceived and tested emergency flight control Provided safe landing for an airplane with failed 
using computer-controlled engine thrust in the flight controls-may be implemented with only 
F-15 & MD-11 software changes. 
1993-1995 Conceived, and developed the Landing Systems Provided unique capability to test Space Shuttle 
Research Aircraft on the CV-990 tires, wheels, brakes, blow-outs, and subsystems 
under severe loading and landing conditions. 
Allowed Shuttle cross-wind landing limits to be 
raised by 33 percent. 
1993-1995 Completely characterized the sonic boom Multi-altitude measurements by probe aircraft 
propagation from airplane to ground permitted assessment of prediction techniques of 
sonic boom propagation characteristics in the seal 
atmosphere. 
1994 Demonstrated flow visualization in-flight of 
planar laser-induced fluorescence for high 
Reynolds number at subsonic through super- 
sonic speeds on the F-104 Flight Test Fixture 
1994 Demonstrated in-flight indirect optical 
technique for high glide-slope approaches with 
no direct view of the airfield on the two-seat F- 
104 
Collected previously unavailable data for sonic 
transverse gas injection into crossflows from Mach 
numbers 0.8 to 2.0, including at Mach 1.0, that 
provided validation of analytical models of the 
same flow conditions. 
Validated indirect optics (non-TV) as a viable 
concept for piloted landings without direct view of 
the ground. Important for hypersonic vei~icles and 
possibly for the High Speed Civil Transport. 
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Photo archives at the Dryden Flight Research 
Center do not reveal the names of the photogra- 
phers for all the photographs used in this vol- 
ume, but the following photographers are 
credited with the photographs listed next to 
their namnes: 
J, Bean: pp. 26 top, 30-31, 81 top; J. Brohmer: 
pp. 77,97; B. Brown: pp. 33 bottom, 34, 101, 
168; Dutch Flager: p. 164 top; Hinson: p. 137 
top; D. Howard: pp. 142, 151: Mary Little 
Kuhl: pp viii, 22, 24 top right and left: T. 
Landis: pp. 83 top, 109, 112, 138 top, 162, 165, 
167; R Meyer: pp. 8-9, 147 bottom, 160; J. 
Ross: pp. 8, 33 top, 35, 37,76, 89,95, 102, 
103,104, 105, 106, 107, 125, 144, 153, 159, 
161, 166, 170, inside back cover; L. Sammons: 
pp. 27, 99 bottom, 156, 169; M. Smith: p. 100; 
D. Taylor: pp. 86, 114 top and bottom, 115, 
143, 146, 154; L. Teal: inside front cover and 
pp. 18, 128, 163; C. Thomas: pp. 4-5, 12,32, 83 
bottom, 93, 96, 113, 138 bottom: K. Wiersema: 
p. 83 center; B. Wood: facing p. 1, pp. 81, 146. 
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